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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Operation DESERT STORM was the first Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
experience for U.S. Forces. This experience will significantly influence TMD efforts in the 
near term. There was only one weapon (the Patriot PAC-II system) capable of engaging 
Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) during DESERT STORM." 
Theater Air Defense BMC4I Vision for Theater Missile Defense 
Air Combat Command Directorate for Requirements Aerospace Control Division 
1 October 1994 
"The USMC TBMD system will evolve from the Marine Corps' existing Tactical Air 
Operations Center (TAOC)/Sector Anti-Air Warfare Center (SAAWC), AN/TPS-59, and 
USMC High Altitude Will Kill (HAWK) missile system." 
Theater Missile Defense Command and Control Plan (DRAFT) 
11 April 1995 
A.   BACKGROUND 
This thesis provides the Marine Corps and other Department of Defense (DOD) 
activities with insight into three areas. First, through the use of an IDEF IX application, 
development of a detailed "As Is" model of the Marine Corps Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense (TBMD) architecture is provided.1 The "As Is" model is used as a tool to aid in the 
examination of the command and control structure, the information exchange, and the 
interoperability of the Marine Corps' High Altitude Will Kill (HAWK) missile system in 
relationship to Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Also, after its completion, the model assists 
in the analysis of the Marine Corps' TBMD system. The modeling of a complex collection 
of processes is an extremely difficult task.  To ensure the  goal of developing a reliable 
'This was accomplished by starting with the model constructed by Michael E. 
Lewis and David J. Steffens [Ref. 10]. 
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model is accomplished, is was necessary to determine which application tool would provide 
the best support. 
The IDEF IX modeling application was selected because it aids in the production of 
intricate diagrams, of extremely complex systems, which were previously unobtainable 
through conventional means. In the past, analysts and managers relied upon flow charts and 
tree diagrams to aid in the mapping and studying of an operational system and its processes. 
However, as the processes grew more complex and the operational systems became more 
technologically advanced, the ability of a flow chart and/or tree diagram to accurately portray 
a comprehensive picture diminished. With the development of the IDEF IX tools, the 
capabilities needed to model a system and its processes, down to the smallest detail, were 
attained. Once a model is completed, its thoroughness allows it to be used to further the 
study of the operational system and its processes through matrix analysis. 
Second, this thesis, through the use of matrix analysis, provides insight and guidance 
to a proposed 2002 "To Be" Marine Corps TBMD model. The matrices, individually, are 
not very helpful in the overall analysis because they represent a picture of specific areas of 
interest. However, when combined and taken as a whole, the matrices provide insight into 
the complete TBMD system. These areas of analysis are: Intelligence Data Flow, Battle 
Management Information Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information 
Support. Intelligence Data Flow examines the ability of the architecture to input, receive, 
process (fuse and correlate), store, display, and disseminate intelligence data on TBM 
operations. Specifically, the analysis provides information that allow answers to be 
developed concerning the flows between systems and their disconnects (who receives, who 
processes, and who uses the information/intelligence). Battle Management Information 
Architecture Cohesiveness explores the ability of the system to provide the decision makers 
with the appropriate information, in a timely fashion, and in an understandable format. More 
specifically, the analysis provides information, to the decision maker, on the data flow how 
it affects performance. Finally, Battle Management Information Support examines the 
TBMD system's ability to process, build, and maintain a situation display based on track 
data and point data received from local and remote sensors over data links from other 
agencies. Further, it looks at the TBMD system's ability to distribute the data required by 
the launchers and other appropriate command and control (C2) agencies. Specifically, this 
analysis provides information on the systems contained within the TMD architecture and 
their ability to adequately provide input and output of information and intelligence in a 
timely, efficient manner and their ability to provide that information and intelligence in a 
correct and usable format. 
Third, this thesis, through its use of models and matrices, provides a possible means 
for conducting successful analysis of IDEF IX models. Increasingly, over the past five 
years, the DOD has invested millions of dollars and thousands of man hours constructing 
models using IDEF IX tools [Ref. 9]. Unfortunately, these models, to the non-subject 
matter experts, are sometimes confusing and attention consist of no more than a cursory 
glance [Ref. 9]. Matrices, combined with an IDEF IX model provide the tools necessary to 
conduct an accurate matrix analysis. Matrix analysis is useful in the examination of complex 
or complicated operating systems. Examining the development of the matrices, and their 
relationship to the model, is one possible method of matrix analysis. 
B.        OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to define a seamless TBMD information architecture 
that can be supported by systems, operators, and available transmission mediums. This is 
done by modeling the existing TMD infrastructure (systems, information flow, inter- 
operability, activities, C2 facilities, etc.), using matrix analysis to identify areas of concern 
within the infrastructure, and developing a possible "To Be" architecture for Marine Corps' 
TBMD in the years proceeding 2002. Through the use of IDEF IX modeling, the responsi- 
bilities and transactions of all Marine Corps entities involved in the TMD process will be 
identified. The author uses the information from the model, the matrices, and the matrix 
analysis to facilitate the identification of current technologies and initiatives that best support 
critical roles in the proposed architecture. 
C.        ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters and six appendices. A bibliography is 
included to supplement the list of references and to provide the reader with resources for 
further research. The first chapter contains the introduction and overview of the thesis. The 
second chapter explores mitigating factors associated with building the "As Is" model and 
the matrices and conducting the analysis. The third chapter examines the function of the 
HAWK missile system, identifies discrepancies with the existing system, and proposes a 
possible infrastructure for a "To Be" TBMD architecture. All appendices of this thesis 
support Chapter III. Appendix A illustrates the existing Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD 
architecture. Appendix B illustrates the IDEF IX model developed to investigate processes, 
information flows, and interoperability of Marine Corps HAWK missile system within the 
context of TMD. Appendices C and D provide further insight into the IDEF IX model by 
providing comprehensive definitions of the activities, the inputs, the outputs, the controls, 
and the mechanisms. Appendix E contains an examination of the individual matrices, an 
analysis of each matrix, and the information the matrices provide. Appendix F illustrates the 
proposed architecture for the Marine Corps HAWK Missile system in the year 2002. 
Chapter IV provides information on the development and possible impact of technologies 
associated with the proposed "To Be" architecture. Chapter V is the thesis conclusion and 
contains recommendations for further research. 
II. MODELS AND MATRICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the existing Marine Corps Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense (TBMD) architecture and provide insight into a proposed "To Be" TBMD 
architecture for the year 2002, three conditions are satisfied. First, an IDEF model of the 
existing Marine Corps TBMD system is constructed. The model is necessary because it 
provides crucial insight into the command and control, information flows, and inter- 
operability of the combined Tactical Air Command Center (TACC)/Tactical Air Operations 
Center (TAOC)/Sector Anti-Air Warfare Center (SAAWC), AN/TPS-59, and HAWK 
systems. Second, using information from subject-matter experts and information from the 
IDEF model, matrices are constructed. The matrices, a total of fourteen, provide information 
that yield a more accurate understanding of the information contained in the model. Finally, 
using information from the IDEF model and the matrices, a thorough matrix analysis is 
conducted. This analysis is instrumental in identifying areas within the TBMD architecture 
that may be improved. 
B. IDEF IX MODEL 
It is important to note that the model presented in this thesis is not considered 
finished. The Marine Corps TBMD architecture is so dynamic and complex that any model 
constructed soon becomes outdated. The model presented in this thesis (Appendix B) 
provides the reader with a nucleus that will enable him/her to better visualize and 
comprehend the current TBMD process. 
1. Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD Model 
The author will construct the "As Is" Marine Corps TBMD model in three steps. 
First, a prior IDEF "As Is" model [Ref. 10], is used as a starting point. After consulting with 
subject matter experts at Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center 
(NCCOSC) and Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) [Ref. 5], a decision 
was to made to start with the existing model because it presented a good base of information 
and only needed restructuring and editing of the information flows to be considered 
complete. The process for restructuring the model is as follows: 
1. The existing model is examined (starting at the lowest levels and working up) 
to ensure that all arrows are traceable throughout every level. All arrows 
(inputs, outputs, controls or mechanisms) that were missing or deemed 
unnecessary to the new model were identified. 
2. All activities are examined to ensure they were correct and required. If an 
activity is insufficiently defined or not required in any way, it will be 
redefined or eliminated. The activities are also examined to ensure that 
correct inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms are present. If any arrows 
are missing or identified as being unnecessary, they will be identified. 
3. All levels are redrawn to show the changes that were identified. 
4. A subject-matter expert is consulted to ensure the correctness of the proposed 
changes. This is an important step because any mistakes made during 
reconstruction could lead to an improper analysis later on. 
5. Any and all corrections made by the subject-matter expert are incorporated 
into the drawings. 
6. The drawings are reexamined for correctness by the author and NCCOSC 
personnel before proceeding further. 
The second step in reconstructing the model is to develop an electronic version of the 
model by inputting the drawings into the computer. It was decided the this will be 
accomplished using the BPWin 1.5.1 modeling tool. Starting at the uppermost level and 
working down is the best way to ensure that all information flows track correctly throughout 
the model. BPWin allows the user to project down to the next level and, at the same time, 
project all the necessary arrows for the next lower level. It is necessary to go down seven 
levels in order to accurately depict the TBMD process. 
Once the model is stored electronically, the final step in reconstructing the model is 
to use BPWin to print out the Activity and Arrow names. The activity2 and arrow names are 
defined to provide the reader with a better understanding of the processes involved in 
conducting TBMD within the specified environment (i.e., HAWK Missile Battalion). 
2. Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD Architecture 
The Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture is constructed using information 
provided by subject-matter experts and information contained in research material [Refs. 5 
and 9]. 
BPWin is used for this application because of the program's flexibility and versatility 
in constructing DFD diagrams. 
3. Marine Corps "To Be" TBMD Architecture 
The Marine Corps "To Be" TBMD architecture is constructed using information 
provided by subject-matter experts, information contained in research material, and 
information provided by the matrix analysis [Refs. 5 and 9]. 
BPWins is used for this application because of the program's flexibility and 
versatility in constructing DFD diagrams. 
C.        MATRIX CONSTRUCTION 
The key to a successful analysis lies in the construction of the matrices. The best 
approach is to build matrices that lead back to the model. However, the model alone does 
not provide enough information with which to construct the matrices. The first step, 
therefore, is to consult with outside sources to help shape and define the boundaries of the 
analysis. The model does not provide answers about how to construct the matrices. Rather, 
the matrices are constructed in such a fashion as to provide insight about, and into, the 
information contained in the model. 
After consulting with NCCOSC and MCCDC, three areas of concern were identified 
[Refs. 5, 9, and 13]. They are: Intelligence Data Flow, Battle Management Information 
Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information Support. The author chose 
2The Activities definitions are still under construction as noted in Appendix C. 
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to use a hierarchical approach to build the matrices. Each matrix, in some way, contributes 
to the construction or analysis of another matrix. This procedure is followed until a series 
of matrices are constructed that enabled the three areas of concern to be adequately covered. 
The construction of the matrices started with the most general areas first; C2 Facility 
to Activity, Intelligence to Activity, Equipment to C2 Facility, Equipment to Communication 
Type, Outputs to C2 Facility, and Outputs to Equipment. These matrices provide needed 
information to construct more in-depth matrices. Also, these matrices present a general view 
of the information contained in the model. Next, the information from the first set of 
matrices is used to construct a second set of matrices that further address the areas of concern 
defined earlier. The matrices include: Intelligence to Equipment, Intelligence to Communi- 
cation Type, Communication Type to C2 Facility, and Intelligence to C2 Facility. These 
matrices present a more concise view of what the model has to offer. However, the two sets 
of matrices, even when combined, do not accurately portray the model in terms needed to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis. 
A final set of matrices are needed to accomplish this task. This set of matrices are 
more difficult to construct. Not only do they contain information from the first two sets of 
matrices, they are also constructed in such a fashion as to depict two two-dimensional views 
within one matrix. The matrices constructed include: Equipment to TACC-Communication 
Type-TAOC, Equipment to TAOC-Communication Type-BCP, Intelligence to TACC- 
Equipment-TAOC, and Intelligence to TAOC-Equipment-BCP. This final set of matrices, 
when combined with the first two sets of matrices, are enough to accurately portray the 
model. They also provide the author with enough information about the model to ensure a 
thorough analysis is conducted. 
D.        MATRIX ANALYSIS 
It is important to note that one purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that matrix 
analysis can be assimilated into the modeling process to help facilitate the understanding of 
difficult conceptual models. In this particular instance, the analysis aids in reinforcing 
defined areas of concern addressed before matrix construction was attempted. 
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Once the model and the matrices are constructed, the final step is to do the matrix 
analysis. The first step is to identify which areas of concern each matrix or combination of 
matrices addressed. Next, the matrices are grouped to ensure that all possible combinations 
have been identified. Once this is completed, the matrices and model are used during 
analysis. 
There is no right or wrong way of doing an analysis. The process is dictated by the 
information available and the information sought. In this case, the procedure is simple. The 
IDEF model depicted the Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture accurately enough to 
provide assistance in building the matrices. The matrices are built after defining the 
boundaries the author wants to explore. The information available is contained in the model 
and matrices previously identified. The information sought will be addressed after the matrix 
boundaries are defined. The analysis process proceeds along the same direction. 
E.        CONCLUSION 
Once again it is important to note that the building of a model does not necessarily 
provide enough information about a system or process to be effective. The information 
contained in the model represents the processes and does provide information concerning 
equipment or information flow. To present a complete, comprehensive view of a system or 
process, such as TBMD, a combination of a model, matrices, and matrix analysis is needed. 
The matrices and matrix analysis provide that missing information on systems and 
information flow that is not apparent in the model. The model must present an accurate 
picture of what is happening within a system or process. Once developed, it must be 
carefully reviewed by a subject-matter expert to ensure both completeness and correctness. 
The next step, when undertaking a project of this nature, is to construct the matrices. The 
information required for construction of the matrices, once again, is not found within the 
model. The model only represents the processes, it does not provide information on where 
the disconnects might be or where a problem might arise. That information is obtained from 
subject-matter experts. Once the boundaries of the analysis are defined, the matrices can be 
constructed. Note, however, that the matrices must be fashioned in such a way as to lead 
back to the model. This is important because the structure of the matrices provides for 
questions of who, what, why, and when and the information in the model provides the 
answers. The matrices must be structured precisely in order to address the boundaries used 
to defined the analysis. The matrix analysis is the last step in presenting a complete, 
comprehensive view of a system or process. This is the most arduous facet of the three. 
However, if the first two steps are accomplished well, the analysis is more labor intensive 
then it is mentally challenging. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
In joint operations, the Marine Corps component commander is responsible to the 
Joint Force Commander (JFC) for the Marine Corps' Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) operations within the assigned Area of Operations (AO). TMD for 
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is normally delegated to the Aviation Combat 
Element (ACE) Commander. The ACE Commander further delegates authority for MAGTF 
TMD attack and active defense operations within the MAGTF 's AO to the Sector Anti-air 
Warfare Coordinator/Tactical Air Operations Center (SAAWC/TAOC). The Marine Corps 
Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) AN/TPS-59 radar provides surveillance, early 
warning, and queuing for the MAGTF. The AN/TPS-59 is also an integral asset to the High 
Altitude Will Kill (HAWK) Missile Battalion. 
The HAWK is the Marine Corps' primary AAW/TMD weapon. It can operate as a 
stand-alone system or it can be integrated with other existing air defense platforms such as 
the Army's PATRIOT Battery or the Navy's AEGIS SM-2. Over the years the HAWK has 
been upgraded repeatedly to defend against increasingly sophisticated threats. It has also 
been programmed for upgrades so that it remains a contributing participant in TMD 
operations. However, even with the best technology in place, TMD is still not being 
performed in the most effective manner in the author's opinion. 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is an integral part of the Marine Corps Information 
Architecture. The Marine Corps Information Architecture must be defined and analyzed 
using reference points and methodologies that ensure that TMD is fully integrated and 
supported by the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command, Control, 
Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) architecture. 
This analysis is a two phase operation. The first phase consists of examining the 
Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture through IDEF modeling. Initial emphasis is 
placed on the determination of the "As Is" environment's strengths and weaknesses within 
the contexts of the areas of concern. These concerns are identified in Chapter II. Analysis 
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of the "As Is" architecture is accomplished through the construction of matrices that relate 
such areas as equipment, intelligence, activities, and C2 Facilities to support the analysis. 
The matrices, when combined and then coupled with an IDEF IX model, provide a clear 
picture of the TBMD architecture. The second phase of this analysis is to form a 
recommended "To Be" architecture. The "To Be" environment is a projection for the years 
1996 to 2002. Presently, systems and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) are already under 
development for this environment. Therefore, the analysis provides insight into the ability 
of the proposed systems and CONOPS to support the Marine Corps' objective of seamlessly 
integrating the TBMD architecture into the MAGTF C4I Architecture and providing 
effective and efficient missile defense. 
B.        INTELLIGENCE DATA FLOW 
Intelligence Data Flow is the ability to input, receive, process (fuse and correlate), 
store, display, and disseminate intelligence data on Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) 
operations to permit friendly counter-operations, maneuver, and resource allocation within 
the enemy's decision and action cycle [Ref. 9]. This analysis provides information that will 
allow answers to be developed concerning the flows between systems and their disconnects. 
Specifically, the ability of the information architecture to provide the following: 
1. Information 
This analysis does not concentrate entirely on the type of information received by C2 
Facilities. More effort is spent examining how and in what form the information is received. 
Questions such as, "Is the system capable of properly communicating information?" and 
"Are there problems within the system that hinder information flow?", are used as the basis 
for the analysis. Specific matrices explore different aspects of these questions. 
• Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY, demonstrates the level of 
intelligence used by the C2 Facilities in the TBMD system. 
• Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, examines the possible 
dilemmas in information flow within the TBMD system. The areas of 
concern are efficiency, formatting, processing, and decision making. 
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• Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, demonstrates the level of 
information that flows into, and out of, C2 Facilities. The matrix also 
addresses the concern of timely, accurate communications between C2 
Facilities. 
• Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the problems of communication (i.e., timeliness, efficiency, and information 
accuracy) in a inter-facility environment. 
• Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
11, but at the TAOC to BCP level. 
• Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, examines 
how information and its effects on decision making in a inter-facility 
environment. 
• Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13, but at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning how and in what form 
information is received. It is not until the information in the matrices is combined that a 
complete picture can be presented. The matrices help identify that there is a problem with 
the format in which information is received. Matrix 7, combined with Matrix 3 and Matrix 
6, illustrates the problem. The matrices show that information (IPBDB Info) received by the 
TAOC (SAAWC) can be received with five separate pieces of equipment. The matrices also 
show that the information, once received, can be displayed on five different pieces of 
equipment. Furthermore, the matrices indicate that information then has to be processed 
(correlated) and transmitted out of the TAOC (SAAWC) on one of three possible systems. 
The choice of what system is used is determined by which C2 Facility the information is 
received from and which C2 Facility the processed information is going to. The entire 
system does not lend itself to effective information flow into or out of the C2 Facility. 
Another example is presented by Matrix 13. When the information from this matrix 
is combined with information from Matrix 3, Matrix 4, and Matrix 7, an information flow 
problem is identified. In the example, Threat Capabilities are transmitted from the TACC 
to the TAOC.   The TAOC processes the information and transmits it out to other C2 
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Facilities. The matrices identify the equipment that can be used to transmit, receive, process, 
and display the information. Even under perfect conditions, using the LAN/WAN to 
communicate intelligence, the TACC and TAOC still encounter problems displaying the 
information received. The flow of information is interrupted because information has to be 
displayed by a separate type of equipment. The use of the LAN/WAN is a best case 
scenario, if another type of equipment is substituted to facilitate communications, the results 
would be even further compounded. 
2. C2 Facility 
The analysis concentrates on the flow of intelligence to the C2 Facilities. Areas of 
interest are: how information is communicated to the C2 Facilities, how information is used 
by the C2 Facilities once it is received, and how information is handled once it is received 
by a C2 Facility. Questions like, "In terms of information flow, what capabilities does a C2 
Facility have?" and "Are C2 Facilities receiving the information they need to complete the 
mission?", are used to assist in the analysis. Specific matrices explore different aspects of 
these questions. 
• Matrix 1, C2 FACILITY TO ACTIVITY, indicates the level of involvement 
of C2 Facilities throughout the TBMD process. 
• Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, indicates the level of 
intelligence used throughout the TBMD process. Combined with Matrix 2, 
it demonstrates the level of intelligence used by the C2 Facilities in the 
TBMD system. 
• Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, demonstrates the ability of the 
C2 Facility to receive, transmit, process, display or do all of the above, in 
terms of capabilities. 
• Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, indicates the amount of 
intelligence the C2 Facility will handle in carrying out its mission. Also, 
demonstrates the capabilities of the C2 Facility concerning information flow. 
• Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, when combined with Matrix 1, 
reenforces the idea of a high level of information flow to and from the C2 
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Facilities.     The  matrix  also   indicates  the   importance   of effective 
communication between C2 Facilities. 
• Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the ability of the C2 Facility to receive, transmit, process, display or all of the 
above on a specific level. 
• Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 11 
at the TAOC to BCP level. 
• Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, indicates 
which C2 Facility, specifically the TACC or TAOC, uses what intelligence. 
The matrix also examines the C2 Facility's capability in handling information 
at that specific level. 
• Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning how information is 
communicated to and used by C2 Facilities. It is not until the matrices are combined that a 
complete picture can be presented. The matrices aid in the identification of a problem with 
how the information is received and in what format the information is received. The 
matrices do not identify any direct problems associated with C2 Facilities' capabilities. 
However, the matrices do indicate that the problems with receiving information at C2 
Facilities were equipment related. These problems, in turn, do affect the use of the 
information received. 
As discussed earlier, the C2 Facilities have difficulty handling information because 
the different types of equipment employed at each facility dictate how and in what format 
the information is received. This, in turn, leads to problems of information incompatibilities. 
Information received in one format could not be easily correlated with information of another 
format. This, in turn, hindered effective communication because valuable time is lost in 
displaying and processing the information. Matrix 3, combined with Matrix 9, illustrates an 
example of this problem. 
15 
From Matrix 9, Target Information is transmitted by both the TAOC (SWD) and the 
TAOC(SAAWC). That information is received, displayed and processed by the ACE 
Battlestaff (COS) and the HAWK (TCO). The HAWK (TCO) also transmits Target 
Information to the ACE Battlestaff (COS). From Matrix 3, The TAOC (SWD and SAAWC) 
can transmit the information, in this case, using three different pieces of equipment. 
However, within the HAWK (TCO) and the ACE Battlestaff (COS) only one of those three 
types of equipment can process the information once it is received. More importantly, none 
of the three pieces of equipment in the HAWK (TCO) or ACE Battlestaff (COS) can display 
the information. It has to be done manually. The same scenario is apparent when viewing 
information passed between the HAWK (TCO) and the ACE Battlestaff (COS). This is a 
clear indication of inefficient communications. Time is wasted manually converting 
information for display purposes. Also, depending on the equipment used, there is wasted 
processing time associated with the use of different types of equipment. 
3. Equipment 
This analysis focuses on the equipment's capability in terms of information flow. 
The main concern of this analysis is equipment adequacy. Questions like, "Does the 
equipment perform the necessary functions for the C2 Facility to operate?" and "What effect 
does equipment have on information flow?", are used as a foundation on which to build the 
analysis. Specific matrices explore different aspects of these questions. 
Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, indicates how the equipment is 
used to handle information within the C2 Facility. 
Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates dilemmas 
associated with equipment and information flow (i.e., efficiency problems, 
processing problems, and decision making problems). 
Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the problems that 
may arise when communicating information over more than one type of 
equipment (i.e., time consuming and ineffectiveness). 
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• Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, indicates 
whether equipment supports the mission of the C2 Facility, in the context of 
the TACC and the TAOC. 
• Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning equipment adequacy. It 
is not until the matrices are combined that a complete picture can be presented. The matrices 
assist the identification of problems with the equipment. The problem is communicating 
information over different types of equipment. This has previously been identified and 
documented when addressing the C2 Facilities. However, what was not discussed was the 
equipment's capabilities. Matrix 13 explores the question and sheds some light on 
equipment capabilities. The analysis provided in Matrix 13 also raises the issue of 
underutilized equipment. 
Matrix 13, along with information from Matrix 3, establishes that the TACC has 
within its boundaries the entire ACE Battlestaff, the JFC (Political Advisor), the JTF 
Commander, and the ACE Commander. With these commands come almost every piece of 
communications equipment in the TBMD architecture. However, these systems are not 
being used to their fullest advantage. The same can be said for the TAOC. Even though the 
S AAWC is the only command within the TAOC receiving Report (ESM) information from 
the TACC, it is not using its TADIL capabilities to their fullest extent. Both of these 
examples demonstrate the lack of cohesion between C2 Facilities necessary to communicate 
information in a timely, efficient, adequate manner. 
4. Usefulness 
This analysis concentrates on what happens to information once a C2 Facility 
receives it. This focuses on information adequacy and the effects of poor communication. 
Questions such as, "Is information being received in a useable format?", "Is multi- 
intelligence data being processed in a timely manner?" and "What happens to information 
once it is received?", are used to facilitate the analysis. Specific matrices explore different 




Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, demonstrates how C2 
Facilities are using intelligence once it is received. 
Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, indicates the format 
information is received in and its usefulness. 
Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, demonstrates how information is 
used once it is received. 
Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TACC, indicates a 
problem with receiving information in a timely manner at the TACC to 
TAOC level and with correlation of said information once it is received. This 
matrix also examines whether or not information received is in a format 
favorable to effective decision making. 
Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices help to identify the problem with information 
adequacy. The problem, however, does not lie with information. On the contrary, as 
established in the examination of C2 Facility, the problem is associated with the equipment 
types used to communicate information. This fact is well established and was documented 
also in the equipment analysis. Matrix 14, combined with information contained in Matrix 
3, Matrix 4, and Matrix 7, illustrates another example of the problem. 
Threat Capabilities, is transmitted by the TAOC and received by the BCP. It is also 
apparent (because the pieces of equipment are present at both facilities) that the information 
will be transmitted and received by one of three pieces of equipment, LAN/WAN, Tactical 
Modem or Tactical Radio. In this instance the best choice is the LAN/WAN because of its 
capabilities. Now, Matrix 3, shows that the HAWK (TCO), which is the C2 Facility for the 
BCP, only receives, transmits and processes information via the LAN/WAN. This means 
that the LAN/WAN, even though it is capable, cannot be used to display the intelligence in 
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the BCP. The only display capability at the BCP is through equipment inherent to the BCP 
or through manual means. This illustrates the problem of a C2 Facility forced to spend time 
manually displaying information because the equipment's inability to communicate 
information in a useful format and with an infrastructure that allows a variety of different 
hardware to integrate the flow and use of data. 
C.        BATTLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE 
COHESIVENESS 
Battle Management Information Architecture Cohesiveness is the ability of the 
decision maker to receive the appropriate information, in time to act on it, and in the format 
required for understanding. More specifically, the analysis concentrates on the flow of 
information to and from the C2 Facilities and how it affects their performance. The analysis 
will explore: 
1. Timeliness 
This analysis concentrates on the timeliness in which information is transmitted or 
received. The key point is whether the information is received in a timely manner. The 
question, "Is the information communicated in a timely manner?", is used as a building block 
for the analysis. Specific matrices explore different aspects of these question. For example: 
• Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY, is the first indicator that there 
may be a problem receiving information in a timely manner. 
• Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, indicates that timeliness may be 
a problem when receiving information. 
• Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, reenforces the importance 
of information within the C2 Facilities. The matrix also reiterates the idea of 
timely, accurate communication between C2 Facilities. 
• Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, addresses the concern of timely, 
accurate communications between C2 Facilities. 
• Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, indicates the problem of timeliness 
due to communications over multiple types of equipment. 
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• Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the problems of communication (i.e., timeliness, efficiency, and information 
accuracy) in a inter-facility environment. 
• Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
11, but at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices help to identify the problem of getting information 
to the C2 Facility in a timely fashion. Almost every matrix portrays the message of the 
importance of timely information flows to aid in decision making and efficient communi- 
cations. However, the best and most concise example is illustrated in Matrix 9. 
Matrix 9 indicates that Target Information is transmitted by both the TAOC (SWD) 
and the TAOC(SAAWC). That information is received, displayed and processed by the 
ACE Battlestaff (COS) and the HAWK (TCO). The HAWK (TCO) also transmits Target 
Information to the ACE Battlestaff (COS). The TAOC transmits Target Information to the 
HAWK Battalion which receives, displays and processes the information. The HAWK 
Battalion, once they have correlated the data, then transmits their Target Information to the 
ACE Battlestaff. The ACE Battlestaff receives the Target Information from both the TAOC 
and the HAWK Battalion and uses the information to monitor the situation. In this instance, 
the HAWK (TCO) cannot react to a track very well if the TAOC does not identify, to them, 
the presence of a possible target and the classification of the target. This demonstrates the 
need for timely, accurate communications between C2 Facilities. This is also a prime 
example of the importance of information flow within the TBMD system. 
2. Format 
This analysis focuses on the receipt format. The area of interest is whether the C2 
Facility's decision making ability is assisted or impeded by the information it receives. The 
question, "Is the information received in a correct and useable format?", is used as an 
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example of topics on which the analysis should concentrate.   Specific matrices explore 
different aspects of these question. 
• Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the format 
information is received in and its usefulness. 
• Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, addresses the problems associated 
with communicating via several types of equipment, in terms of format. 
• Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the format problems associated with communicating information in a inter- 
facility environment. 
• Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
11, but at the TAOC to BCP level. 
• Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TACC, indicates a 
problem with receiving information in a timely manner at the TACC to 
TAOC level and with correlation of said information once it is received. This 
matrix also examines whether or not information received is in a format 
conducive to effective decision making. 
• Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices aid in the identification of the problems associated 
with receiving information in the wrong (wrong being defined as not readily adaptable to a 
type of equipment for the purpose of processing, displaying, or transmitting) format and how 
it affects decision making. Matrix 12, combined with information contained in Matrix 3, 
Matrix 4, Matrix 6, Matrix 7, and Matrix 11, illustrates the importance of receiving 
information in the correct format. The matrix also amplifies the problems associated with 
receiving information in the wrong format. 
Matrix 12 demonstrates that Track (AN/TPS-59 Data) intelligence can be received 
by the BCP from four separate TAOC commands, over five separate pieces of equipment. 
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Over those four pieces of equipment, it is possible that the information could be received 
using one of two communication types. Track (AN/TPS-59 Data) information, being 
transmitted in five different formats, using two communication types and being displayed 
on three possible mediums, has to be correlated and processed. If that were not enough, the 
processed information has to be broken down (transformed) and transmitted out of the BCP 
to the proper C2 Facilities in the appropriate format. This is a representation of formatting 
problems leading to efficiency problems, formatting problems, processing problems, and 
ultimately, decision making problems. 
3. Adequacy 
This analysis concentrates on information adequacy in terms of decision making 
capabilities. The focus here is in determining if the C2 Facilities are receiving information 
in a format adequate for making decisions. The question, "Does the format and timeliness 
of information effect its adequacy?", is a starting point for the analysis. Specific matrices 
explore different aspects of these question. 
Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, indicates that timeliness may be 
a problem when receiving information. It also indicates a problem with the 
communications system in the decision making process. 
• Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the format 
information is received in and its usefulness. Also, indicates problems 
associated with decision making. 
Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, addresses the concern of timely, 
accurate communications between C2 Facilities. 
Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, indicates the problem of timeliness 
due to communications over multiple types of equipment and its effect on 
decision making. 
Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the format problems associated with communicating information in an inter- 
facility environment. It also demonstrates the effects of format problems on 
information adequacy and on the decision making process. 
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Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
11, but at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TACC, indicates a 
problem with receiving information in a timely manner at the TACC to 
TAOC level and with correlation of said information once it is received. This 
matrix also examines whether or not information received is in a format 
conducive to effective decision making. 
Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices help to identify if the information received is 
adequate enough to make mission critical decisions. Adequacy, in this sense, refers to the 
timeliness and format of the information received. Both timeliness and format have been 
addressed previously. It is apparent from the analysis previously conducted that the 
information being received by the C2 Facilities is not adequate in terms of efficient decision 
making. This conclusion is best illustrated by Matrix 11, matrix 12, matrix 13, and matrix 
42. All four matrices examine the flow of information, equipment, and their effect on the 
decision making process in terms of timeliness, efficiency, and adequacy. 
D.        BATTLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SUPPORT 
Battle Management Information Support is the ability to process, build, and maintain 
a situation display based on track data and point data received from local and remote sensors 
over data links from other agencies. Also, it is the TBMD system's ability to distribute the 
data required by the launchers and other appropriate C2 Facilities. More specifically, it is 
the ability of equipment to provide the following: 
1. Mission Support 
This analysis concentrates on the equipment's support of the mission. The focus is 
on whether equipment, located in the C2 Facilities, expedites or impedes the decision making 
process.    The questions, "Is information communicated effectively to and from C2 
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Facilities?" and "Does equipment provide the capabilities necessary to support the decision 
making process?", are used as the basis for this analysis. Specific matrices explore different 
aspects of these question. 
• Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, indicates that timeliness may be 
a problem when receiving information. It also indicates a problem with the 
communications system in the decision making process. 
• Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the format in 
which information is received and its usefulness. Also, indicates problems 
associated with decision making. 
• Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, indicates the problem of timeliness 
due to communications over multiple types of equipment and its effect on 
decision making. 
• Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
format problems associated with communicating information in a inter- 
facility environment. Also demonstrates the effects of format problems on 
information adequacy and on the decision making process. 
• Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 11 
at the TAOC to BCP level. 
• Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, indicates a 
problem with receiving information in a timely manner at the TACC to 
TAOC level and with correlation of said information once it is received. This 
matrix also examines whether or not information received is in a format 
conducive to effective decision making. 
• Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
14 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices aid in the identification the problem of equipment 
impeding decision making and, thereby, impairing mission support. Matrix 7, combined 
with information from Matrix 3 and Matrix 6, is a prime example of the problem. Matrix 7 
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demonstrates that IPBDB Info is received by the TAOC (SAAWC) from a possible seven 
separate C2 Facilities, over five separate pieces of equipment. This information, in five 
different formats and being displayed on five separate mediums, has to be correlated and 
processed. If that is not enough, then the processed information has to be broken down and 
transmitted out of the TAOC (SAAWC) to the proper C2 Facilities in the appropriate format. 
This is a representation of efficiency problems, formatting problems, processing problems, 
and ultimately, decision making problems. 
2. Adequate Capabilities 
This analysis concentrates on the equipment used within the TBMD system. The 
focus is centered around the equipment's abilities. Questions like, "Is there system 
redundancy?" and "Are there too many different types of equipment being used?", aid in the 
analysis. 
Specific matrices explore different aspects of these question. 
Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, indicates the capabilities of the 
equipment within the C2 Facilities. The matrix also explores the possibility 
of system redundancy. 
Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, depicts the 
different classes of communication utilized by the different types of 
equipment. The matrix also examines equipment redundancy. 
Matrix 5, COMMUNICATION TYPE TO C2 FACILITY, depicts the 
different classes of communication used by C2 Facilities. It also supports the 
idea of system redundancy. 
Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the redundancy 
of equipment and the associated problems affecting the flow of information. 
The matrix also demonstrates the need to minimize the amount of equipment 
employed in the TBMD system. 
Matrix 8, INTELLIGENCE TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, demonstrates 
the different classes of communication associated with intelligence. The 
matrix also examines the existence of equipment redundancy. Finally, the 
matrix demonstrates the need to reduce the number of equipment types. 
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Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the existence of 
equipment redundancy. The matrix also examines the problems associated 
with communicating information over more than one type of equipment. 
Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC, demonstrates 
the communication problems associated with equipment. The matrix also 
indicate the presence of equipment redundancy within the C2 Facilities. The 
matrix, further, examines the issue of not exploiting equipments full capabil- 
ities. 
Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, mirrors Matrix 11 
at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, demonstrates 
the equipment's ability to support the mission. The matrix also examines the 
issue of equipment capabilities not being available at all C2 Facilities. 
Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, mirrors Matrix 
13 at the TAOC to BCP level. 
Each matrix tells a portion of the overall story concerning what happens to 
information once it is received. It is not until the matrices are combined that a complete 
picture can be presented. The matrices help to identify problems with the communications 
equipment used in the TBMD system. There are problems of equipment redundancy in the 
TBMD system, equipment capabilities not being exploited by C2 facilities, and excessive 
types of equipment were employed within C2 Facilities. Matrix 13, combined with informa- 
tion contained in Matrix 3 and Matrix 6, best illustrates the problems of system redundancy 
and excessive types of equipment being deployed at C2 Facilities. The matrix shows that 
Report (ESM) data is transmitted to the TACC from five different C2 facilities, over three 
possible types of equipment. The matrix then indicates that information is processed and 
displayed, in almost all instances, by different types of equipment within the TACC. The 
matrix goes on to show that different commands, within the TACC, process and display the 
Report (ESM) data on one of four different types of equipment. Next, the matrix examines 
the role of the TAOC. The matrix shows that once information is processed (correlated and 
or fused) at the TACC, it is transmitted to the TAOC via one of three types of equipment. 
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Finally, the matrix indicates that the information, at the TAOC, is also displayed and 
processed on one of seven different types of equipment. 
However, this is not all that the matrix illustrates. The matrix also examines the 
problem of equipment capabilities not being totally exploited by C2 Facilities. Matrix 13 
explains that the TACC has within its boundaries the entire ACE Battlestaff, the JFC 
(Political Advisor), the JTF Commander, and the ACE Commander. With these commands, 
come almost every piece of communications equipment in the TBMD architecture. 
However, these systems are not being used to their fullest advantage. Different types of 
equipment possess different capabilities within the confines of their respective C2 Facilities. 
For example, the ACE Battlestaff (COS) has TADIL A and TADIL B equipment, but the 
capabilities are limited to display and process only. The same holds true for the TAOC. 
Even though the SAAWC is the only command within the TAOC receiving Report (ESM) 
information from the TACC, it is not using its TADIL A and TADIL B capabilities to their 
fullest extent. 
E.        CONCLUSION 
The current Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture was developed to meet the 
need for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) identified during the Persian Gulf War. It was 
crucial to establish an architecture that would deal with the problems associated with 
MAGTF operation against an enemy with Theater Missile capabilities. Once an initial 
system was in place, opportunity existed to go back and refine the system to meet the needs 
of the Marine Corps. However, first, a TBMD system had to be in place, even if it meant 
initializing a system that was inadequate. 
The first phase of the analysis examines the "As Is" TBMD architecture and identifies 
its strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths lie in the foundation of the HAWK Missile 
System. However, the main concern of this analysis is to identify the weaknesses of the 
architecture as they relate to Intelligence Data Flow, Battle Management Information 
Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information Support. 
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The "As Is" model displays a unique configuration of communications types that link 
many different components. Within the entire process of identifying, tracking, and 
launching, there is no "one" function that is more critical than any other function. All the 
components have to be involved for a missile shoot to be successful. The problem is that 
although the entities are connected and have communications capabilities, those capabilities 
are often times inadequate. The first deficiency is that most of the communications 
equipment located in the C2 Facilities is not being fully exploited. The capabilities available 
with each type of equipment are not being utilized to their fullest potential. Information is 
not getting to the people that need it to make decisions in a timely, efficient manner. The 
second deficiency is that the information being passed between the entities does not enable 
quick decision making. An aircraft tracking an inbound ABT on its display must radio that 
information to the TAOC. The TAOC, who receives the information manually (voice to 
written), must then check the information against the AN/TPS-59, CWAR or PAR radar 
displays to ensure the track is being picked up. Then the information must be converted 
again (manually) before it can be radioed to the BCP. This process, often times more 
intricate, is repeated over and over for each different track. The final deficiency is that the 
information, once received, is not in the correct format. An example would be the TAOC 
receiving a combination of digital radar displays, voice communications from aircraft, and 
internally generated manual reports and then trying to correlate the information to make a 
launch decision. The Marine Corps found out during the Persian Gulf War that this process 
took too much time. A solution is needed that will allow for the timely transmission of 
correlated information in a usable format. 
The second phase of the analysis is two-fold. First, make a recommendation for a 
Marine Corps "To Be" TBMD architecture. The proposed "To Be" architecture is contained 
in Appendix F. Recommended changes to the physical environment of the "As Is" 
architecture are not drastic. However, some recommendations that are not addressed in 
Appendix F are: improvement of existing systems capabilities within the C2 Facilities to 
facilitate efficient communications throughout the TBMD environment and the reduction of 
the number of redundant system within the TBMD arena. 
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Second, examine the systems already under development for the "To Be" 
environment and address their ability to support the Marine Corps' objective of seamlessly 
integrating the TBMD architecture into the MAGTF C4I Architecture and providing 
effective and efficient missile defense. Some of the systems under development, that will 
be addressed in Chapter IV, are: the development of an Air Defense Communications 
Platform (ADCP) to facilitate communications and information flow between the TAOC and 
the BCP, the development of a Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (SAAWC) Operations 
Facility (SOF) to be located within the TAOC, the development of the Tactical Digital 
Information Link J (TADIL J) to facilitate communications internally and externally within 
the TBMD environment, improvements to the AN/TPS-59 radar to enable a wider coverage 
of the MAGTF's area of responsibility, and improvements in the capabilities of the HAWK 
Missile system to include Ballistic Missile Defense. 
The key to the analysis of the Marine Corps TBMD Architecture is to remember that 
the physical environment of the architecture is very dynamic and suggested changes to that 
physical environment or in a particular technology are forecasts of what that future might 
bring. In the context of TBMD, nothing is certain. As this is written, the possibility exists 
that the Marine Corps' role in TMD could be diminished drastically [Ref. 9]. 
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IV. INITIATIVES AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As identified in Chapter III, there are opportunities for improvement in the Marine 
Corps "As Is" TBMD model in the following areas: Intelligence Data Flow, Battle 
Management Information Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information 
Support. The Marine Corps has undertaken several initiatives to enhance the structure of the 
"As Is" TBMD environment. This chapter examines those initiatives, their capabilities, and 
their ability to alleviate the deficiencies identified in Chapter III. The initiatives examined 
fall into three separate categories. First, there are improvements to the HAWK Missile 
System and the AN/TPS-59 Radar. These are improvements to existing technology. The 
development of these two system enhancements address problems associated with communi- 
cations and interoperability. Their implementation has little effect on the physical makeup 
of the TBMD architecture. Second, there are enhancements to the Tactical Air Operations 
Center (TAOC) and the Battery Command Post (BCP). These are additions to the existing 
physical architecture. These changes address the communications and information flow. 
Also, these changes will have a direct effect on how the proposed "To Be" TBMD 
architecture will be laid out. Finally, there is the acquisition of the Tactical Digital 
Information Link J (TADIL J). This is a new technology. The system, TADIL J, directly 
addresses the problems associated with communications (i.e., timeliness, efficiency, and 
decision making abilities). This technology also has a significant effect on the physical 
layout of the Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture (Appendix F, Figure F.l). 
B. USMC TBMD SYSTEM WITH HAWK AND AN/TPS-59 IMPROVEMENTS 
The USMC TBMD system has evolved from the Marine Corps' existing 
TAOC/SAAWC, AN/TPS-59, and USMC HAWK Missile System. Upgrades to the HAWK 
Missile environment will provide the Marine Corps with short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) capabilities and limited medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities. The 
TBMD environment will retain its inherent capabilities to integrate an array of air defense 
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systems designed to counter air breathing targets (ABTs) and cruise missiles. The 
nonorganic sensors and processors will also retain its ability to detect and track long-range 
missiles. The TMD system will interoperate with THAAD, PATRIOT, and Navy TBMD 
systems as a part of an integrated TMD family of systems (FOS). 
1.        High Altitude Will Kill (HAWK) Missile System 
The HAWK Missile System is a mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, air defense 
system that plays a key role in defending Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) during 
amphibious assaults, forced entry operations, and other assigned missions. The HAWK 
system can operate as a stand-alone system or can be integrated with other existing air 
defenses systems such as the Army's PATRIOT or the Navy's AEGIS Standard Missile-2 
(SM-2). 
Salient HAWK features are 360 degree surveillance, interceptor guidance by a 
separate fire control radar (FCR), and the ability to engage multiple targets with or without 
human control. The HAWK Launcher contains three HAWK missiles and can be located 
remotely from the radar and other equipment. The HAWK system has been repeatedly 
upgraded to defeat increasingly sophisticated threats and is programmed for additional 
upgrades so that it can remain a contributing participant in TMD operations. 
Planned improvements that will enhance TMD effectiveness include the following: 
• Converting to a digital interface between the launcher and missile. 
• Upgrading the launcher train and elevation mechanism to reduce the 
precommit timeline. 
• Improving the launcher to allow movement with full weapons load (three 
ready-to-fire HAWK missiles or up to eight alternative missile types). 
• 
• 
Reducing set-up and tear-down times. 
Improving the missile warhead to increase lethality against TBMs. 
Adding the Air Defense Communications Platform. 
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Other enhancements under consideration include incorporating BCP functions into 
the ADCP and adding TBMD C3I functions to the TAOC (TAOM). Also, communication 
enhancements include early warning enhancements to the theater and the joint data network 
capabilities and initial capabilities of the joint fire control network to the theater and joint 
data network. These enhancements increase communications and provide improved early 
warning to theater, joint data networks, and the joint fire control network. 
2. AN/TPS-59 Radar 
The An/TPS-59 is a solid-state radar with a phased array antenna. The antenna 
electronically scans in elevation while continuously rotating in azimuth to provide real-time 
three dimensional data on all objects within the specified surveillance volume and time 
frame. The radar provides a maximum surveillance volume of 4 to 30 nautical miles in 
range, 0 to 19 degrees in elevation, 100,000 feet in altitude, and 360 degrees in azimuth. The 
radar's operating frequency is in the 1215 to 1400 megahertz frequency (L-band). It 
provides air breathing target (ABT) and theater ballistic missile (TBM) target cueing data 
to HAWK, other theater sensors, and weapon systems, but is not currently designed to accept 
cueing. 
The AN/TPS-59 radar is being upgraded to provide long-range, high-altitude 
surveillance and tracking of TBMs. The AN/TPS-59 will provide target cueing data to 
HAWK and other theater sensors and weapons systems and will be modified to accept 
cueing. Planned enhancements to the AN/TPS-59 radar will improve range performance 
with small targets, increase data processing speed and capacity, and provide direct 
communication links with other sensors and theater dat networks. The surveillance volume 
for TBMs will increase 400 nautical miles, with an elevation of 70 degrees and an altitude 
in excess of 500,000 feet. Beyond the year 2002, the AN/TPS-59 radar will have additional 
incremental improvement of its capability. 
C.        INITIATIVES 
There are two changes to the "As Is" physical architecture that are currently being 
undertaken. First, the BCP will no longer be directly linked to the TAOC. Communications 
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will be facilitated through an Air Defense Communication Platform (ADCP). The next 
change will occur within the TAOC. A Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordination Operations 
Facility (SOF) will be located within the TAOC. The SOF will be linked, via a LAN, to the 
TAOM and the Operations Center. These two enhancements are designed to improve 
communications within the architecture and allow for better command and control. 
1. Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP) 
The ADCP was added to facilitate communications between the TAOC and the BCP. 
The ADCP will receive TBM tracks from AN/TPS-59 radars, to filter geographically any 
TBM data of interest to HAWK Batteries, to propagate TBM tracks in time and space, to 
perform coordinate conversion and data formatting functions, to provide connectivity to the 
joint data network, and to provide communications throughout TMD's identify, track, and 
launch process. In operation, the AN/TPS-59 radars and the theater joint data network 
forward TBM tracks to the battery ADCP, which correlates and forwards these tracks to the 
BCP, the platoon-level command, control, coordination, and intelligence (C3I), and fire 
control center. 
The ADCP will be the first Marine Corps program to have JTIDS/TADIL J 
capability. This capability is intentionally limited to Network Management, Precise 
Participant Location and Identification (PPLI), and three Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
messages. The ADCP is planned as an interim JTIDS/TADIL J participant until the TAOC 
has this capability. 
2. Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (SAAWC) Operations Facility 
(SOF) 
The SOF, located in the TAOC, houses the SAAWC and SAAWC staff, who 
supervise anti-air warfare (AAW) operations. The SAAWC is the ACE Commander's air 
defense battle manager.   The SAAWC's principle function is that of tactical decision 
making.   The SAAWC should be activated whenever there is a need for timely, adroit 
orchestration of the interaction of surface-to-air and air-to-air defense assets for both 
MAGTF and Joint Operations. When established, the SAAWC becomes the representative 
of the Tactical Air Commander (TAC) at the TAOC [Ref. 4]. 
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The SAAWC is responsible to the TAC for: 
During the planning process: 
* Provide qualified representation to the Air Combat Element (ACE) 
Battlestaff to develop appropriate courses of action based on the 
perceived threat 
* Recommend tactical placement of command and control assets to best 
counter the threat 
* Develop, in conjunction with surface-to-air weapons representatives, 
appropriate states of alert and airspace control measures to maximize their 
effectiveness 
* Plan the communication need-lines of the TAOC to cover the Alternative 
TACC Functions 
During the execution phase: 
* Decentralized management of assigned weapons platforms 
* Coordination of all active and passive air defense and air traffic within an 
assigned sector under the direction of higher authority 
* Maintaining the status of committed assets and resources for the TACC 
* Recommending adjustments to the states of alert for; Radiation Control 
(RADCON), Emissions Control (EMCON) Conditions, and Weapons 
Release Conditions to the TAC as appropriate 
* Coordinating with adjacent agencies 
* Recommending changes in airspace control measures to the TAC 
* Determination of the deployment and commit criteria for available assets 
in coordination with the TAC 
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* Based on the recognized air picture, plan tactics 15 to 60 minutes ahead 
of the real-time battle 
* Be prepared to assume the role of the Alternate TACC should the TACC 
become a casualty 
D.        COMMUNICATIONS 
After the Persian Gulf War, the Navy and the Marine Corps knew that the the SCUD 
missile, or proposed missile, attacks created a crisis they were not equipped to deal with. 
Poor communications techniques and faulty information flow could have resulted in a 
crushing blow to the Navy and Marine combined missile defense efforts. These problems 
have since been identified and resources are being expended to develop a more effective 
system. The problems have also been examined in the analysis presented in Chapter III and 
further amplify the communications issue. TADIL J, by itself, is not the panacea to the 
problems that exist. However, it, coupled with other advances, definitely aids in alleviating 
the current communications problems. 
1. Tactical Digital Information Link J (TADIL J/Link 16) 
Link 16/TADIL J is a part of a joint service system known as Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System (JTIDS). JTIDS is interoperable with USN/USAF/USA/ 
USMC/United Kingdom/France and NATO terminals. Link 16 will become an important 
netted data link between most TMD platforms, other forces, and allies by the year 2002. It 
promises to provide increased throughput, security, jam resistance, grid accuracy, and 
interoperability. Link 16 is the U.S. Naval/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
terminology for sets of netted links which allow for the exchange of tactical information 
among ships and aircraft in digital format in accordance with protocols and standards set 
forth in Navy Operational Specification 516 and NATO's STANAG 5516. Link 16 message 
standards and protocols are being modified to handle the TBMD requirements. Other system 
improvements will be made after Link 16 is introduced during the mid 1990s, but the first 
major upgrade will be the Enhanced Link 16 in the 2010 time frame. 
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JTIDS is a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), jam resistant, digital data, and 
voice communication system operating in the 960-1215 MHZ frequency range with gaps for 
Tactical Air Navigation Beacon (TACAN) and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). Service 
on JTIDS can be broadcast or link specific. There are three modes by which users can access 
a net: Dedicated (preassigned), Contention, and Time Slot Reallocation. There are also two 
relaying modes Paired Slot and Repromulagation [Refs. 2, 3, and 11]. JTIDS supports a 
number of information transfer requirements for TMD. 
Track data on target position, position uncertainty, velocity, and velocity 
uncertainty. 
Launch point estimation. 
Impact point and time of arrival. 





Engagement coordination and status. 
The most impressive aspect of JTIDS is the ability of all components of every service 
to possess the same digital display and voice communications system. 
2. Implementation 
TADIL J will be employed within the three major C2 Facilities in the proposed 
Marine Corps "To Be" TBMD architecture; the TACC, the TAOC, and the ADCP. The 
ADCP will facilitate communications between the BCP and the TAOC. The ADCP will 
have five separate communications links. The most important of these will be the TADIL 
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J link that permits direct communication between the ADCP, friendly aircraft, and other 
friendly forces. The TAOC will also add the TADIL J link to its components to facilitate 
communications between itself, the TACC, friendly aircraft, and friendly forces. The final 
change will occur in the TACC, which will no longer have a direct connection to other forces 
via TADIL A. It will, instead, add TADIL J to its communication components to facilitate 
communication with other agencies and with the TAOC. 
E.        CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the advancements discussed, in one way or another, improve upon the 
communications system currently seen in the Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture. The 
problems associated with information flow, its timeliness, efficiency, format and effects on 
decision making are, in effect, also addressed. However, these initiatives do not solve all of 
the problems. Problems will continue to exist if the communications equipment, physical 
makeup, does not change. There is still a problem with equipment redundancy and with the 
continued inability of C2 Facilities to completely exploit equipment capabilities, even when 
that equipment is present in their commands. TADIL J goes a long way towards rectifying 
these problems, but until it, or a technology like it, is used solely for communication, the 
problem will continue to exist. Problems associated with multiple equipment systems are 
not addressed by TADIL J, but they are a factor that needs further analysis. 
Looking beyond the year 2002, the USMC TBMD system will be able to detect, 
identify or classify, engage, and destroy, at a sufficient range (50 km x 100 km area) all 
aerial targets posing a threat to stationary or mobile MAGTFs. This system will be capable 
of conducting simultaneous engagements in semi-automated and automated engagement 
modes. The system will employ netted and distributed data and information architectures 
within sensor and fire control elements. The TBMD system will also interoperate with 




A. THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the Marine Corps TBMD information architecture. The main 
objective is to provide feedback in areas of information flow, equipment adequacy, and 
decision support. This thesis provides an IDEF IX model of the Marine Corps TBMD 
information architecture along with matrices that, when used together, present possible 
analysis and clarification in three areas: Intelligence Data Flow, Battle Management 
Information Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information Support. This 
thesis also provides an "As Is" TBMD physical architecture model and a possible "To Be" 
physical architecture model that are supported by the analysis. Identifying the discrepancies 
and a possible TBMD physical architecture provides documentation to be used in further 
research, development, and implementation of the concept of a joint TBMD program. The 
architectures studied and presented in this thesis are based on the idea of a joint, 
interoperable TBMD information architecture and will continue to evolve. 
B. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The restrictive nature of this thesis lead to the identification of a variety of topics 
which require further research. Further research of the Marine Corps TBMD concepts fall 
into four general categories: development of a "To Be" model to facilitate new system 
enhancements and technological changes, further research into developing or identifying a 
less complicated communications network for the proposed Marine Corps "To Be" TBMD 
architecture, further research into intraoperability and the proposed Marine Corps TBMD 
architecture, and further research into the viability of combining matrix analysis with 
modeling to analyze existing and future models. 
1. Development of a "To Be" Model 
The TBMD physical architecture is very dynamic. As such, it is important to ensure 
that the concept of a physical architecture is kept separate from the concept of the 
information architecture model.   As technological changes are made to equipment, and 
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enhancements are made to C2 Facilities, the physical make up of the architectures will 
change. However, the effects on the information architecture model will be less noticeable. 
No matter how drastic the changes to the physical architecture, the processes and procedures 
contained in the model will continue to be used. The purpose of constructing the model is 
to develop a core structure. Once that is accomplished, changes can be incorporated without 
effecting the integrity of the model. 
If a process becomes automated or is eliminated by a change in equipment and that 
change has a direct effect on the model, the change can easily be reflected in the model. For 
example, the implementation of TADIL J, along with the establishment of an ADCP, has a 
direct effect on how missile shoot commands are relayed to and from the BCP. These two 
implementations have a dramatic effect on the physical architecture (Appendix F, Figure 
F.l). However, the effects of the two implementations are not as noticeable in the model. 
The change in the model, at the lowest level, is to add the HAWK (ADCP) link to block 
A.0.5.2.2.1.1, Obtain Launch/Impact Point (Appendix B, Figure B.2, Page 79). Of course, 
this addition must also be reflected throughout the upper levels of the model to maintain 
consistency and integrity of the information contained in the model. 
The systems and enhancements discussed in Chapter IV are just examples of the 
changes that will be made to the existing architecture. An example of the topics that will 
directly affect the direction of TBMD, in the Marine Corps, are interoperability and 
intraoperability. As more and more technologies are examined and more enhancements are 
proposed that address these topics, the effects on the information architecture model must 
also be explored. To better understand the effects of the proposals and to conduct adequate 
analysis, proposed changes need to be reflected within a "To Be" information architecture 
model. 
2. Development of a Communication System 
As identified in the thesis, there are many problems associated with the 
communications equipment employed by the C2 Facilities within the TBMD architecture. 
The problems range from, but are not limited to, timeliness of information received, 
adequacy of information received, equipment redundancy, and adverse effects on the 
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decision making process. It is clear, from the analysis presented in Chapter III, that the need 
for a more streamlined communications system exists. The development of TADIL J goes 
a long way toward addressing some of the communications problems, but until the number 
of different communication equipment is curtailed or protocol standards exist which allow 
heterogeneous equipments to interoperate, the problem will persist. Concerns about the lack 
of exploitation of equipment capabilities and the need for multiple equipment types need to 
be addressed. 
3. Intraoperability Problems 
Intraoperability is not covered in this thesis, but it is a very important issue. As much 
as a simple, easy to use communications network is needed for the TBMD architecture, it 
must be made clear that the development of such a system must coincide with the 
communications developments of other entities within the Marine Corps. A prime example 
of this type of development is the TADIL J communications link. TADIL J was a 
development project aimed directly at the issue of intraoperability and interoperability. 
The goal of the Marine Corps, as stated in Chapter III, is to seamlessly integrate the 
TBMD Architecture into the MAGTF C4I Architecture and provide effective and efficient 
missile defense. In order to accomplish this goal, it is necessary for the MAGTF forces 
involved with TBMD to communicate with other units within the Marine Corps (Appendix 
A, Figure A.l and Appendix F, Figure F.l). This intraservice communication capability is 
a prime example of intraoperability. Intraoperability is an area of study that is getting more 
than its share of attention as of late. This is especially true with TBMD since all commands 
within the Marine Corps are involved in the development of a cohesive TBMD Architecture 
[Ref. 9]. The effects of intraoperability on the physical TBMD architecture must be 
examined and documented with the development of any and all new enhancements or 
technologies. 
4. Matrix Analysis 
Matrix analysis is a tool for examining models. It gives the reader an ability to 
understand difficult or complex processes. It also affords them an opportunity to adequately 
examine subjects not in their realm of expertise.   However, the effectiveness of matrix 
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analysis is questionable because of the procedures involved with accomplishing the analysis. 
In order for a proper analysis to be accomplished, certain elements have to be present. First, 
a thorough model of the procedures and processes needs to be constructed. Second, matrices 
that accurately depict the information contained in the model, and that address relevant 
topics, needs to be constructed. Finally, in order to accomplish steps one and two, a subject- 
matter expert must be either available for consultation or be directly involved with the study. 
The development of the model is an important step and should not be trivialized. However, 
many models already exist. The problem begins with construction of matrices for these 
models. As discussed in Chapter II, the areas of concern for this thesis were already known 
before construction of the matrices was attempted. Without the subject-matter expert's input, 
construction of the matrices would have been equivalent to finding a needle in a haystack. 
What is at issue here is whether or not the matrices can be constructed without the aid of a 
subject-matter expert. Procedures for the development of matrices without aid from subject- 
matter experts must be developed. 
C.        CONCLUSION 
This thesis establishes strong evidence that the existing Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD 
architecture is inadequate in its current state. Through the use of a model, matrices, and 
matrix analysis, a comprehensive study was accomplished that identified the communi- 
cations equipment infrastructure as the key to the inadequacies. The existence of multiple 
equipment systems within the communications environment directly affects the stability of 
the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense architecture. 
The Marine Corps choice of combining the TACC/TAOC/SAAWC, AN/TPS-59, and 
HAWK system, inevitably lead to the problem of equipment redundancy. These C2 
Facilities are outfitted, in the Table of Organization (T/O), with numerous overlapping 
communications capabilities. Those overlapping capabilities are not, however, incorporated 
throughout every C2 Facility since the equipment is not universally dispersed. This 
redundancy leads to information flow problems. Information format and information 
timeliness are effected considerably by equipment redundancy.   There is no analytical 
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evidence that suggests that multiple equipment systems are necessary to carry out mission 
object. In fact, the analysis in Chapter III identified problems which make it clear that there 
is a need to consolidate the communications infrastructure. 
The initial TBMD architecture was developed to take advantage of the 
communications structures already present in the MAGTF's environment. However, those 
capabilities are overshadowed by the architect's lack of exploitation of the equipment 
capabilities. Information flow, in particular, is adversely impacted in the existing 
infrastructure. The lack of timely information is unacceptable given the precarious nature 
of the mission objectives. Information flow, timeliness in particular, is affected by 
information adequacy, information format, and information processing (fusing and 
correlating data) or a combination of the three. The absence of any or all of these traits can 
have a detrimental effect on TBMD. The communications structure within the TBMD 
environment, as depicted in Chapter III, is not conducive to efficiency in any one of these 
areas. The result of the communications dilemma is the inability of the architecture to 
support good decision making.   The resulting effect is poor performance. 
TBMD, on the MAGTF level, has not been battled tested. The need for TBMD did 
not arise until the Persian Gulf War had already started. The lessons learned in that time 
frame made it necessary for the Marine Corps to quickly assemble an infrastructure that dealt 
with the problem. However, if the Marine Corps is going to integrate the TBMD 
Architecture into the MAGTF C4I Architecture and provide effective and efficient missile 
defense, it has to start building an architecture to deal with these future needs. Those needs 
are centered around communications and intraoperability and interoperability. 
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APPENDIX A. USMC "AS IS" ARCHITECTURE 
A.        USMC "As Is" AAW/HAWK Configuration 
The existing configuration (Figure A.l) consists of three key elements. 
1. Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) 
The TACC is the senior agency within the Marine Air Command and Control System 
(MACCS) and as such, is responsible for the overall supervision, coordination, and control 
of tactical air operations in the Marine Corps area of responsibility [Ref. 12]. The TACC 
provides facilities from which the Air Combat Element (ACE) Commander and his battle 
staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and execute all current and future Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) air operations. The TACC also provides integration, coordination and 
direction of joint and combined air operations. The TACC is dependent upon three separate 
communications links3. 
a. TADIL A 
The TADIL A (Link 11) is a HF/UHF, half duplex link that is used to 
exchange air, surface, and subsurface tracks and points in real and near-real time. It provides 
two-way communication between the TACC and other military components. 
b. TADIL B 
The TADIL B (Link 1 IB) is a multi-channel radio, full duplex link that is 
used to exchange air, surface, and subsurface tracks and points in real and near-real time. 
It provides two-way communication between the TACC and the Tactical Air Operations 
Center (TAOC) and the TACC and other military components. 
c. NATO Link 1 
The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) Link 1 is a multi- 
channel radio, duplex link used to exchange air tracks and points in real time. It provides 
two-way communication between the TACC and NATO forces. 
3The TACC also employs a LAN to facilitate communications between the TACC 




2. Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) 
The TAOC acts as the senior air defense agency within the MAGTFs assigned sector 
of responsibility. The TAOC preforms the function of air surveillance and early warning, 
aircraft control, and controls all surface-to-air missile fires within its assigned sector [Ref. 
12]. The TAOC is composed of multiple Tactical Air Operations Modules (TAOM), a 
AN/TPS-59 radar, and an operations center. The TAOC performs real-time direction and 
control of all AAW operations, including manned interceptions and surface-to-air weapons. 
By collecting and displaying information from its own sensors, other Marine Corps sources, 
and external sources, the TAOC controls assigned airspace and directs and controls the fire 
of assigned air defense assets. The TAOC employs TADIL A and three other major 
communications links4. 
a. TADIL C 
The TADIL C (Link 4A) is a Marine Corps System Operator (manual), half 
duplex link that is used for aircraft control. It provides two-way communication between the 
TAOC and friendly aircraft. 
b. ATDL-1 
The Army Tactical Data Link (ATDL-1) is a multi-channel radio, full duplex 
link that is used to exchange air tracks and points in real and near-real time. It provides two- 
way communication between the TAOC and friendly aircraft. 
c. GBDL 
Ground Based Data Link is a LAN system that is used to exchange target and 
fire control information. It provides two-way communication between the TAOC and the 
Battery Command Post (BCP). 
3. Battery Command Post (BCP) 
The BCP functions as the control facility for the HAWK surface-to-air missile system 
[Ref. 1]. The BCP provides the required communications and processing functions to enable 
4The TAOC also employs an internal LAN/WAN to facilitate communications 
between the AN/TPS-59 radar and the Operations Center. 
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HAWK firing sections to engage air breathing targets (ABT). The Continuous Wave 
Acquisition Radar (CWAR) and Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) detect ABTs at medium 
altitudes and ranges, but have no role against the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) threat. 
The High Power Illuminator (HPI) designates the target for intercept by the missile. In 
operation, the PAR, CWAR, or AN/TPS-59 radar processes and forwards a track to the BCP, 
the command level command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), and the fire 
control center. When the target approaches the engagement range of the HAWK interceptor, 
the BCP assigns the target to a HPI for acquisition and tracking. The BCP calculates the fire 
control solution, designates an interceptor, and issues fire control and initialization 
commands to the launcher and the missile. The BCP employs an Intra-Battery Data Link 
(IBDL) to facilitate communications between the BCP, The HPI and the HAWK missile 
platform. 
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APPENDIX B. USMC "AS IS" IDEF MODEL 
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Figure B.2 (Continued) 
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APPENDIX C. ACTIVITIES DEFINITIONS 
Casualty Procedure Options: Al.4.3 Prescribing alternate agencies. In an air defense 
environment, provisions are made in case of operational failure of the TAOC either from 
enemy action or system malfunction. Failures must not disrupt the continuity of air defense 
operations and some system degradation must be anticipated during planning to provide 
alternatives. In lieu of establishing a duplicate TAOC within a sector, proper planning will 
ensure air defense functional continuity. This preservation requires significant 
decentralization of authority as well as imposing some operating restrictions on friendly 
aircraft. Local standing operating procedures (SOP's) will establish the specific procedures 
and relationships for decentralized operations. The EW/C and AEW/C facilities may assume 
some of the functions of a TAOC. Since each of these facilities possess the same basic 
capabilities, they are considered equally suitable as alternate facilities for performing some 
TAOC functions. Long-range surveillance capabilities will vary with each configuration, 
but these facilities do offer the MAGTF continuity of this vital function. Further, these 
facilities also offer an alternate means of control for interceptor aircraft. AEW/C aircraft 
allow semiautomatic data exchange with the TAOC and reduce the requirement for the 
degree of decentralization necessary with a manual EW/C facility. However, where both 
operational modes are concerned, saturation occurs more quickly, coordination with missile 
systems is indirect, and the general level and quality of management is greatly reduced. 
(FMFM 5-5) 
Conduct Acquisition/Location: A3.1.3 Activity related to fusing track and report 
information. Information is received from many sources, in many different mediums, and 
formatted differently. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources 
into an accurate, concise and complete summary. The goal of performing fusion is to reduce 
information to the minimum essentials, put it in a form that Marines can quickly act on, and 
produce a common situational awareness that is accurate and meets the needs of the 
commander and subordinate leaders. Properly fused and displayed information, at the right 
time and place aids the commander in overcoming uncertainty. (FMFM 3, section 3003) 
Fusing the information used in TBM detections may not totally be possible, but at a 
minimum, a confidence level must be assigned to assist the commander in associating the 
numerous types of tactical reports. In some cases, the classification level of the sensor may 
exceed the operators clearance level. In this case, the information must be transformed into 
a for that is appropriate and usable. 
Conduct Analysis of Probable Enemy Response: A4.3 Activities related to the 
determination of the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the 
commander's own course (s) of action. (AFSC Pub 1) 
Conduct Antiair Warfare Operations: A0 Antiair warfare (AAW) is the action that is 
required to destroy or reduce the enemy air and missile threat to an acceptable level.  It 
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includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, air-to-air and surface-to-air 
Weapons (SAW's), electronic countermeasures (ECM), and the destruction of the aircraft or 
missile threat both before and after launch. Other AAW measures which are taken to 
minimize the effects of hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception 
(including electronic deception), and mobility (FMFM 5-5). The term "Theater Missile 
(TM)" applies to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles whose targets 
are within a given theater of operation. The term "Theater Missile Defense (TMD)" applies 
to the identification, integration, and employment of forces supported by other theater and 
national capabilities, to detect, identify, locate, track, minimize the effects of, and/or destroy 
enemy Tms. This includes destruction of TMs on the ground and in flight, their 
ground-based launchers and supporting infrastructure; TM-capable ships and vessels in port 
or at sea; and enemy aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles. TMD operations are 
accomplished by integrating a mix of mutually supportive passive defense, active defense, 
attack operations, and C4I support measures. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) It has been 
determined that TMD fits into the Marine Corps implementation of AAW as indicated in the 
below areas. (Air Control /Air Defense Doctrine Officer, MCCDC Letter 3000, c423, 8 
April 1994) Active Air Defense Activities related to defense measures designed to destroy 
attacking aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce 
the effectiveness of such an attack. For TMD, Active air defense applies to operations 
initiated to protect against a TM attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms, and/or 
destroying TM's in flight. Active defense includes multitiered defense in depth via multiple 
engagements using air, land, sea, space, and special operations assets. It also includes active 
EW to disrupt remote or on-board guidance systems. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) Offensive 
AAW Activities related to operations conducted against enemy air assets and air defense 
systems before they can be launched or assume an attacking role. Offensive AAW 
operations in or near the objective area consist mainly of air attacks to destroy or neutralize 
hostile aircraft, airfields, radars, air defense systems, and supporting areas. (FMFM 5-5) For 
TMs, Attack operations apply to operations initiated to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize TM 
launch platforms and their supporting command, control, and communications (C3); logistic 
structures; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) platforms. Attack 
operations include offensive action by air, land, sea, space and special operating forces. 
(Joint Publication 3-01.5) Passive Air Defense Activities related to actions taken to 
minimize the effects of hostile air action, they include: cover, concealment, dispersion, 
deception (including electronic) and mobility. (FMFM 5-5) For TMs, passive defense 
applies to measures initiated to reduce vulnerability, and to minimize the effects of damage 
caused by TM attack. Passive defense includes TM early warning and NBC protection, 
Countersurveillance, deception, camouflage and concealment, hardening, electronic warfare, 
mobility, dispersal, recovery and reconstitution. Passive Air Defense for TMs also can 
include training civil authorities to organize and instruct their populations on actions to take 
upon warning of missile attack. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) 
Conduct Attack Operations (OAAW): Activity Definition: A5.3 Conduct Attack 
Operations (OAAW) Activities related to operations initiated to destroy, disrupt, or 
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neutralize TM launch platforms and their supporting command and control, and 
communications (C3); logistics structures; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition (RSTA) platforms. Attack operations include offensive action by air, land, sea, 
space, and special operating forces (SOF). (Joint Publication 3-01.5) 
Conduct C2 Warfare: A5.3.2.3 Activity related to implementing the integrated use of 
Operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), 
electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to 
deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary capabilities, while protecting 
friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W is both offensive (Counter C2) and 
defensive (C2-protection). (CJCS MOP No. 30 dated 8 Mar 1993) (Meeting with 
MAWTS-1,18 May 1994) C2W is employed against an enemy's C3 surveillance and target 
acquisition to disrupt. TM operations. This will influence, degrade or destroy the enemy C2 
Capabilities and is closely linked to passive defense measures of deception. The primary goal 
is to blind the enemy and thereby enhance overall protection of the force. (Joint Publication 
3-01.5) 
Conduct Data Transformation: A3.1.3.3.1 Before a comparison can be mad, detections 
(reports) and tracks (from sensors which maintain local track files or reports that have been 
associated with other reports that are of the same event) must be associated in time and space 
to assign sensed data to individual target files. Because the reports and tracks arrive from 
sensors with differing geometries. 
Conduct Identification & Classification: A3.1.4 Activity related to determination of the 
tactical reports identification as a friend or foe and what type of weapons platform that it is. 
Once determined, the track or report is classified with the appropriate category . The TAOC, 
due to its air defense design, is the focal point for all such activity and is also the point of 
primary evaluation of the various inputs. An examination of the internal tasks of the TAOC 
should effectively illustrate the rationale behind the preceding discus-sion. The surveillance 
identification section provides detection, acquisition, and identification of all unknown 
targets within the assigned air defense sector. Subsectors are assigned according to the 
specifies of the situation, and surveillance is accomplished within these sub sectors. For this 
task, operators employ the radar organic to the TAOC as well as surveillance reports from 
SAW and EW/C radars. "Unknown" contacts are forwarded by these sources for the 
application of identification criteria by the Surveil-lance Identification Director. Altitude 
information is confirmed. Then, flight plan correlation, use of friendly corridors, and aircraft 
flight characteristics are applied to the contact to provide identification. Should all of these 
methods fail to produce positive identification, the track is designated as unknown. 
(FMFM5-5 ) Within the processes of any air defense system, the starting point for all 
operations is detection/identification. This is most critical and must be rapidly accomplished 
at a reasonable range. The destruction-in-depth deployment of weapons allows some margin 
of flexibility in the engagement process, but the speed capabilities of in-coming enemy 
aircraft reduces flexibility in the time allowed for identification. The system must provide 
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for rapid and positive identification through clear-cut assignment of identification 
responsibility. The most effective measures designed to provide timely identification include 
positive radar control, visual control, flight plans, IFF, and air corridors. A detailed 
discussion of these measures is found in NWP 32. Another method employed in the various 
identification processes is identification by flight characteristics. In effect, however, this 
method more often determines hostile rather than friendly targets. In many instances, the 
observed movement of an air contact may be presumed hostile if out of character with local 
air activity. Some examples are: Low-level, high speed, approaching targets detected by 
SAW units may be presumed a hostile because close air support delivery maneuvers are not 
of long duration on a consistent inbound heading, inbound aircraft speeds are slower close 
to the vital area due to the density of aircraft, and whenever marginal communications exist, 
CAP pursuits are broken off well before the crossover point. An unidentified air contact 
maneuvering for attack position on friendly aircraft should be presumed hostile as all 
friendly interceptor aircraft will be under positive control. The flight characteristics of an 
aircraft maneuvering for an advantageous position for air-to-air engagement are obvious to 
a radar observer and relative positions of other friendly fixed-wing aircraft are immediately 
available. The third and most obvious type of flight characteristic providing hostile air 
identification is the commission of a hostile act observed by any friendly force clement. 
Below is a discussion of identification sources, Tracking. 
a. Identification Sources: In an active air defense environment, the indicated 
agencies are responsible for securing and maintaining the friendly identification prescribed 
below: 
(1) Positive Radar Control: The TAOC is the initiating agency for air 
defense action and is the source of most positive control information. It controls CAP 
aircraft, provides flight following, and exchanges mutual interest track information with 
adjacent air defense agencies. The traffic control section performs the TAOC's most reliable 
identification process-positive control of friendly aircraft. All operating fixed-wing aircraft 
transiting the sector or not otherwise under control of another MACCS element are processed 
through the TAOC. The TAOC traffic control task is performed by one or more weapons 
control teams as permitted by the air defense alert condition. Subsectors are assigned these 
weapons control teams to allow for concentration of effort and to assist recall. En route 
friendly aircraft are received by these teams, identified, designated, and either vectored or 
monitored as they proceed with their mission. If the mission requires control by another 
agency, aircraft are released but will be required to report back for recovery and 
reclassification. Aircraft reporting in/out procedures are found in FMFM 5-1. Not only is 
safety served by this process, but ideally, all fixed-wing aircraft are under active 
control/monitoring at all times. This control/monitoring allows rapid comparison of the 
warning section reports to known position information. These operators also query agencies 
external to the TAOC concerning their positive control information. Should internal data not 
allow correlation, an attempt is made by the traffic controller to correlate positive control 
position information from other agencies such as the DASC or Marine air traffic control 
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squadron. If time and target speed allow, correlation will be attempted before initiating any 
engagement. This process is vital not only for friendly aircraft safety but also for air traffic 
manage-ment. It should also be obvious that as sector aircraft density increases, less time will 
be available for the TAOC to individually query each positive control agency. The TAOC 
is not, however, an exclusive source of positive radar control information and requires 
supplementary information from the MATCS. The aircraft status on radar controlled 
departures and approaches is maintained by the MATCS. The MATCS additionally 
maintains the status of aircraft in holding patterns. The TAOC is kept informed of the status 
of aircraft under MATCS control and those aircraft anticipated to report for air traffic control 
purposes which are penetrating the sector. 
(2) Visual Control: The only consistent sources of visual identifica-tion 
of friendly fixed-wing aircraft are LAAD teams and terminal close air support (CAS) control 
agencies or observers such as the forward air controller (FAC), TAC(A), or air observers 
(AO). These agencies, with the exception of the additional duty LAAD teams of the LAAM 
battalion, operate through the DASC. Therefore, the DASC is responsible to furnish the 
TAOC with position information on these aircraft and on any aircraft under the visual control 
of these terminal agencies. 
(3) Flight Plan Information: The sources of flight plans are aircraft 
crews assigned missions by the daily fragmentary order, aircraft crews on routine flights, and 
aircraft crews departing or entering the air defense sector. Flight plans are filed with the 
appropriate air traffic control center (ATCC), including any designated en route ATCC. 
Sector ATCC's receive and forward to the TACC/TAOC flight plan information as 
prescribed. At the discretion of the TAC, the ATCC may directly forward these to the 
TAOC, which then advises the TACC. For aircraft departing or entering the sector, adjacent 
ATCC's exchange flight plan data of mutual concern. Verbal flight plan information is 
recorded and retained by the receiving agency and promulgated as necessary. 
(4) Identification, Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature 
(IFF/SIF): Due to its nature, this identification data requires different handling than other 
types. IFF/SIF information is only available to agencies possessing the equipment required 
to provide electronic challenge. Such a capability is found in the TAOC, BCP, and MATCS. 
When applicable, IFF/SIF modes and codes accompany initial position reports from these 
units. 
(5) Air Corridors: Identification of aircraft within air corridors is 
obtained through radar surveillance and the exchange of flight information between adjacent 
and internal air defense sector control agencies. Corridor boundaries are maintained by all 
concerned agencies. 
(6) Flight Characteristics: Any agency which identifies hostile aircraft 
by their flight characteristics will immediately report this information, with the status of any 
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initiated engagement, to the TAOC. Ground units, LAAD teams, FAC's, etc., report through 
the DASC. TAC(A)'s, helicopter coordinators (airborne) (HC (A)'s), AO's, and other aircraft 
report directly to the TAOC when possible by appropriate air-to-ground communications. 
LAAM batteries and early warning and control (EW/C) sites report directly to the TAOC. 
b. Surveillance/Traffic Monitoring:   Once initial radar detection has been 
made, the air defense control agency requires a means of maintaining the changing position 
of the radar contact. It is additionally necessary to keep abreast of the move-ments and 
intentions of friendly aircraft operating within the objective area. For this purpose, 
surveillance operator traffic controllers, and weapons controllers are stationed in the TAOC. 
(1) Surveillance: The TAOC establishes radar-detected tracks through 
its surveillance system. Upon detection, the identification process begins and each friendly 
control is identified by appropriate category. The contact is assigned symbology and the 
system automatically updates its position. Depending on the degree of threat and the volume 
of traffic, surveillance is conducted by assigning a surveillance operator to each subsector. 
Thus, detection, identification, and symbology assignment are performed. The surveillance 
capacity of the TAOC is limited by the detection capability of the input radars. 
(a) TADILS: The TADILS have been designed to develop and 
exchange digital data on a variety of air matters. The information of concern to the MACCS 
is the position and identification data on aircraft operating under the cognizance of naval air 
control agencies. In this manner, an aircraft passing through a sector or flying in a sector 
overlap area is identified with current and accurate position information. Two-way exchange 
of information between the MACCS and NTDS/ATDS is possible and is made through the 
Marine tactical data communication central (TDCC), normally employed with the TACC and 
TAOC. 
(b) SAM Acquisition: In addition to visual acquisitions by 
LAAD teams which are relayed to the TAOC through the DASC, the coverage of TAOC 
radars has been supplemented in the shorter range, low to medium altitude radar envelope 
by the acquisition radars of the Hawk system. This coverage product is relayed to the TAOC 
for initial identification and/or identification confirmation. 
(c) Other Agencies: Provisions are also made by the TAOC to 
allow surveillance input from other radar sources, such as airborne or ground gap-filler radar 
facilities. 
(2) Track Monitoring: Once traffic is detected and identified as friendly, 
they are passed to a TAOC traffic controller whose function is to provide flight following 
navigational assistance, and altitude separation from other air traffic. Traffic controllers are 
normally assigned geographic subsectors in which they maintain accurate and timely 
situation data on all friendly aircraft. Their tasks include control of aircraft reporting for 
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flight following. These personnel assist the surveillance effort by sustaining timely 
information on targets already processed for identification. Weapons controllers are 
responsible to ensure current track status on interceptor aircraft under control. When CAP 
stations are not actively manned, weapons controllers may function as additional traffic 
controllers (FMFM 5-5) Examples of Track Classification. The definitions of track 
classifications herein are general and must be specifically defined by the tactical air 
commander to conform to the tactical situation. CONFIRMED HOSTILE; any track 
positively determined to be hostile. ASSUMED HOSTILE; any track whose hostile identity 
has been assumed in accordance with the criteria established by doctrine or the tactical 
situation. Efforts to positively identify continue. UNKNOWN; the identity assigned to all 
tracks whose intent cannot be determined by criteria or doctrine as being either hostile or 
friendly. ASSUMED UNKNOWN; an identity automatically assigned to all new tracks 
which indicates that the track has not been considered by the TDS identification officer. 
ASSUMED FRIEND; any track whose friendly identity has been assumed in accordance 
with the criteria established by doctrine or tactical situation. Efforts to identify positively 
continue. CONFIRMED FRIEND; any track which has been positively identified as 
friendly. The TAOC, as previously indicated, is the agency responsible for requesting, 
receiving, and coordinating the various identification inputs, maintaining the appropriate 
aircraft classifications, and responding to queries made by defensive weapons systems by 
back-tell. As the focus of the sector air defense system, it must anticipate specific input 
requirements from associated air control elements and recommend appropriate tasking. It 
is further responsible to anticipate and recommend alternate procedures to preserve air 
defense continuity should its systems become degraded or inoperative. (FMFM 5-5) 
Conduct Local Sensor Acquisition & Tracking: A3.1.3.1 Activity representing the 
function of a tracking radar that detects a target and begins to build a track history. The 
AN/TPS-59 radar accomplishes this task in the TBM or Combined mode of operation. 
Conduct Passive Air Defense: A5.4 Passive AAW operations are employed by all elements 
of the MAGTF and are designed to minimize the effect of hostile air action. Passive 
operations include cover and concealment, dispersal of forces and installations, deception 
(including electronic deception), shielding, damage control provisions, and exploitation of 
the mobility of an expeditionary force. Considerations may also be given to assisting HN 
or allied civil authorities in establishing passive defense measures for the civilian population 
and HN assets, consistent with the overall mission. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) Cruise 
missiles often require photos for the last 2 to 5 miles of the target (friendly locations). 
Altering the area with camouflage or moving equipment can assist in moving shadow angles 
or totally denying an opportunity for an enemy to obtain the necessary photos. 
Conduct Planning: Al Planning must implement the commander's vision and lay the 
foundation for future decisions and tasks. Planning normally begins with the receipt of a 
formal mission or the commander's understanding of an implied task based upon informal 
communications with higher headquarters. Essential information that supports the mission 
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is gathered and a thorough analysis is performed to determine an appropriate coarse of 
action. (FMFM 3, section 3005) This identifies one planning cycle. The ACE commander 
plans and prosecutes air operations using combined arms to support the MAGTF 
commander's plan. Air operations include close operations designed to apply power 
projection decisively against enemy forces that pose an immediate or near term tactical 
threat. Air operations can also include deep and rear operations. The MAGTF commander 
may designate the ACE as his main effort. The ACE is the MAGTF's primary fire support 
means. (FMFM 5-60) Based upon an analysis of doctrine, AAW Planning is a dynamic 
process in which many of the activities are interrelated requiring them to be developed 
concurrently. For example, the size and scope of the battlespace is determined, in part, by 
the time-to-intercept estimates which are associated with weapons and control capabilities. 
The required weapons and control requirements are dependent on the battlespace. Normally 
the AAW planning is conducted in the plans section of the TACC and involves activities 
related to evaluating the status of current identification, the track is designated as unknown. 
Define & Bound Battlespace: Al.3 Activities related to determining the battlespace 
organization which is the way naval expeditionary force commanders visualize how they are 
going to fight the enemy and structure the command and control to ensure victory. 
Battlespace is an area of operations viewed in three dimensions: air/space, surface and 
subsurface. The commander relates his forces to each other in terms of sea, air and land 
operations and to the enemy in terms of time. The Commander must know not only the 
location of the enemy, but how fast the MAGTF can react to the enemy=92s initiatives and 
how fast the enemy can react to the MAGTF. (MACCS Tactical Planning, section 2005) 
The ACE follows this same methodology with more emphasis on time since air assets can 
employed/re-employed very quickly. For the ACE this process includes determining the 
ACE Area Of Operation and the Area Of Interest. The AO is the area that the ACE is 
responsible to provide AAW support for. The AOI is the area that the ACE must provide 
surveillance for and it may extend beyond the bounds of the AO. It will generally be 
determined based upon the terrain, sensor capabilities, threat capabilities and support for the 
ACE mission. 
Define & Bound Mission: A 1.2 Process related to clearly defining the AAW Mission and 
its Boundaries. It is important to go beyond the battalion or squadron mission and to analyze 
the ACE and MAGTF. Also analysis will be conducted on the ACE and MAGTF 
Commander's intent and Concept of operations. This provides insight into their vision for 
success on the battlefield and how they see the battle unfolding. It will also provide an 
appreciation for the overall scheme of maneuver. Most importantly, it will facilitate deriving 
the specified and implied tasks which will be crucial in the accomplishment of the assigned 
mission. This process includes determining any assumptions that have been made. 
(MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) During mission analysis, the commander assesses the 
total situation, builds his vision of the battlespace, and projects the desired outcome of the 
battle or campaign. Mission analysis is conducted by the commander and all members of 
the staff, a thorough mission analysis identifies the following: Higher commander's intent, 
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Specified task(s), Implied task(s), Limitations (constraints and restraints), Critical 
vulnerability (What will make the enemy unwilling or unable to fight? What is critical to the 
MAGTF's success), and Center of gravity. (FMFM 3, Section 3005) 
Define Boundaries of ACE AO: Al.3.2 The AO is a defined area of land in which 
responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for development and 
maintenance of installations, control of movement and the conduct of tactical operations 
involving troops under his control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions. 
(Joint Pub 1-02, (part 1 of 2 part definition) and FMFM 5-60, p. E-8) For the ACE this 
translates to the process of determining the size of the AO, the Airspace Control Area, Air 
Defense Area, and Sectors Of Responsibility. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Define Boundaries of ACE AOI: Al.3.3 Activity related to determining the area of 
concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and 
extending into enemy territory to the objectives of the current planned operations. This area 
also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of 
the mission. (Joint Publication 1-02, and FMFM 5-60, p. E-8) 
Determine ACE Commander's Priorities & Intent: Al.2.4 Activity related to deter- 
mining the ACE Commander's priorities and intent. The commander's priorities for the 
TMD effort, for example, might be: what type of targets are most important for attack 
operations and what friendly assets must be protected by active air defense. (Joint 
Publication 3-01.5) The ACE Commander's intent is a clear, concise statement that defines 
success for the force as a whole by establishing, in advance of events, the battle or 
campaign's desired end state. It stimulates the entire planning process, unifies the force 
toward a common mission objective, and provides subordinate commanders with a way to 
gauge freedom of action. The commander's intent contains: the purpose of the operation, 
the critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity for both enemy and friendly forces, a vision 
of how the operation will be conducted in a broad scope. A description of the end state with 
respect to the relationship of the force, the enemy, and the terrain. A description of how the 
end state will facilitate future operations. (FMFM 3, section 2001) The Commander's 
vision for success includes the focus of the main effort and potential friction areas, identified 
strengths the must be exploited to ensure success, vulnerabilities in our defense the threat 
may attempt to exploit and finally a definitive mission statement. The overarching purpose 
of this intent is to provide subordinates the necessary guidance with which to execute the 
plan while providing ample room for individual initiative in the absence of further input. 
(MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Determine Air Control Air Direction Authority: Al .4.1.1 Air Control is the authority 
to direct the physical maneuver of aircraft in flight or to direct an aircraft or SAW to engage 
a specific target. An air controller performs air control when he maneuvers an aircraft by 
directing the pilot. A missile controller performs air control when he directs a SAW to 
engage a particular target.  (FMFM 5-60)  Air Direction is the authority to regulate the 
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employment of air resources (aircraft and SAW units) to maintain a balance between their 
availability and the priorities assigned to their use. The purpose of air direction is to achieve 
a balance between the MAGTF=92s finite aviation assets and the accomplishment of the 
ACE's mission. Air direction tasks include, but are not limited to: development of ATOs, 
fulfilling the requirements of ATOs (tasking aircraft to perform specific missions), changing 
or altering an aircraft's mission, processing air support requests, collecting information 
concerning mission status, moving Ground-based air defense fire units to new firing 
positions, and adjusting aircraft/SAW unit mission assignments within previously set 
parameters due to changes in the air or ground situation. (FMFM 5-60) Below is a table 
outlining the agencies normally assigned Command, Control, and Air Direction authority 
within the MACCS. (FMFM 5-60, p. 2-2) 
TACC TADC TAOC DASC 
MATCSEW/C TAC(A)FAC FAC(A) ASC(A) COMMAND X 
AIR CONTROL X X X X 
X X X X POSITIVE CONTROL X X X 
PROCEDURAL CONTROL X X X X 
X X X X RADAR CONTROL X X X 
TERMINAL CONTROL X X X X XX 
X AIR DIRECTION X X X 
X 
Determine ACE Objectives & AAW Integration: Al.2.3 This activity is completed in 
close association with the MAGTF planning staff. Once the ACE Commander has 
determined how the ACE will support the MAGTF scheme of maneuver, he will then 
determine the rough order of magnitude of AAW operations required. 
Determine Appropriate Weapon: A5.3.1 Activity related to determining what weapon 
or C2W strategy would be appropriate to engage the TEL or Missile Platform. The 
determination is made if the ACE, MAGTF or the JTF assets would be more appropriate. 
Determine Asset Availability: A5.3.2.1 Activity related to determining the availability of 
Artillery, Aircraft, or SOF. Artillery call for fire is placed with the FSCC. An Aircraft 
destined for a CAS mission may be diverted to an OAAW mission once coordinated with 
the FSCC. 
Determine Combat Service Support Requirements: Al.5.5 Activities related to the 
CSSE commander planning for operations that will provide essential logistics functions, 
activities , and tasks that support and permit force sustainment. 
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Determine Degree Of Air Superiority Required/Desired: Al.5.1 Activity related to 
determining the level of localized air superiority required in the Area Of Operations (AO) 
necessary for successful operations. (FMFM5-60) 
Determine Engagement Criteria/ROE: Al .5.2 Activities related to determining targets, 
conditions for attack, asset assignment for target surveillance, target acquisition, 
deconfliction, SEAT), and attack methods. Rules Of Engagement (ROE) are activities related 
to the coordinating the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or 
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE allows the commander 
to exercise control over aviation units and aircraft by prescribing the exact conditions under 
which they may engage a target. The ROE tells aviation units what they can attack, where 
they can attack, and when they can attack. ROE will contain at a minimum: The right to self 
defense, target identification criteria, and weapons control statuses. (FMFM 5-60) 
Determine Possible Air Control Architecture(s): Al .4.1.4 Activity related to determining 
possible air control Facility locations to provide positive control and those procedural 
control measures required to ensure continuity of operations under adverse environmental 
conditions, or the lack of positive control facilities. 
Determine Possible Air Control Facility Location(s): Al.4.1.4.1 The command and 
control system is the means through which the commander controls and coordinates the 
variety of AAW systems involved in the detection, interception, and destruction of hostile 
targets. The efficient integration and coordination of the surveillance and destructive means 
is the key to making the system effective. Further, the command and control system should 
provide the means to maintain positive control over friendly air support operations in an 
antiaircraft missile environment in order to prevent mutual interference in the accomplish- 
ment of missions. (FMFM 5-5) Determining control systems involves selection, 
positioning, and the assignment of responsibilities. For a discussion of selection and 
positioning of control systems, see NWP 32. Responsibilities for the control of air defense 
are determined and assigned during planning. These assignments are in consonance with the 
missions and functions of the agencies. They establish priorities, communication and 
relationships, and tasks as conditioned by the locations and capabilities of the units involved. 
Generally, air defense control is not decentralized below the level of the TAOC. In addition 
to the assignment of general control responsibilities, special provisions and measures are 
provided for the following: 
(1) Coverage limitations of surveillance equipment and weapons may require 
positioning of air defense systems outside the vital area. This dispersion 
requires special control provisions. 
(2) Decentralization of functions is anticipated and planned for agencies which 
might become saturated in their target handling capabilities. 
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(3) Decentralization of functions is planned for the possibility of communication 
system failures. The circumstances for unilateral assumption of decentralized 
air defense control authority must be clearly defined. As such a failure may 
be progressive and/or widespread, each remaining agency must have compen- 
satory activities assigned, particularly weapons control. Plans for control 
system degradation include preassigned aircraft electronic identification 
codes and the establishment of air corridors, control reporting points, 
restricted areas, and other special aircraft flight procedures to aid in friendly 
identification. All control agencies are furnished the locations of friendly 
aircraft orbit and control points to assure their awareness of friendly aircraft 
activity, thus providing aircraft a degree of safety in the event of ground 
system failures. Units required to form the control component are determined 
from an estimate of the quantities of AAW weapons which will be required 
for simultaneous employment, plus the size and nature of the area and the 
scope of operations. (FMFM 5-5) 
Determine Possible Air Defense Control Measures: Al .4.1.4.4 Activities related to the 
establishment of measures in air defense that maximize the effectiveness of air defense 
operations while minimizing its interference with other operations. Air defense control 
measures must complement established fire support coordination and airspace control 
measures. Air defense control measures include Air defense operations areas, air defense 
action areas, air defense identification zones, air defense areas, regions, and sectors. (FMFM 
5-60) 
1. Air Defense Area: Activity related to the implementation of specifically 
defined airspace for which air defense will be planned and provided. The Joint Force 
Commander (JFC) may assign an Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) to coordinate and 
integrate air defense operations in the air defense area. (FMFM 5-60) 
2. Air Defense: Region Activities related to implementation of the geographic 
subdivision of the air defense area. The CATF will normally be assigned an air defense 
region, with the Antiair Warfare Commander (AAWC) assuming responsibility for all air 
defense operations within that region. Regional air defense commanders (RADCs) can also 
be assigned to other air defense regions. (FMFM 5-60) 
3. Air Defense Sector: Activities related to the implementation of the 
geographical subdivision of an air defense region. The CATF or the JFC will normally 
assign an air defense sector to the MAGTF. The MAGTF commander will assume control 
of the sector(s) which best supports MAGTF Operations. The MAGTF's air defense sector 
is under the control of the landing force sector Antiair Warfare Commander (LFSAAWC). 
The LFSAAWC operates out of the SAAWC operations Facility which is collocated or 
integrated in the TAOC, once ashore and operational. (FMFM 5-60) 
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a. Destruction Area: Activities related to determining that portion of 
the air defense sector where planning and execution for destruction or defeat of the enemy 
airborne threat occurs. The size of the destruction area will depend on the situation. The 
vital area falls within the destruction area. The air intercept, missile intercept, and 
antiaircraft gun zones make up the destruction area. The Marine Corps does not use the 
antiaircraft gun zones. (FMFM 5-60) 
b. Designate Vital Area: Activities related to the determination or 
defense of the area(s) designated to be defended by air defense units. It contains facilities, 
units, and installations necessary for the MAGTF to accomplish its mission. The outward 
boundary or edge is always the reference point in application of the destruction-in-depth 
principles. More than one vital area may exist, depending on the scope of the amphibious 
or expeditionary operation. Vital areas can include airfields, command and control systems, 
combat support units, ground combat element (GCE) unit, and MAGTF command element. 
The MAGTF commander will define the vital areas through his establishment of air defense 
priorities. The vital area falls within the destruction area. (FMFM 5-60) 
(1) Weapons Engagement Zones: Activities related to the 
establishment of airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for 
engagement normally rests with a particular weapons system. These zones are generally 
identified as Low Altitude Missile Engagement Zones (LOMEZ), Fighter Engagement Zones 
(FEZ), Short Range Air Defense Engagement Zones (SHORADEZ), Crossover Zones, and 
Joint Engagement Zones. (FMFM 5-60) 
(a) Air Intercept Zone: Activities related to recom- 
mendation or activation of the defined planned area where interceptor aircraft will destroy 
or defeat the enemy airborne threat. Various Fighter Engagement Zones further defines the 
interceptor responsibilities within the AIZ. 
(i) FEZ: Activities related to the assignment of 
airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement rests with 
fighter aircraft. Each FEZ may have one or several CAP aircraft assigned to patrol it. 
(ii) Combat Air Patrols: Activities related to the 
aircraft patrol over an objective area, over the force protected , over the critical area of the 
combat zone, or over an air defense area., for the purpose of intercepting and destroying 
hostile aircraft before they reach their target. (FMFM 5-60) If the CAP is within the air 
defense area, it is an air defense function. 
(b) Missile Intercept Zone(s): Activities related to the 
recommendation or implementation of the area where surface-to-air weapons (missiles) will 
have primary responsibility for destroying the enemy airborne threat. Various MEZes fall 
within the MIZ. (FMFM 5-60) 
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(i) LOMEZ: Activities related to the assignment 
of airspace established for the control of low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile 
(HAWK) engagements. A low altitude missile engagement zone will limit the volume of 
airspace within which these weapons may conduct engagements without specific direction 
of the AADC. Subject to weapons capabilities, the LOMEZ will normally extend beyond 
the forward edge of the battle area. 
(ii) SHORADEZ: Activities related to the 
assignment of airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engage- 
ment rests with the short range air defense weapons (Stinger, guns). The SHORADEZ may 
fall within a low altitude engagement zone or under a high altitude engagement zone. Some 
areas may be solely defended by SHORED assets. Because centralized control over the 
SHORED weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and 
disseminated so friendly aircraft can avoid them. 
(c) Joint Engagement Zone: Activities related to the 
assignment of airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple air defense weapons 
systems (SAW's and friendly fighters) of one or more services are simultaneously employed 
and operated. The JEZ is an option depending on the capability to have positive hostile 
identification (PHID) of missiles and fighters in the same airspace. (FMFM 5-60) 
(d) Base Defense Zone: Activities related to the air 
defense zone established around an air base and limited to the engagement envelope of the 
short range air defense weapons defending that base. The BDZ have specific entry/exit and 
IFF procedures established. (FMFM 5-60) One or several SHORADEZs will fall within the 
BDZ, but other SHORADEZs may also exist in other locations not related to the BDZ. The 
BDZ procedures will be coordinated with the Air Traffic Control procedures to ensure the 
safe and expeditious control of aircraft. The BDZ will also require coordination with the 
TAOC to assist in early warning. The ATC will also provide early warning to the assigned 
weapons system. 
(e) Crossover Zone: Activities related to establishing of 
the zone or point defining the boundary where an airborne target changes from an air 
intercept target to a surface-to-air missile target. It separates the AIZ from the MIZ, or 
adjacent WEZs, Where more than one type of weapons system has the capability to engage 
an airborne threat. A weapons system making an engagement in this zone will normally be 
under the positive control of Air Command And Control. (FMFM 5-60) Positive control 
would normally be provided by the TAOC, EW/C, or Airborne Early Warning. 
4. Ingress/Egress/Return-To-Force(RTF) Control Procedures: Activities 
related to the establishment of procedures which allow friendly aircraft to safely move in, 
out, and through the MAGTF's airspace . Control procedures must be thoroughly examined, 
especially for safe passage of friendly aircraft through restricted areas.  The use of these 
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control procedures should maximize the safety of the defended area while minimizing the 
possibility of fratricide. These control procedures include the use of: Low level transit 
routes, corridors, control points, visual identification, electronic identification via NCTR, 
TACAN, IFF equipment, Altitude and airspeed restrictions, Lame Duck Procedures(when 
aircraft have no communications, no IFF, battle damage, etc.), and ACAs to name a few. 
(FMFM 5-60) The established procedures will be altered periodically to ensure that the 
enemy cannot replicate them. 
5. Air Defense Warning Conditions: Activity related to the establishment of 
the degree probability of air attack. The particular probability of air attack affects specific 
actions that will be taken by the entire MAGTF, to include aircraft, MACCS agencies, SAW 
units, and ground units. These specific actions are normally established in operations orders, 
Standing Operating Procedures(SOPs), etc. Air Defense Warning Conditions will be passed 
by the senior air control agency to all elements of the MAGTF. Warning conditions may 
differ from one area to of the battlefield to another due to the tactical situation and level of 
the enemy's air threat. In those cases where it is desirable to set different warning conditions 
for different areas of the battlefield, the ACE commander will designate the reference or grid 
system to be used. During independent operations, the senior organizational commander 
assumes responsibility for setting the air defense warning conditions. The three air defense 
warning conditions are: Air Defense Warning Red - Attack by hostile aircraft and/or 
missiles is imminent or in progress. This means that hostile aircraft and/or missiles are 
within an air defense divisions/sector or are in the immediate vicinity of the air defense 
divisions/sector with a high probability of entering the division/sector. Air Defense 
Warning Yellow - Attack by hostile aircraft and/or missiles is probable. This means that 
the hostile aircraft and/or missiles are en route toward and air defense division/sector, that 
unknown aircraft and/or missiles suspected to be hostile are en route toward or are even 
within an air defense division/sector. Air Defense Warning White - Attack by hostile 
aircraft and/or missiles is improbable. (FMFM 5-60) 
6. Weapons Control Status: Activity related to the defining of the restrictions 
on firing air defense weapons for a particular area and time period. The entire MAGTF must 
be aware of the weapons control status, to include MACCS agencies, SAW units, aircraft, 
and ground units. Subordinate operational commanders have the authority to impose a more 
restrictive weapons control status within their sectors/zones of action. These commander can 
also request a less restrictive weapons control status for their operating areas. Independent 
operational commanders may be delegated the authority to set weapons control status for 
their operating areas. Weapons control status may be varied to apply only to certain aircraft 
for specified time periods. For example, weapons free for all aircraft heading westbound, 
weapons tight for all other aircraft is not unusual. Weapons control status are defined as: 
Weapons Free - Weapons control status used to indicate that Air defense weapons systems 
may be fired at any target not positively identified as friendly. Weapons Free is the most 
desirable weapons control status for SAW units as it lessens restrictions on the units and 
maximizes the capabilities of the systems. Weapons Tight - Weapons control status used to 
97 
indicate that Air Defense weapons systems may be fired only at targets identified as hostile 
(in accordance with prevailing target ID criteria). Weapons Hold - Weapons control status 
used to indicate that Air Defense weapons systems may only be fired in self defense or in 
response to a formal order. In the event of lost communications, the air defense units will 
follow the weapons control status procedures detailed in the applicable operations order or 
SOP. (FMFM5-60) 
Determine Possible Airspace Control Measures: Al .4.1.4.3 Airspace control measures 
are procedural control measures designed to maximize the effectiveness of combat operations 
by promoting safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control measures are used 
to delineate or modify hostile criteria, delegate target identification authority, or serve as aids 
for fire control. The assignment of Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), airspace control 
sectors, and air control points directly relate to airspace control measures. (FMFM 5-60) 
Determine Possible Command Facility Location(s): Al.4.1.5 Activity related to 
determining the location of the TACC which is the command facility for the ACE and the 
alternate command facilities. The governing factors in site selection are accessibility, area 
size, shape and physical contour. The selected site must provide for ingress and egress of 
TACC shelters by one of the feasible modes of transportation. The shelters are designed to 
operate at a maximum angle of 20 degrees. (MACCS Reference Guide) Consideration must 
also be given to the communications limitations and the best location to receive and maintain 
the tactical picture and influence the battle. 
Determine Possible Fire Support Coordination Measures: Al.4.1.4.2 Fire support 
coordination measures allow a commander to open up areas for rapid engagement of targets 
or to restrict the control of fires. Since Marine aviation is a source of firepower, it can be 
affected by fire support coordination measures. The Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) is 
a fire support coordination measure that is a three-dimensional block of airspace in which 
friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The ACA acts as a safety 
measure for aircraft while allowing other supporting arms to continue fires. (FMFM 5-60) 
The ACA may be utilized during TM Attack Operations. 
Determine Possible Sensor Location(s): Al.4.13 An effective AAW system requires the 
capabilities to detect, locate, and identify hostile targets on the ground and in the air. This 
surveillance system must have communications for transmitting acquired information to a 
control agency. The method of surveillance may be electronic, photo, infrared radiation, or 
visual techniques. Operational characteristics of AAW surveillance equipment should 
provide long-range detection and identification at all altitudes for early warning. The 
surveillance system must also provide accurate range, bearing, and altitude discrimination 
for weapons control and the ability to observe and identify ground targets. The landing force 
surveillance system must also be compact and lightweight and possess the mobility that will 
ensure ease of handling for amphibious operations. (FMFM 5-5) Detection for attack 
operations requires identification of prelaunch and postlaunch signatures and the accurate 
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location of the launch system. To support attack operations in all environments, diminish 
the effects of enemy countermeasures, and capitalize on distinctive signatures of TM 
equipment, and operations, the surveillance capability will be multispectral, and integrate 
national-level intelligence and other externally furnished information with theater-level 
significance. Detection will involve segmentation of the battlespace of the battlefield to 
accommodate a systematic search of specified areas identified in the IPB. (Joint Publication 
3-01.5) Visual observers will also be included into the sensor category. The ACE will be 
responsible for providing protection against TM s in the terminal phase (determined by the 
maximum range and altitude at which a TM can be targeted by the HAWK missile system). 
Since it should be expected that an enemy attack may integrate aircraft and missiles, TM 
active air defense operations will be integrated into the ACE air defense system. (Joint 
Publication 3-01.5) The sensor selection and emplacement will take into account these dual 
requirements. 
Determine Possible Weapon Location(s): Al.4.1.2 The determination of the required 
number and disposition of weapons components, both SAM elements and aircraft, is based 
on the minimum safe intercept point for each type of threat, enemy delivery technique, attack 
altitude, attack speed, ordnance, and anticipated rate of attack. Another determinant of 
weapons selection is the time lapse between target detection and actual interception. This 
time lapse is minimized by selecting optimum weapons systems and positions. This 
determination of aircraft and SAM elements requires consideration of the following factors; 
1. Aircraft Requirements 
a. Depth of the antiair warfare area which the landing force may be 
assigned. 
b. Operating characteristics and firepower of the aircraft. 
c. Expected duration of the operation. 
d. The total destruction expectancy which the landing force AAW 
system can achieve during the different phases of the amphibious 
operation. 
e. The expected attrition rate for landing force fighter aircraft. 
f. Fighter aircraft provided by commands external to the landing force. 
g. Other factors as may be imposed due to the nature of a particular 
amphibious operation. 
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2. Surface-to-Air Missile Requirements 
a. The effects which weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions may 
have on deployment of antiaircraft missile units. 
b. Operations ashore extending beyond the support of naval antiaircraft 
missile elements or when operations continue after naval forces are 
withdrawn. 
c. The number, size, and distance between AAW vital areas. 
d. The type and duration of naval antiaircraft support available. 
e. The number and type of aircraft units available. 
f. Helicopter availability and AAW weapons systems transportability. 
(FMFM 5-5) 
Determine Situation and Courses of Action: A4.2 Activities related to determining the 
current situation and possible course of action. (AFSC Pub 1) 
Determine Size, Profile, Launch & Probable Impact Point: A3.1.3.4 Once all of the 
tracks are associated, the size of the raids, profile information, launch point can be 
determined. The impact point will be calculated in the AN/TPS-59 radar for TM tracks that 
it produces, other sensors will be responsible for placing the information on the JTIDS link. 
Determine Surveillance Area Readjustment: A3.1.1.1 The surveillance area is the area 
in which air search, detection, and tracking are accomplished. It must extend beyond the 
destruction area to allow enough warning that reaction times will permit engagement as the 
target reaches the destruction area. This surveillance area is not coincidental with the 
destruction area as it is not limited by interceptor positive control restrictions. Further, the 
destruction area is oriented totally toward the assigned air defense sector of responsibility, 
while the surveillance area might extend into another air defense sector. Lag time is the sum 
of all times required to collect, evaluate, and commit a weapons system to a detected air 
defense target. The surveillance area is expanded to absorb this lag time by converting the 
most logically anticipated target speed into distance. One particular qualification applies to 
this surveillance area for low-altitude detection. When surface radar is employed as the 
principal method of detecting low-altitude targets over land, extended range is better attained 
by locating radars on high elevations and supplementing coverage with gap filler radars 
displaced inland. Special visual zones in specific avenues of approach may be used beyond 
the vital area or surrounding installations to further supplement this coverage. (FMFM 5-5) 
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Determine Surveillance System Re-Positioning Requirements: A3.1.1.2 Activity related 
to determining if the current surveillance network is providing an adequate picture of the 
battlespace, if not and a better picture is required, then a repositioning of assets may be 
necessary. Surveillance positions must be considered as an integral portion of the ground 
scheme of maneuver to ensure that the appropriate locations are taken to provide the most 
effective surveillance network possible. 
Determine Threat Composition: A3.1.5 Activity related to fusing all available track 
information to associate the tracks and determine the probability that the tracks are acting as 
a raid or are associated. This is a manual process that is aided by TADIL information and 
displays. 
Determine Time-to-intercept Estimate: Al.3.1 Activity related to developing time and 
space relationships and systems capabilities to provide an estimate of reaction time and 
ability to maintain operational momentum. (FMFM 3, Section 2005) It includes 
determining the effects of topography, masking, mobility, trafficability, vegetation, foliage, 
and environmental effects on the proposed battlespace on weapons and command and 
control. 
Develop C2 Architecture Options: Al.4.1 Activity related to integrating TMD systems 
into existing C2 architecture. The Command and control structure must provide command 
authorities at all levels with timely and accurate data to plan, monitor, direct, control, and 
report TMD operations. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) The MACCS gives the ACE the ability 
to exercise centralized command and coordination and decentralized control of MAGTF air 
assets and operations. It also affords him the means to coordinate air operations with other 
services. (FMFM 5-60) The MACCS also provides the command and control structure 
required to integrate TMD into the existing AAW architecture. 
Develop C3 Architecture: Al.4 Activities related to determining the C3 architecture. 
Once the battlespace area and the time factors are determined, the commander facilitates 
command and control by organizing his command and control organization and C2 support 
system into a framework that orders the battle, provides control measures, and integrate the 
MAGTF's efforts in order to achieve the desired effect on the enemy. (FMFM 3, Section 
2005) 
Develop Communications Architecture Options: Al.4.2 Satellite communications is 
essential to support the vast distances and required operational interfaces with reliable 
networks to support both the vertical and horizontal flow of information. These and many 
other highly technical systems and resources are essential to support the efficient flow and 
processing of information. However, the demand for information always exceeds the 
available support resources. It is therefore crucial to focus information requirements to 
determine the need and priority for C2 support systems. 
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Develop Plans: Al.6 Activities related to the creation of plans necessary to accomplish 
AAW operations. 
Display and Disseminate: A.3.3 Maneuver warfare demands that the C2 support system 
create a common situational awareness throughout the battlespace by rapidly sharing 
information among the commander, his staff, key decision makers, and supporting forces. 
The C2 support system controls the processing and flow of information and integrates 
all-source, multimedia, and multiformat information into an accurate, complete summary. 
Decision makers then access the information required to maintain situational awareness. The 
commander's ability to access, on demand, only the information critical to the area of 
operation allows him to avoid information overload and increases his ability to react. 
(FMFM 3, Section 4001) The landing force AAW system is required to handle a large 
number of air contacts (friendly and enemy) through a high speed data processing system. 
This requirement increases in importance whenever friendly forces on the offensive require 
large numbers of air support aircraft in the objective area. An enlarging AAW area increases 
the number of air contacts that will be detected. The enemy possesses the capability for 
launching mass air attacks. (FMFM 5-5) In identifying the items of air defense summary 
display, only the TAOC and TACC are discussed. All other associated air defense agencies 
maintain similar displays. 
1. TAOC: The following information is made available to the TAOC on a real 
time basis and is necessary to achieve threat evaluation and weapon assignment: The 
location, composition, status, and alert condition of all friendly air defense weapon. 
Particular items required for CAP aircraft are: type of aircraft, number of aircraft, control 
frequency, armament; and Fuel state. The location, identification, and controlling agency 
of all friendly aircraft within the surveillance envelope. Major equipment status of 
subordinate and adjacent air defense units. The location, composition, speed, altitude, and 
course of all unknown/assumed hostile/hostile aircraft. The status of controlled airborne 
intercepts to include aircrew assumption of intercept, attack mode, weapons release, and 
completion or noncompletion of the intercept. ECM/ECCM conditions. 
2. TACC: For air defense purposes, the TACC requires the following 
information: The location, composition, speed, altitude, and course of all unknown/assumed 
hostile/hostile aircraft from all subordinate and adjacent agencies. Major equipment status 
of subordinate and adjacent air defense units. Commitment status of air defense weapons. 
ECM/ECCM conditions. Readiness conditions and availability of unassigned weapons. 
(FMFM 5-5) Dissemination is the distribution of processed information, with the addition 
of human insight, vision , and direction, to its appropriate user. The commander determines 
what information is disseminated to everyone, to designated units or elements (higher, lower 
, adjacent) or to key individuals. The commander also establishes the priority of information. 
If possible, dissemination is predetermined and automated to avoid delaying receipt of 
critical information. (FMFM 3, section 4003) Dissemination includes the dissemination of 
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launch warning information to all components, allies, and host nation civil authorities for 
population warning as appropriate. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) 
Employ/ Maneuver Forces: A2 AAW Weapons means are employed and/or located in 
such a manner as to ensure continuity of engagement and provide for mutual support. In this 
way, the landing force increases the probability of preventing the penetration of the AAW 
vital area by hostile aircraft or missiles. Proper employment and/or location ensures that 
each target is within range of several AAW elements. This integrated and overlapping 
pattern of mutual support and continuity of engagement minimizes any reduction in 
effectiveness of the AAW system resulting from loss of one or more AAW elements. 
(FMFM 5-5) During the conduct of air defense operations ashore, surveillance facilities are 
established, weapons are placed in position, and offensive AAW strikes are conducted to 
reduce the enemy threat to a manageable level. Air control management requires supervision 
and coordination of all tactical air support operations to include the integration of aircraft 
from a variety of sources and the establishment of air defense sectors. Detailed local 
planning examines contingencies related to both enemy air successes and system failures 
within the MACCS. Due to the significance of the threat, all control agency personnel must 
be familiar with the immediate actions required to offset foreseeable degradation. In order 
to obtain this familiarity, standardization and a thorough knowledge of participant responsi- 
bilities and relationships are necessary. The primary determinant in establishing the air 
defense system's standards for surveillance and destruction is the enemy air capability. This 
capability is ascertained by an analysis of the most successful counter weapons available and 
the distribution of friendly forces/installations which require air defense protection. 
Following the identification of these factors, the composition and deployment of specific air 
defense elements are planned. In order to obtain the optimum degree of air defense 
protection with available forces, capabilities are examined, and operational requirements are 
determined. (FMFM 5-5) Emplacement/Maneuvering of Hawk unit. The performance 
characteristics of enemy aircraft represent a technical challenge which the Hawk system has 
been designed to defeat. Enemy force capabilities, on the other hand, are a tactical challenge 
which impacts upon the number and type of Hawk units required and the manner in which 
they are deployed. Enemy ground force as well as air force capabilities must be considered, 
since Hawk units are vulnerable to ground attack while in position and to ambush and mining 
tactics while on the move. The assessment of combined enemy capabilities raises 
deployment considerations which may conflict. For example, an air capability which is not 
extensive may permit the concentration of Hawk units at the most vital of assets and the use 
of position areas which inherently provide excellent mutual fire support and local security. 
Conversely, an extensive enemy air capability may force consideration of the extensive 
dispersion of Hawk units to cover all forces and assets, which in turn will force consideration 
of the resultant reduction in mutual fire support and vulnerability of remote units of both air 
and ground attack. All of the considerations and conflicts imposed by enemy force capabil- 
ities must be weighed and resolved at battalion or higher levels. (FMFM 5-5) 
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Engage Aircraft or UAV: A5.2.1 Within a single sector of air defense responsibility, the 
engagement sequence depends upon the position at which the target is identified. Under 
ideal circumstances, this position is at the limit of the surveillance area, well beyond the CAP 
stations. Time and position allowing, the first engagement will be made by interceptor 
aircraft according to the desired process: i.e., single aircraft attack-reattack or single front 
attack by one or more interceptors. Should the success of the intercept be questionable, as 
the target approaches the crossover zone, missile batteries will be directed to acquire and 
lock-on. Once the target reaches the crossover point, the decision is made whether to allow 
the interceptor to continue his attack or to assign the target to the SAW system. If the 
interceptor is in position to fire and the sector antiair warfare coordinator concurs, the SAW 
units will be given a CEASE FIRE command to allow completion of the interceptor attack. 
If not, the interceptor will be directed to break away and the missiles will engage the target. 
(FMFM 5-5) 
Engage Cruise or Air-to-Surface Missile: A5.2.2.2 Cruise missiles create a somewhat 
different challenge from TM s, Aircraft or UAVs. They can be air, land, or sea launched and 
normally fly to their target at low altitude, thus creating an acquisition problem. Often, they 
follow an unpredictable trajectory that makes it difficult to determine their point of launch 
or to predict their exact impact point. The mobility of the cruise missile launch platforms, 
the small launch signature of the missiles, and their reduced radar cross section also 
complicate TMD operations. Stealth technologies can be incorporated into cruise missiles, 
making them an even more challenging target. A robust combination of friendly active air 
defense and attack operations is required to defeat the Cruise missile threat. (Joint 
Publication 3-01.5) It is for the above reasons that engagement of cruise missiles is broken 
out. 
Engage Missile Launch Platform: A5.3.2.2 Activity related to conducting an engagement 
of a TEL or Missile platform. 
Engage TBM: A5.2.2.1 A TBM will be engaged at the farthest possible point from the 
protected vital area. The most desirable situation is for a TBM to be engaged by a Boost 
phase of mid-course TMD asset prior to its entering the HAWK engagement area. The 
HAWK missile system can engage only those targets that will fall within its limited 
engagement zone and will use a ILM missile for the engagement. 
Engage Theater Missile: A5.2.2 Activity related to engaging a TM that is already in flight. 
The HAWK system coupled with TAOC radar in the TBM or Combined mode of operation 
provides the terminal phase engagement capability. Other theater missiles will be engaged 
in the same manner as a ABT. 
Engage With ACE Assets: A5.3.2 Activity related to tasking an ACE asset to conduct an 
attack on the TEL or Missile Platform. 
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Establish EMCON Plan: Al.4.2.4.3 Activity related to establishing the selective and 
controlled use of the electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and 
control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security, detection by enemy sensors; 
to minimize mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or to execute a military 
deception plan.   (FMFM 5-60) 
Establish LAN/WAN Options: Al.4.2.2.3 Activity related to establishing local area 
networks that are used mainly for administrative traffic. 
Establish Landline Options: Al.4.2.1.3 Activity related to establishing the landline 
requirements to support operations. Landlines are the preferred method of communication 
in most cases. 
Establish Launch Warning Options: Al.4.2.1.5 Developing and executing plans for 
dissemination of launch warning information to all components, allies, and host nation civil 
authorities for population warning, as appropriate. (Joint Publication 3-01.5) 
Establish & Maintain Tactical Picture: A3 Activity related to providing a display of the 
near real-time status of the battlespace. It includes all friendly and enemy air vehicles. 
Establish Management Procedures: Al.4.2.4 Activity related to managing the 
communications architecture to provide for effective, efficient and timely dissemination of 
information. 
Establish Point-to-Point Data Link Options: Al .4.2.2.2 Activity related to establishing 
the architectures for the point-to-point links between: AN/TPS 59 radar and the TAOC(for 
ABT until 1998 then both) AN/TPS 59 radar and the ADCP (for TMD until 1998) ADCP 
and the HAWK BCP (IBDL) ADCP and the HAWK Launcher (GBDL) Point-to-point data 
links activity also include the usage of tactical computers linked via modems for passage of 
information such as the ATO. 
Establish Possible Data Communications Architectures: Al.4.2.2 Activity related to 
establishing all data communications architectures. 
Establish Possible Voice Architectures: Al.4.2.1 Activity related to determining the 
extensive communications network required for the volume and speed of traffic involved 
with air operations and their effective command and control. It will provide for 
interagency/service, intra-agency, and air-to-ground/ground-to-air communications. (FMFM 
5-60) It also includes the net required to communicate a launch warning to the host nation 
civil authorities, if required. 
Establish Radio Communications Options: Al.4.2.1.4 Activity related to establishing 
which portion of the voice architecture will be by tactical radio. 
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Establish SATCOM Options: Al.4.2.1.2 Activity to establish the SATCOM 
requirements. This is especially important for TMD which requires extensive intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance information from theater or national sources. 
Establish TADIL Interface Options: Al .4.2.2.1 Activity related to establishing a TADIL 
interface that is flexible enough to adapt to the tactical scenario as it unfolds and robust 
enough to continuously provide the ACE with an accurate depiction of the status of the 
battlespace. 
Establish Technical Control Procedures: Al .4.2.4.4 Activity related to the establishment 
of procedures to maintain the voice architecture at peak operating capacity. 
Establish Voice Interface Requirements: Al.4.2.1.1 Activity to establish the voice 
interface requirements to conduct AAW operations. The next step is to determine what 
assets will be used to provide the necessary connectivity. 
Examine Current Mission Objectives: A4.1 Activities related to the examination of the 
assigned or deduced task and its purpose. Determination of any immediate tasks, prescribed 
or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission. (AFSC Pub 1) 
Examine MAGTF Mission Objectives: Al.2.2 Air Defense considerations affect the 
MAGTF commander's course of action. The MAGTF commander must establish his air 
defense priorities. The enemy air and missile threat and the type of AAW requested 
determine the degree of destruction or reduction necessary. If existing air defense assets 
pose prohibitive interference to MAGTF operations, the MAGTF Commander assigns high 
target priority to their elimination or neutralization. If assigning terrain objectives for air 
defense purposes, the MAGTF Commander must give priority to the early establishment of 
air defense facilities ashore. (FMFM 5-60) Since Marine aviation is a major, combined 
arms asset of the MAGTF, the ACE objectives are derived from and in conjunction with the 
MAGTF commander's objectives. Understanding the MAGTF's objectives allows the ACE 
and subordinate units to estimate the AAW role that will be required to support the MAGTF 
Commander's scheme of maneuver. 
Examine Political, Legal & Religious Requirements: Al.2.1 TMs may be as much a 
political or religious weapon as a military weapon. In many cases, their political impact 
may outweigh their military significance. (Joint Pub 3-01.5) This activity relates the process 
of identifying the political and legal limitations or considerations which have been place on 
the conduct of the mission. For TMD, there may be a requirement to protect political targets 
from attack by theater missiles, this requires a clear understanding of legal and political 
issues especially relating to host nation sovereignty issues. 
Execute: A5 Activity related to transforming the commander's desires into actions. Active 
AAW operations are those actions taken to destroy, or reduce to an acceptable level, the 
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enemy air threat. Included are those measures taken to destroy this threat prior to and after 
launching. Upon entry into the objective area, MAGTF AAW operations consist mainly of 
offensive strikes to destroy hostile aircraft and missiles and to neutralize airfields, radar 
installations, missile sites, and logistic support facilities. As the capability of the enemy to 
reconstitute his air resources varies, neutralization of the enemy air potential continues, 
employing interceptor sweeps, attack bombing, and aggressive air search and surveillance. 
These operations are intended to supplement the preliminary offensive AAW activity 
previously conducted by carrier attack forces or area forces. Air defense measures to protect 
the MAGTF from residual enemy air constitute another category of active AAW. (FMFM 
5-5) Destruction in depth, mutual support, and centralized coordination and decentralized 
control are three principles of antiair warfare which have evolved from years of experience 
in opposing an air threat. The application of these principles is necessary to achieve and 
preserve air superiority. Destruction-in-depth is considered the most important principle of 
AAW. The main effort is to destroy the enemy air threat at its source. In this respect, sector 
boundaries are assigned within the area of responsibility. The principle of mutual support 
involves the simultaneous engagement of a target by multiple elements of the same type 
weapon. The principle of centralized coordination and decentralized control offers the best 
means of achieving economy of forces while minimizing the reaction time and vulnerability 
to losses. (FMFM5-5) 
Initiate Mission: A5.3.2.2.1 Activity related to initiating the OAAW (Attack ops) mission. 
For Artillery it is a call for fire. For an OAAW mission, it is a JTAR request or a "Nine-Line 
Brief for airborne aircraft. It provides the initial information to commence the mission, but 
may not contain complete target identification. 
Obtain Engagement Quality Track Information: A5.2.2.1.3 The HAWK system requires 
accurate targeting information that is currently available only through the AN/TPS-59 radar. 
This targeting information allows enough resolution for the HPI to commence tracking with 
its pencil beam radar and thus allow for the TBM to be engaged. 
Obtain Launch/Impact Point: A5.2.2.1.1 Activity related to determination of the Launch 
and impact point of a TBM. The AN/TPS-59 radar will have the capability of determining 
both launch and impact point to allow for the earliest possible determination of the ability 
of the HAWK to intercept or if must be taken to further reduce the extent of damage. Other 
sensor information may only provide a launch point and the type of TBM this, would require 
manual determination of the impact point and will all but eliminate the HAWK's ability to 
intercept. 
Obtain TEL/Platform Location: A5.3.2.2.2 Updates Depending on the capabilities of the 
sensor and surveillance systems, and the source and quality of intelligence, cuing of 
additional systems may be necessary to provide more refined enemy missile launch point 
data to ensure accurate targeting. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may be 
able to detect, footprint, or search areas that will then require more refined RSTA activities 
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by theater and tactical assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, 
and other intelligence asserts requiring cueing are focused rapidly to achieve the necessary 
accuracy for IPB targeting objectives. (Joint Pub 3-01.5) Initial indications are that the 
target resolution needs to be, for aircraft, 1000 SQ M in a desert climate, 200 SQ M in a 
mountainous climate and 100 SQ M in all climates for artillery. The updated information 
needs to arrive at the weapons platform 90-180 seconds after mission initialization. (Meeting 
MAWT-1) Point weapons such as general purpose bombs, or PGMs will require target 
acquisition by the delivery platform. Area weapons such as ATACMs, cluster bomb units, 
or scatterable mines, may only need a geographic aim point aircraft diverted from other 
missions will require target location, a clear target description, the appropriate type of 
imagery (SAR, IR, or EO) the weapon system will need to detect the TM, target altitude, best 
attack axis, and controlling agency (if applicable). The degree of detail will vary dependent 
upon the type of munitions available and the on-board sensor system. 
Perform Threat ID & Assessment & Determine Relative Combat Power: Al. 1 Perform 
Threat ID/Assessment & Determine Relative Combat Power Threat assessment should 
permeate the entire planning process from the time of the mission receipt to the time of 
mission accomplishment. As the threat changes, the employment plan will must change 
accordingly. The threat assessment will include: Air Order Of Battle, Ground Order Of 
Battle, Electronic Warfare, Reconnaissance (Both ground and air) and terrorists or 
unconventional threat. Throughout the assessment of the threat, the enemy's capabilities 
must be examined with respect to the friendly situation ACE and MAGTF capabilities, 
limitations, and intentions. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) The Intelligence Preparation 
of the Battlefield serves as the basis for the threat analysis and assists in determining the 
follow areas: 
Determine Air Order Of Battle Process related to creation of an assessment of threat 
Air capabilities. It extends beyond the normal encyclopedic-type data on airframe 
capabilities and limitations and includes enemy's ordnance capabilities, extent of training 
and morale, their likely tactics, and their intended likely targets. (MACCS Tactical Planning 
Guide) 
Determine Ground Order Of Battle Activities related to collecting information on the 
threat's surface to surface missile (SSM) threat. Specific areas to address when conducting 
the assessment of the threat's SSM capability include: location, range, accuracy, ability to 
rapidly displace and be ready to fire once again. Particular attention is given to the threat's 
mechanized capability, as it will likely impact on the siting of agencies which conduct the 
control of aircraft and missiles. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) Determine EW 
Capabilities Activities related to determining the threat Electronic Warfare Support (ES) and 
Electronic Attack (EA) capabilities. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Determine Reconnaissance Capabilities Determination of the threat's Airborne and 
Ground reconnaissance capability. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
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Determine Terrorist/Unconventional Activities related to the determination of 
potential terrorist or unconventional operations capability. A terrorist with a well-aimed 
sniper round or a well placed satchel charge can just as easily disrupt the MAGTF's ability 
to effect the control of aircraft and missiles as can an aircraft with ordinance. (MACCS 
Tactical Planning Guide) 
Plan for Execution: A 1.5 Activities related to conducting coordination with higher, 
adjacent and subordinate units, translating the ACE Commander's intent and priorities into 
projected AAW missions and coordinating support for these missions. 
Provide Command and Control: A5.1 The basic principle involved in the command and 
control afforded by the AAW system is that the results of coordinated effort are greater by 
many times than any possible results of the random separate efforts of individual units. This 
increased effectiveness is derived from the manner in which the functioning and effect of 
each component is complemented by the other components. This requires a centralized 
control for coordination, overall authority, and responsibility; and decentralized control for 
short reaction time. The delegation of authority to control any of the subsystems is governed 
by the capabilities of the system and subsystems as related to the situation. In modern AAW, 
the delegation of authority to subordinate control agencies is required to reduce force 
reaction time. The MAGTF commander, through his ACE and the agencies of the Marine 
air command control system, commands, controls, and coordinates Marine tactical air 
operations. The MACCS, while primarily responsive to the MAGTF commander, must also 
be compatible with and supportive of other like systems within the joint force. The 
TACC/TADC is the primary point of contact for operational aviation coordination with JTF 
and forces external to the MAGTF, although subordinate agencies may interface directly to 
exchange information. When engaged in joint operations, aircraft of more than one service 
may be required to traverse and/or conduct operations in portions of the same airspace, 
thereby necessitating procedures to minimize mutual interference and to maximize 
operational effectiveness and safety. Under such conditions, it is essential that all aircraft 
operate under an integrated airspace control system. Any airspace control system must, 
however, be responsive to the ground commander's need for artillery and/or naval gunfire 
support, as well as providing for air defense and ensuring flight safety. The joint force 
commander establishes general airspace control procedures and responsibilities to achieve 
the maximum safety and operational effectiveness. The joint coordinating authority for air 
is additionally responsible for the coordination of airspace control. The purpose of any 
coordination must be to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. In this case, however, the 
effectiveness of the coordinated ground, surface, and air effort is the prime consideration, not 
merely to increase efficiency. Within the MAGTF sector of responsibility, the TAOC is the 
major en route air traffic control facility, and the Marine air traffic control unit provides 
terminal air traffic control. Provide Airspace Control Activities related to providing for the 
coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of a defined airspace. It also provides for 
the identification of airspace users. Airspace control is the authority to direct the maneuver 
of aircraft so the best use is made of the airspace. Airspace control authority is inherent to 
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the commander whose unit is responsible particular blocks of airspace, types of missions, or 
types of aircraft. It does not include measures to approve, disapprove, deny, or delay air 
operations. (FMFM 5-60) Provide Positive Control Activities related to the method of 
providing positive identification, tracking, and direction of aircraft within an assigned 
airspace, conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and 
responsibility therein. Positive control relies on real-time tracking, direction, direction, and 
identification of aircraft by agencies equipped with capabilities such as radar, identification 
friend or foe (IFF), computers, digital data links, and communications equipment. Positive 
control can be equated to electronic control. Units must have backup procedures in the event 
of failure of part or all of their positive control systems. Two conditions must exist for a 
commander to exercise positive control of aircraft and missiles: (1) Means to identify and 
locate airspace users, and (2) Continuous communications must be maintained with airspace 
users. (FMFM 5-60) Provide Procedural Control Activity related to establishing 
non-electronic methods to provide airspace control. Usually through the use of control 
points, and airspace restrictions and special use airspace. These procedures allow for 
flexibility when air operations are in areas with little or no communications, when air 
operations are in areas where no electronic surveillance assets are employed or in extreme 
environmental conditions such as Jamming or atmospheric interference. (FMFM5-60) 
Provide Continuity Of Engagement & Mutual Support AAW weapons means are employed 
and/or located in such a manner as to ensure continuity of engagement and provide for 
mutual support. In this way, the landing force increases the probability of preventing the 
penetration of the AAW vital area by hostile aircraft or missiles. Proper employment and/or 
location ensures that each target is within range of several AAW elements. This integrated 
and overlapping pattern of mutual support and continuity of engagement minimizes any 
reduction in effectiveness of the AAW system resulting from loss of one or more AAW 
elements. (FMFM5-5) 
Provide Track Monitoring: A3.2 Once initial radar detection has been made, the air 
defense control agency requires a means of maintaining the changing position of the radar 
contact. It is additionally necessary to keep abreast of the movements and intentions of 
friendly aircraft operating within the objective area. For this purpose, surveillance operators, 
traffic controllers, and weapons controllers are stationed in the TAOC. Once traffic is 
detected and identified as friendly, they are passed to a TAOC traffic controller whose 
function is to provide flight following navigational assistance, and altitude separation from 
other air traffic. Traffic controllers are normally assigned geographic subsectors in which 
they maintain accurate and timely situation data on all friendly aircraft. Their tasks include 
control of aircraft reporting for flight following. These personnel assist the surveillance 
effort by sustaining timely information on targets already processed for identification. 
Weapons controllers are responsible to ensure current track status on interceptor aircraft 
under control. When CAP stations are not actively manned, weapons controllers may 
function as additional traffic controllers. (FMFM 5-5) 
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Receive Cuing, GCI or Detect Target Locally: A5.2.1.1 If the target is detected by a 
sensor other than that of the weapons platform, cuing will be provided in the form of a point 
out (i.e. 240- at 10,000 feet from your position) over a voice net or a symbol and command 
will be initiated via the TADIL. Aircraft could be provided with one of several forms of 
Ground Controlled Intercepts to the target. In the case of low-flying aircraft, the weapons 
platforms may be the first to detect and therefore will have total situation awareness on the 
target. 
Reload Missile: A5.2.2.1.6 The reload capability required to sustain a high rate of fire is 
provided by the loader. Although in normal operation the loader handles missiles three at 
a time, it can load or unload from one to three missiles. The loader is a tracked vehicle with 
a superstructure of movable missile supports which are controlled from the driver's 
compartment. During a loading operation, the loader indexes to the pallet or launcher for 
load support during missile transfer. If required, the loader may be converted to a crane by 
attaching a single fixture. (FMFM5-5) 
Reload/ Reconstitute: A5.2.1.5 Activity related to reloading the HAWK missile launcher 
or providing air-to- air refueling to CAP aircraft with available weapons. 
Request External Engagement: A5.3.3 Activity related to requesting assistance from the 
MAGTF, NEX, or JTF commander for weapons or capabilities that are not available within 
the ACE. 
Resolve Shortfalls: Al .5.4 Activity related to resolving shortfalls by re-allocating MAGTF 
assets or requesting support from external sources. 
Set Mode of Operation/Readiness State: A3.1.1.3 The setting or requesting the mode of 
operation for sensors includes sensors at all levels operational to strategic. A discussion of 
the specifics for the mode of operation is normally available technical or reference manuals. 
The mode of operation is important to the MAGTF because of the multiple mission 
capability of the AN/TPS-59. The selection of Air Breathing Target (ABT) mode or Theater 
Ballistic Missile (TBM) mode will affect the capabilities to conduct AAW. Appendix G 
provides a brief summary of capabilities. The TAOC establishes the sensor readiness sate 
based on the anticipated or existing air defense situation, ensuring the passage of information 
on friendly, unknown, and enemy aircraft to the DASC, the command post of the LAAD 
battery. These sensor readiness states could be: "2 minutes"; sensors can be operational 
within 2 minutes. "5 minutes"; sensors can be operational within 5 minutes. "15 minutes"; 
sensors can be operational within 15 minutes. "30 minutes"; sensors can be operational 
within 30 minutes. "1 hour"; sensors can be operational within 1 hour. "3 hours"; sensors 
can be operational within 3 hours. "Released"; sensors are released from surveillance 
commitment for a specified period of time. Although sophisticated radar systems require 
considerable maintenance for ideal performance, they are capable of operating at levels less 
than optimum. Those radars considered essential to achieve required detection probabilities 
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must be assigned a minimum acceptable level of degradation. Once this level is exceeded, 
for any reason, standby radars assume the surveillance activity, while also meeting 
performance standards. If primary radar assets permit sufficient overlap coverage, standby 
radar requirements may be reduced. However, overlap coverage is often degraded by 
adverse terrain characteristics and requires the utilization of secondary radars as a 
supplementary measure. When resources are limited, priorities are established for the 
employment of secondary radars. (FMFM 5-5) 
Weight Air Control/Coordination Measures: Al.4.1.4.5 Activity related to weighting 
the combinations of air control, airspace control measures and air defense control measures. 
The intent is to arrive a combination that allows for the best integration of coordination, 
integration, regulation and identification. (FMFM5-60) Coordination. That degree of 
authority necessary to achieve effective, efficient, and flexible use of airspace without 
providing command authority. Integration. Considers the need to combine requirements for 
the use of airspace in the interest of achieving a common goal at the lowest possible level. 
Regulation. The requirement to supervise activities in the airspace to provide for flight 
safety and connotes the authority to ensure safe flight. Identification. Promotes timely 
engagement of enemy aircraft while reducing the potential of fratricide. 
Weight C2 Options: Al.4.1.6 Activity related to weighting the command and control 
options to assist the commander in determining the framework that orders the battle, provides 
control measures, and integrates the ACE's efforts in order to achieve the desired effect on 
the enemy. The commander will determine the weighting to be assigned. 
Weight C3 Architecture Options: Al.4.4 The combined weighted C2 and communi- 
cations options are combined into a weighted matrix of options that are then provided to the 
ACE Commander for inclusion in the AAW plans and for final selection during the 
employment phase. 
Weight Communications Options: Al.4.2.3 Activity related to weighting the communi- 
cations options so that an optimum mix can ultimately be determined by the ACE 
Commander. 
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APPENDIX D. DEFINITIONS: INPUTS, OUTPUTS, 
CONTROLS, AND MECHANISMS 
This appendix is provided as an aid to the reader. It is being prepared by Marien 
Conklin, Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), RDT&E 
Division, Code 411. 
AAW Reports 
To be determined. 
Airspace 
The total airspace surrounding the proposed AO. 
ACE 
Aviation Combat Element- The ACE is task organized to conduct air operations. It 
consists of an ACE commander, aviation staff, and its own command and control support. 
The ACE has organic aviation command, combat support, and combat service support units. 
There is only one ACE in a MAGTF. If required, units of the ACE can be based at diverse 
locations to speed response. (FMFM 3 Section 3003) 
ACE Agencies 
All agencies belonging to the ACE. 
ACE Assets 
The ACE assets are organic ACE assets that are available to prosecute the AAW 
Mission. The major asset categories are broken out below. 
ACE Assets (Aircraft) 
This category includes all Aircraft available to the ACE. This includes the FA/18 as 
the primary radar capable CAP aircraft; AH1 and AV8 as visual CAP aircraft, and all other 
aircraft that either provide a strike capability for the OAAW mission or provide support to 
the strike mission. It also includes any support aircraft that transports or moves AAW 
ordnance or weapons platforms. 
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ACE Assets (Aircraft, UAV) 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) - ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, 
and artillery projectiles are not considered UAVs. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
ACE Assets (Communication) 
This category includes all Organic ACE communication assets. For a complete 
discussion of the assets, FMFM 3-30 and the appropriate technical manuals must be 
referenced. 
ACE Asset (Comm - Radio Equip) 
Ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58) 
Very-high frequency (VHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58) 
High frequency (HF) radio(s) and crypto   (KY-75/advanced narrow band digital 
voice terminal [ANDVT]) 
The plotter receives information from TAOC operators and/or determines the current 
air situation from listening to various radio nets. 
This air threat environment might preclude missions such as immediate CAS, as the 
requirement for effective radio communications and coordination may not be possible. 
(FMFRP 0-14) 
Radio - speaker available to broadcast in SOF any VCAU net/line. A radio rack with 
four (objective of six) shelves will be provided. The rack will allow various radios to be 
operated within the SOF and will provide external access to enable radio/antenna cables 
remoted external to the shelter or facility. 
ACE Asset (Comm - Satellite) 
Satellite/multichannel (MUX) assets 
ACE Assets (Command Platform) 
The assets of the Marine Air Command And Control System provides the means for 
the ACE to effectively command MAGTF airspace and aviation assets. It includes assets of 
the: Tactical Air command Center, Tactical Air Direction Center, Tactical Air Operations 
Center and Early Warning/Control (EW/C) sites, Direct Air Support Center, and Marine Air 
Traffic Control Detachments. 
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ACE Assets (Control Platform) 
The assets of the Marine Air Command And Control System provides the means for 
the ACE to effectively control MAGTF airspace and aviation assets. It includes assets of 
the: Tactical Air Command Center, Tactical Air Direction Center, Tactical Air Operations 
Center and Early Warning/Control (EW/C) sites, Direct Air Support Center, and Marine Air 
Traffic Control Detachments. 
ACE Assets (Data Link) 
The data link assets of the ACE include TADIL A, B, C, ATDL-1, point-to-point data 
links and LAN/WAN configurations. 
ACE Assets (Data Link - TAOC(AN/TPS-59), ADCP, TAOC) 
AN/TPS-59 Radar - the radar will be modified to provide increased ability to detect, 
track, and process TBM targets and distribute those targets to the TAOM. In the near-term 
configuration, the AN/TPS-59 is connected to a TAOC via fiber optic cable for passing air 
breathing target (ABT) information and to the light anti-air missile (LAAM) battalion's air 
defense communications platform (ADCP) via a point-to-point data link for passing TBM 
tracks. 
ACE Assets (Data Link - TAOC, TACC, ADCP, BCP) 
MACCS systems (TACC, DASC, MACALS, ADCP/BCP) and other service/allied 
C2 systems. 
ACE Assets (MACCS) 
The assets of the Marine Air Command And Control System provides the means for 
the ACE to effect command and control of MAGTF airspace and aviation assets. It includes 
assets of the: Tactical Air Command Center, Tactical Air Direction Center, Tactical Air 
Operations Center and Early Warning/Control (EW/C) sites, Direct Air Support Center, and 
Marine Air Traffic Control Detachments. 
ACE Assets (Mobility Requirements) 
This includes all of the equipment to move, transport and remain in a mobile status. 
ACE Assets (Resolved Shortfalls) 
This category identifies that the difference between the assets required to support the 
AAW mission and the assets organic to the ACE that are available has been resolved. 
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ACE Assets (RSTA) 
This includes all organic Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition assets 
of the ACE. 
ACE Assets (Sensors) 
This category includes all sensors organic to the ACE. Included are the COMINT, 
ELIOT, Photo, Radar, and Visual observations. The An/TPS-59 is the only radar modified 
for TBM tracking. 
Through radar inputs from its organic sensors and data link information from other 
military radar units (MRU), the TAOC provides real-time surveillance of assigned airspace 
in addition to air direction, positive aircraft control, and navigational assistance to friendly 
aircraft. Its primary function, to conduct and coordinate anti-air warfare (AAW), is 
accomplished through the direction, coordination, and employment of various air defense 
weapons systems which include interceptor aircraft and ground based air defense (GBAD) 
weapons. 
ACE Assets (Shortfalls) C2 & Weapons 
This category identifies the difference between the C2 & Weapon assets required to 
support the AAW mission and the assets organic to the ACE that are available. 
ACE Assets (Shortfalls) - Communications 
This category identifies the difference between the C2 & Weapon assets required to 
support the AAW mission and the assets organic to the ACE that are available. 
ACE Assets ( Shortfalls) - Mobility Required 
This category identifies the difference between the required equipment to move, 
transport and remain in a mobile status to support the designated AAW mission and the 
mobility assets organic to the ACE that are available. 
ACE Assets (Shortfalls) 
This category identifies the difference between the assets required to support the 
AAW mission and the assets organic to the ACE that are available. 
ACE Assets (Tankers) 
Orbit areas (AEW/CAP/tankers/CAS stacks/EA/ES). 
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ACE Assets (Voice, Data) 
Voice 2002 - Communications: the SOF and the TAOC are normally physically or 
electronically co-located, hence certain communication assets may be shared. The SAAWC 
and SAAWC staff require reliable means of communication with the TAOC, higher, 
adjacent, and subordinate air defense agencies. Communications within the SOF may 
include: 
(1) Digital subscriber voice terminal (DSVT). 
(2) Digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT). 
(3) Secure telephone unit (STU) III (secure voice). 
(4) Intercommunication system (ICS). 
(5) Ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58). 
(6) Very-high frequency (VHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58). 
(7) High frequency (HF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-75/advanced 
narrow band digital voice terminal [ANDVT]). 
(8) Satellite/multichannel (MUX) assets. 
(9) AN/GRA-39 (for remote access, hot lines, etc.). 
ACE Assets (Weapons - Siting Options) 
To be determined. 
ACE Assets (Weapons) 
This category includes all AAW weapons available to the ACE. It also includes 
strike weapons that support the OAAW mission. 
Its primary function, to conduct and coordinate anti-air warfare (AAW), is 
accomplished through the direction, coordination, and employment of various air defense 




Conducting air defense specific planning to support the ACE battlestaff in preparing 
the air defense portions of operation orders to include: 
Identifying critical assets, vital areas, and air defense priorities. 
Coordinating the preparation of the ACE surveillance plan. 
Establishing and coordinating air defense communication requirements. 
Recommending air defense control measures. 
Recommending the utilization of allocated air defense weapons platforms. 
Ascertaining availability of air-to-air missiles (AAM) and surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM) and developing specific requirements for a resupply plan. 
Coordinating establishment of airspace management/control procedures. 
Planning for the tactical redeployment/alternate siting of AAW assets in 
response to changes in the surveillance plan, the threat, or the ground force 
positions. 
Identifying the need for airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft to the 
ACE/Marine air control group (MACG) to supplement radar coverage. 
ACE Battlestaff (ACE Commander) 
The ACE commander, his staff, and the MACCS, as the MAGTF's air operations and 
AAW experts, provide joint or combined force planners with the MAGTF's AAW 
capabilities and requirements. They also identify MAGTF capabilities and requirements 
relative to airspace control and air defense operations. Specifically, joint and combined 
operational plans must: 
(1) Integrate and complement the mission of the joint force. 
(2) Ensure the interoperability of equipment and personnel. 
(3) Ensure the common use and understanding of terminology. 
(4) Allow responsiveness and the massing of firepower whenever and 
wherever needed. 
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(5) Identify the proper liaison and staff/agency representation between joint 
force components. (Representatives from each component must enable and 
improve the information flow and provide expertise.) 
(6) Outline procedures for airspace control and air defense degradation. 
(7) Facilitate transition from peacetime conditions to hostilities. 
ACE Battlestaff (ACLO) - Air Control Liaison Officer 
A member of the TACC (FOS) who is responsible for advising the G-3/S-3 on air 
control issues to include: 
Coordinating with senior and subordinate air defense control agencies. 
Recommending the tactical employment of air and surface AAW means. 
Planning and coordinating with services concerning SAW matters. 
Planning and coordinating with adjacent, higher, and external HQs on OAS 
and Assault Support control matters. 
ACE Battlestaff (ADC) - Air Defense Coordinator 
Responsible to the Senior Air Coordinator for coordinating Air Defense within the 
MAGTF area of responsibility. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE Battlestaff (ASC) - Air Support Coordinator 
Responsible to the Senior Air Coordinator for coordination of OAS and assault 
support within the MAGTF area of responsibility. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE Battlestaff (C2W Plans Officer) 
A member of the TACC (FOS) who: 
Coordinates and establishes priorities between EW and signals intelligence 
missions. 
Coordinates lethal and nonlethal EW with the Weapons Employment Officer 
(WEO) to ensure that jamming, electronic deception, and destructive EW are 
integrated with other aviation weapons. 
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Coordinates with communications-electronics officer (CEO) to ensure 
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Prioritizes the target requirements of enemy electronic emitting agencies that 
may influence the MAGTF's capabilities to conduct operations. (FMFM 5- 
60) 
ACE Battlestaff (Frequency Manager) 
Initial Planning - After receipt of an initiating directive from the MAGTF commander 
(in situations involving amphibious operations) or after receiving an operation plan 's 
(OPLAN) initiating order, the SAAWC and TAOC staffs will begin the initial planning 
phase. Considerations for the initial planning phase include: 
a. Establishing early liaison and initiating coordination efforts with amphibious 
task force (ATF) and joint force planners and coordinating with adjacent and 
subordinate units for operational execution. 
b. Identifying communication requirements for subordinate, adjacent, and 
higher level circuits with the aviation combat element (ACE)/MAGTF 
communications planners. These requirements should include identification 
of desired connectivity, encryption hardware and software, and authentication 
materials. 
c. Coordinating all frequency requirements (voice, data, radars) for subordinate, 
adjacent, and higher level circuits with the ACE/MAGTF communications 
planner. 
ACE Battlestaff (FOS) 
TACC's future operations section (FOS). 
ACE Battlestaff (FWF) - Fixed Wing Fragger 
A member of the TACC (FOS) who is responsible to the G-e/S-3 for detailed 
planning and tasking of fixed wing aircraft and also: 
Plans the required number of sorties for air interdiction. 
Plans and estimates the availability of air assets for the AAW concept. 
Plans sorties for OAS. 
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Plans the required number of sorties for CAS. 
Computes excess/required sorties for fixed-wing assets and forwards them 
to the G-3/S-3 Watch Officer. 
Assists in the preparation of the ATO. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE Battlestaff (G-3/S-3 Watch Officer) 
Senior watch officer in the TACC (FOS). He is responsible for all matters relating 
to the prosecution of future air operations. He performs the following duties: 
Coordinates and supervises the detailed planning and resource allocation 
of ACE units by the FOS for future operations, to include development    of 
the ATO(s) and FRAGOs. 
Maintains situational awareness on the friendly situation, both air and 
ground. 
Evaluates the tactical situation and advises the operations section in the 
ACE HQ in the preparation of operation estimates, operations plans and 
orders, and operational and historical reports. 
Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 for the employment of intelligence systems 
and for updates on the enemy situation, to include establishing EW 
priorities. 
Establishes priorities for allocation of personnel, weapons, equipment, and 
ammunition in short supply. 
Exchanges information with the COS and the planners in the ACE HQ on the status 
of current and future operations. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE Battlestaff (G-6) 
The Communications and Electronics Officer who assists in ACE communications 
planning. 
ACE Battlestaff (ICO) - Interface Coordination Officer 
Responsible to the Senior Air Coordinator in the TACC for ensuring and accurate 
situation display and orderly functioning of all data links and data interfaces. He performs 
the following duties: 
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Ensures the accurate and timely publishing of coordinating instructions for 
data link employment. 
Establishes surveillance sectors for suitably equipped platforms commen- 
surate with their surveillance capabilities. 
Assigns the responsibility for establishing and reporting special points for 
interface among all link participants. 
Ensures that surveillance/identification procedures are published and 
executed. 
Utilizes data filters to protect participating units' data base without 
degrading the air situation display. 
Monitors TADILS and makes or recommends changes as necessary to 
ensure the best link quality. 
ACE Battlestaff (IWO) - Intelligence Watch Officer 
A member of the TACC organization, but not specifically included as a member of 
the TACC (COS or FOS). He is responsible to the Senior Watch Officer for maintaining an 
accurate display of the enemy situation, both air and ground. Supporting the COS, he 
advises the FOS on possible enemy courses of action as a result of current operations. He 
also: 
Ensures that the intelligence status boards and data bases are current and 
keeps the Senior Watch Officer on any changes. 
Coordinates with the ACE G-2/S-2 watch officer and the intelligence watch 
officers of aircraft groups and squadrons for mission planning EEIs. 
Coordinates intelligence operations with external agencies. 
Coordinates photo and sensor imagery requests and tasking. 
Disseminates intelligence information to subordinate agencies and units. 
Exchanges information with FOS and the Operations Planners in the ACE 
HQ on the enemy status in current operations. (FMFM 5-60) 
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ACE Battlestaff (MACCS (DASC)) 
SAAWC Role in Amphibious Operations - During an amphibious operation, 
MACCS air command and control (C2 ) facilities, whose functions parallel those of the 
Navy's air control agencies afloat, are established ashore. Once operational ashore, these 
MACCS agencies initially operate in a standby status, monitoring appropriate communi- 
cations circuits and acquiring situational awareness in preparation for assuming control of 
their particular air control functions. Normally, once a particular MACCS facility (DASC, 
TAOC, etc.) is completely operational, to include appropriate equipment and communi- 
cations circuits, the commander, landing force (CLF) will request from the commander, 
amphibious task force (CATF) that control ofthat function be passed from the appropriate 
naval agency afloat to the MACCS agency ashore. After passage of a particular control 
function ashore, the naval agency afloat will continue to monitor appropriate communication 
circuits and remain ready to resume active control in the event this becomes necessary. The 
operation order will state exactly what prerequisites must be met (i.e., checklists) prior to 
accomplishing the passage of control ashore and how the passage of control ashore will be 
accomplished. 
ACE Battlestaff (MWCS) - Marine Wing Communications Squadron 
Primary communications organization within the ACE. Specifically it: 
Provides technical assistance in planning of ACE communications for 
command and control of MAGTF aviation assets. 
Provides all backbone multichannel and digital trunking/switching system 
links between the ACE command, agencies of the MACCS and forward 
operating bases. 
Provides message center services for the TACC. 
Provides tactical automated switching and telephone services to the TACC 
and ACE headquarters. 
Provides communications control for the ACE. 
ACE Battlestaff (SAC) - Senior Air Coordinator 
The senior MACCS watch Stander in the current operations section of the TACC 
He is responsible for execution of current operations through the MACCS. 
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ACE Battlestaff (SJA) - Staff Judge Advocate 
Although not a normal participant in the ACE Battlestaff or TACC staff, in TMD 
operations, the SJA would be expected to provide legal services. 
ACE Battlestaff (TAWO) - Tactical Air Watch Officer 
The TAWO is responsible to the SAC for matching fixed-wing assets with 
requirements. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE Battlestaff (TDC) - Track Data Coordinator 
The TDC is responsible to the Senior Air Coordinator in the TACC for track 
coordination within the MACCS and other tactical data systems. He performs the following 
duties: 
Provides track coordination within the MACCS and other tactical Data systems by: 
Resolving track reporting conflicts referred to him for action. 
Resolving dual track designations. 
Initiating drop track orders. 
Resolving identification conflicts. 
Initiating Handover Orders. 
Selectively readdressing incoming/outgoing orders. 
Ensure proper use of manual cross tel procedures. 
Recommend changes to data link configuration. 
Ensures that the data link picture is an accurate presentation of the current 
air operations. 
The TDC's function may be combined with that of the ICO depending on the 
intensity of the operation and the number of track data system participants. 
(FMFM 5-60) 
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ACE Battlestaff (WEO) Weapons Employment Officer 
A member of the TACC (FOS) who advises the G-3/S-3 on the best utilization of 
Aviation weapons. He performs the following: 
Advises the G-3/S-3 watch officer of the most efficient employment of all 
of the wing's aviation ordnance assets. 
Works directly with the Fixed Wing Fragger and Rotary Wing Fragger. 
Recommends ordnance requirements based on available target information 
for current and future operations. 
Provides weponeering data for CAS, DAS, interdiction, and SEAD/offensive 
anti-air Warfare (OAAW) missions. 
Performs target analysis for nuclear/chemical munitions and coordinates   all 
related mission planning. 
Coordinates with the command and control Warfare (C2W) plans officer 
on EW targeting and employment procedures. (FMFM 5-60) 
ACE C3 Architecture 
The ACE C3 Architecture refers to the command, control and communications 
architecture that is created to support AAW in general and TMD in specific. It includes all 
data and voice communications. 
ACE C3 Architecture (C2 Option) 
To be determined. 
ACE C3 Architecture (Casualty Option) 
To be determined. 
ACE C3 Architecture (COMM Net & Freq Assign) 
Refers to the Communications Nets that are required and the Frequency(ies) assigned 
to them. 
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ACE C3 Architecture (Connectivity) 
Refers to which agencies or tactical assets can communicate via the ACE C3 
Architecture to another unit also within or connected to the architecture. 
ACE C3 Architecture (Data Option) 
The data portion of the architecture which will include ground based data links, 
TADIL A, TADIL B, and TADIL J among others. 
ACE C3 Architecture (Facility Location) 
The location of a facility that provides support to the ACE C3 architecture. 
ACE C3 Architecture (JTIDS) Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
JTIDS will be used by TMD agencies to coordinate TMD operations. 
ACE C3 Architecture (Status) 
The current status of the C3 architecture. Includes participants, quality of 
communications and alternate communication capabilities. 
ACE C3 Architecture (TADIL) Tactical Digital Information Link 
Until all ACE AAW agencies and/or assets become JTIDS capable. TADIL A will 
provide the main source of communicating TMD operations with the TACC and TAOC. 
ACE C3 Architecture (Voice Options) 
Communications - The SOF and the TAOC are normally physically or electronically 
co-located, hence certain communication assets may be shared. The SAAWC and SAAWC 
staff require reliable means of communication with the TAOC, higher, adjacent, and 
subordinate air defense agencies. Communications within the SOF may include: 
(1) Digital subscriber voice terminal (DSVT). 
(2) Digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT). 
(3) Secure telephone unit (STU) III (secure voice). 
(4) Intercommunication system (ICS). 
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(5) Ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58). 
(6) Very-high frequency (VHF) radio(s) and crypto (KY-57/58). 
(7) High frequency (HF) radio(s) and crypto  (KY-75/advanced narrow band 
digital voice terminal [ANDVT]). 
(8) Satellite/multichannel (MUX) assets . 
(9) AN/GRA-39 (for remote access, hot lines, etc.). 
ACE Capabilities 
This identifies the combat capabilities of the ACE. It identifies the ACE's ability to 
conduct AAW and TMD. 
ACE Capabilities (Data Link) 
The data portion of the architecture which will include ground based data links, 
TADIL A, TADIL B, and TADIL J among others. 
ACE Capabilities (IADS/Personnel) 
The mental and tactical capabilities of the integrated air defense personnel assigned 
to the ACE staff and the System technical capabilities. 
ACE Capabilities (Relative Combat Power) 
This includes an examination and comparison of opposing forces which involves an 
assessment of communication and electronics capabilities, logistic support, and time and 
distance factors.   (FMF 5-5) 
ACE Capabilities (Sensor) 
The capability of the sensor under discussion. Includes such items as range, 
resolution, field of view, and accuracy. 
ACE Capabilities (System) 
The physical and tactical capabilities of the integrated air defense systems technical 
capabilities assigned to the ACE staff. 
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ACE Capabilities (System/Weapon Performance) 
The physical and tactical performance capabilities of the integrated air defense 
systems and weapons technical capabilities assigned to the ACE staff at a given time. This 
is normally less than their advertised capability. 
Non-material Alternatives. Changes to doctrine, organization, training/education or 
tactics will not adequately fulfill this need. Current doctrinal concepts maximize the 
effectiveness of the present surface-to-air weapons systems. The present system has 
demonstrated inadequacies in weapons performance, firepower, mobility, logistics and 
maintenance. Current training methods have proved effective in maximizing current 
equipment capabilities but can not address the physical limitations of the weapons system. 
Present tactics maximize the effectiveness of current MAGTF low to medium altitude air 
defense assets. However, the technological advances in attack aviation have System 
Performance. The SOF will provide automated assistance, in the form of informational and 
tabular displays, to the S AAWC and staff personnel in the conduct of AIR OPS for the 
MAGTF operational forces. The SOF will be able to support fixed-site long-term SAAWC 
operations and periodic short-duration Alt TACC operations. The SOF must be capable of 
employment across the entire operational continuum . The SOF will enhance the capability 
of the TAOC to manage and coordinate all AIR OPS activities to include TMD operations. 
Enhancements to the TAOC battle management, surveillance, intelligence, and weapons 
control functions will be provided through hardware, software, and communications 
improvements provided by the SOF. The SOF will interface with required equipment to 
establish the Alt TACC configuration. All Alt TACC personnel need not operate from the 
SAAWC shelter. The AN/TYQ-23(V)1 will interface with the SOF for the exchange of data, 
and these interfaces will employ an open architecture operating system expanding to the 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and Common Operating Environment 
(COE). 
General system requirements. To achieve the desired capability, the SOF will 
provide the below performance: 
a. Support 
1. System initialization. 
2. System administration. 
3. Network configuration and management. 
4. Performance monitoring. 
5. Voice and data communications. 
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6. Interfaces to other systems. 
7. Security System. 
b. Design and Construction 
1. Accessibility of functions from any SOF workstation (objective). 
2. Common Operating Environment. 
3. Utilize Commercial Off-The-ShelfGovernment Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS/GOTS) equipment. 
4. Equipment packaged for transport to ensure survivability, flexibility, 
and ease of deployment. 
5. Utilize existing systems/prototypes, as appropriate. 
6. SOF workstations and equipment will be removable to allow remote 
operations mode four hundred meters (seven-hundred and fifty meters 
objective) from the host AN/TYQ-23(V)1. The SOF will also be 
capable of being set up within its own enclosure to provide a work 
space with at least three-hundred square feet (four-hundred and fifty 
square feet objective) of floor space in a rectangular configuration. 
7. Use available GCCS compliant software systems to include 
applicable software segments of Joint Maritime Command Informa- 
tion System JMCIS), Tactical Combat Operations (TCO), Intelli- 
gence Analysis System (IAS) and display the required DMA digital 
maps. 
8. Use existing TAOC communications to maximum extent. 
9. Provide migration to Global Command and Control System (GCCS). 
c. Monitor Intelligence Situation 
1. Analyze intelligence/threat situation 
(a) Perform area delimitation/terrain analysis/radar coverage 
analysis. 
(b) Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). 
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(c) Receive/process/display near-real-time GENSER threat data 
(JMCIS, CIS, TIBS/TRAP). 
(d) Receive/process/display other digital or manually entered 
threat data. 
(e) Receive/display/annotate order-of-battle data. 
(f) Receive/display/annotate secondary imagery data and orient 
this information to the tactical situation display (objective). 
(g) Perform multi-intelligence data correlation (objective). 
(h)       Perform multi-source Combat ID data correlation (objective), 
(i)        Receive/display weather information (imagery objective). 
2. Prepare/edit/transmit request for intelligence updates 
3. Provide integrated intelligence/operations situational display 
d. Monitoring of TAOC weapons control functions 
1. Threat ranking (air and ground targets). 
2. Weapons cuing. 
3. Weapons coordination. 
4. Weapons assignment/control. 
e. Automated mission monitoring status 
1.        Receive, display, store, parse, process, and forward the ATO and 
ACO (to include all updates): 
(a) Tasking. 
(b) Resource allocation. 
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(c)       Target priorities. 
(d)       Processing will include deconfliction of airspace control 
measures. 
2. Monitor resource status (fuel, weapons, equipment and airfield status). 
3. Monitor execution or status of missions/schedules. 
f.         Monitor air defense situation 
1. Receive/display air situation data (process objective): 
(a)       Local and remote air track data (TAOC, CRC, AWACS, 
AEGIS, and other available sources). 
(b)       Local and remote passive sensor data. 
(c)       TADIL and surface-to-air unit locations. 
2. Exchange air situation data with required MAGTF units via WAN 
(objective). 
g.         Monitor friendly ground situation 
1. Receive/store/process/display ground track data required for the 
SAAWC to plan and conduct AAW operations (Joint Surveillance 
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), TCO, IAS). 
2. Exchange ground situation data with required MAGTF units via 
WAN (objective). 
h.        Monitor and disseminate missile defense situation 
1. Receive/display missile situation data. 
(a)       Receive/display local sensor data (AN/TPS-59). 
(b)       Receive/display missile track data from remote sources. 
2. Display correlated view of missile track data (launch point, impact 
point, and missile track) and air track data (objective). 
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3. Transmit missile track data to appropriate TMD agencies and 
disseminate missile warning information (passive defense) as 
appropriate. 
4. Receive and display missile defense unit locations and engagement 
zone information. 
i. Conduct Alt TACC operations 
1. Provide necessary Alt TACC communications interfaces (with 
augmentation). 
2. Provide limited ATO generation capability (with TACC augmenta- 
tion). 
3. Monitor all required SOF situational displays/unit communications 
with he addition of air support requirements (with TACC augmenta- 
tion). 
ACE Capabilities (Tanking) 
To be determined. 
ACE Capabilities (Weapons Utilization Rate) 
The rate at which a weapon can be fired and returned to a state ready to fire again. 
Also provides a sense of ordnance utilization rate. 
ACE Capabilities (Weapons, C2 Platform/Facilities & Sensors) 
ACE Capabilities Weapons + ACE Assets C2 Platforms + ACE Capabilities Sensors. 
ACE Capabilities (Weapons) 
The physical and tactical capabilities of the integrated air defense weapons technical 
capabilities assigned to the ACE staff. 
ACE Commander 
The ACE commander, his staff, and the MACCS, as the MAGTF's air operations and 
AAW experts, provide joint or combined force planners with the MAGTF's AAW 
capabilities and requirements. They also identify MAGTF capabilities and requirements 
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relative to airspace control and air defense operations.  Specifically, joint and combined 
operational plans must: 
(1) Integrate and complement the mission of the j oint force. 
(2) Ensure the interoperability of equipment and personnel. 
(3) Ensure the common use and understanding of terminology. 
(4) Allow responsiveness and the massing of firepower whenever and 
wherever needed. 
(5) Identify the proper liaison and staff/agency representation between j oint force 
components. (Representatives from each component must enable and 
improve the information flow and provide expertise.) 
(6) Outline procedures for airspace control and air defense degradation. 
(7) Facilitate transition from peacetime conditions to hostilities. 
Air Control/Air Direction Authority 
Airspace control sectors are designated in accordance with procedures and guidance 
contained in the airspace control plan in consideration of component, host nation, and allied 
airspace control capabilities and requirements. 
Air Order Of Battle (AOB) 
Activities related to not only collecting the encyclopedic-type data on airframe 
capabilities and limitations, but will also include enemy's ordinance capabilities, their extent 
of training and morale, their likely tactics, and their intended priority targets. The potential 
UAV Threat must also be considered since enemy UAVs may be used as targeting, jamming 
or reconnaissance platforms. They may also be used as drones to stimulate. The MAGTF 
Integrated Air Defense System and make it susceptible to anti-radiation missiles. (MACCS 
Tactical Planning Guide) 
Air Superiority Required 
Air Defense Specific Planning - The ACE staff will normally augment several air 
defense specialists to assist in the preparation of the MAGTF operations order. Critical 
decisions, to include air defense apportionment and planning to achieve air superiority must 
be addressed and answered during this phase. The preliminary site selections for air defense 
agencies (TAOC, HAWK) are also finalized. Other planning efforts include: 
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Air Superiority - That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another 
which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces 
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 
1-02) 
Mission - MAGTFs deploy worldwide and are involved in the full spectrum of 
conflict. Air defense is necessary for the MAGTF to establish air superiority and protect the 
force from air attack. Air superiority allows the MAGTF the freedom to maneuver and 
subsequently position itself to defeat the threat. The mobile surface-to-air missile system 
will be required to provide very low to medium altitude/close to medium range air defense 
for the entire MAGTF. The system must be capable of defeating the full spectrum of air 
threats from tactical ballistic missiles to low radar cross section cruise missiles and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. The deficiencies in this mission area are outlined in Mission Area 
Analysis (MAA) 32, (Anti-air Warfare (S)) specifically deficiencies: Active Defense 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 19/Passive Defense 1, 2, 4 and 5. This need is also 
identified in the MAGTF Air Defense Study of 26 July 1991. 
Airspace Control Request (ACR) 
The document used to request airspace control measures. The ACR provides the 
airspace control authority with detailed airspace requirements, which if approved, are 
included in the ACO. 
Allocation Request 
Allocation Request (ALLOREQ) - a message or voice request from the ACE 
commander to the MAGTF commander requesting air units allocation. 
Allocation Shortfall 
To be determined. 
AN/TPS-59 
AN/TPS-59 Radar Set. The AN/TPS-59 (Figure 2-2) is a solid state radar designed 
to provide long-range (300 nautical mile) surveillance. The AN/TPS-59 is a 3 dimensional 
(bearing, range, and target altitude), linear phased array radar which operates in the D band 
(1215-1400 megahertz [MHZ]). The radar set consists of three computer shelters and an 
antenna which is transported on three single-axle trailers. The radar control shelter 
accommodates two position display consoles which are capable of providing a planned 
position indicator (PPI) display, range height indicator (RHI) display, or both displays 
simultaneously. The radar's 54 transmitters are arranged in 54 rows and operated 
independent of each other which allows redundancy. 16 rows can be non-operational before 
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the radar is considered degraded. The AN/TPS-59 also has the capability of operating in the 
2 dimensional mode should its general purpose computer fail. The AN/TPS-59 radar suite 
includes four ARM decoy pallets. Theater missile defense (TMD) enhancements to the 
AN/TPS-59 radar will improve its range and altitude detection capabilities to 400 nautical 
miles and 500,000 feet respectively. 
Approved Plans 
To be determined. 
Approved Plans (ACE Surveillance) 
Establishing coordination for and preparation of the ACE surveillance plan. The 
ACE surveillance plan provides the foundation for all subsequent air defense operations and 
should consider all available means (electronic or visual) to detect, identify, and track air 
vehicles in the MAGTF's area of operations (AO). While the location of individual elements 
of the surveillance system (TAOC and HAWK radars, combat air patrols [CAP], airborne 
early warning [AEW], Stinger teams, etc.) will be influenced by many operational and 
topographical factors, every effort should be made to provide detection capabilities at all 
altitudes throughout the AO, with particular emphasis on likely threat avenues of approach. 
Overlapping and redundant surveillance coverage should be achieved where possible and a 
reliable, swift and redundant communications plan should also be devised to ensure rapid 
dissemination of detections. 
Conducting air defense specific planning to support the ACE battlestaff in preparing 
the air defense portions of operation orders to include: 
Identifying critical assets, vital areas, and air defense priorities. 
Coordinating the preparation of the ACE surveillance plan. 
Establishing and coordinating air defense communication requirements. 
Recommending air defense control measures. 
Recommending the utilization of allocated air defense weapons platforms. 
Ascertaining availability of air-to-air missiles (AAM) and surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM) and developing specific requirements for a resupply plan. 
Coordinating establishment of airspace management/control procedures. 
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Planning for the tactical redeployment/alternate siting of AAW assets in 
response to changes in the surveillance plan, the threat, or the ground force 
positions. 
Identifying the need for airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft to the 
ACE/Marine air control group (MACG) to supplement radar coverage. 
Approved Search Procedure 
To be determined. 
AO 
Area of Operations - That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations 
and for the administration of such operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also called AO. 
Establishing coordination for and preparation of the ACE surveillance plan. The 
ACE surveillance plan provides the foundation for all subsequent air defense operations and 
should consider all available means (electronic or visual) to detect, identify, and track air 
vehicles in the MAGTF's area of operations (AO). While the location of individual elements 
of the surveillance system (TAOC and HAWK radars, combat air patrols [CAP], airborne 
early warning [AEW], Stinger teams, etc.) will be influenced by many operational and 
topographical factors, every effort should be made to provide detection capabilities at all 
altitudes throughout the AO, with particular emphasis on likely threat avenues of approach. 
Overlapping and redundant surveillance coverage should be achieved where possible and a 
reliable, swift and redundant communications plan should also be devised to ensure rapid 
dissemination of detections. 
The JFC normally assigns responsibility for JTMD attack operations outside the 
component commander's AOs to the joint force air component commander (JFACC), if the 
JFC designates a JFACC. The JFC normally tasks component commanders to conduct 
JTMD attack operations within their assigned AOs. 
AOI 
Area of Interest (AOI) - provides airspace control, management, and surveillance for 
its designated sector or area of interest (AOI). 
Applications Broadcast (TIBS/TRAP) 
Special purpose broadcasts that provides time-critical sensor reports to the intelli- 
gence community. It is a one -way data link. 
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Artillery 
Artillery organic to, under the control of, or available for use by the ACE, MAGTF, 
or JTF as indicated. Artillery is considered available if it is in an operational ready status and 
is not being utilized by another mission. Artillery would also be available if the current 
missing was of higher priority and the Artillery could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability 
An asset is organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. 
An asset is considered available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized 
by another mission. An asset would also be available if the current mission was of higher 
priority and the asset could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (ACE - Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs) 
An Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, 
or JTF as indicated. An Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs is considered available if it is in an 
operational ready status and is not being utilized by another mission. An Aircraft, Missiles, 
& UAVs would also be available if the current missing was of higher priority and the 
Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (ACE Communication) 
A communication system organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or 
JTF as indicated. A communication system is considered available if it is in an operational 
ready status and is not being utilized by another mission. A communication system would 
also be available if the current mission was of higher priority and the communication system 
could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (ACE - Aircraft) 
An aircraft organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. 
An aircraft is considered available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being 
utilized by another mission. An aircraft would also be available if the current mission was 
of higher priority and the aircraft could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (Aircraft, Missiles, UAVs) 
Same definition as Asset Availability (ACE - Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs). An 
Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as 
indicated. An Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs is considered available if it is in an operational 
ready status and is not being utilized by another mission. An Aircraft, Missiles, & UAVs 
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would also be available if the current mission was of higher priority and the Aircraft, 
Missiles, & UAVs could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (Host Nation) 
A host nation that allows the organic assets under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, 
or JTF to reside in its territory. A host nation is considered available if it is operationally 
ready to receive assets. 
Asset Availability (JTF, MAGTF) 
An asset is organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. 
An asset is considered available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized 
by another mission. An asset would also be available if the current mission was of higher 
priority and the asset could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (Land-lines) 
A land-line (communication path of copper or fiber optic) organic to, under the 
control of, or available for use by the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. A land-line is 
considered available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized by another 
mission. A land-line would also be available if the current mission was of higher priority 
and the land-line could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability ( MAGTF - Artillery) 
MAGTF - Artillery organic to or under the control of the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as 
indicated. MAGTF - Artillery is considered available if it is in an operational ready status 
and is not being utilized by another mission. MAGTF - Artillery would also be available if 
the current mission was of higher priority and the MAGTF - Artillery could be diverted to 
the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (Radio Equipment) 
Radio communications equipment organic to or under the control of the ACE, 
MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. Radio communications equipment is considered available if 
it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized by another mission. Radio 
communications equipment would also be available if the current mission was of higher 
priority and the Radio communications equipment could be diverted to the desired mission. 
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Asset Availability (Satellites) 
Satellites available to the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. A satellite is 
considered available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized by another 
mission. A satellite would also be available if the current mission was of higher priority and 
the satellite could be diverted to the desired mission. 
Asset Availability (Sensors) 
Sensors available to the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. A sensor is considered 
available if it is in an operational ready status and is not being utilized by another mission. 
A sensor would also be available if the current mission was of higher priority and the sensor 
could be diverted to the desired mission. The ACE has its own sensor and will have access 
to other sensors. This refers to all sensors available. 
Asset Availability (Weapons) 
Weapons available to the ACE, MAGTF, or JTF as indicated. A weapon is 
considered available if it and its delivery platform is in an operational ready status and is not 
being utilized by another mission. A weapon would also be available if the current mission 
was of higher priority and the weapon could be diverted to the desired mission. The ACE 
has its own weapons and delivery positions and will have access to other weapons. This 
refers to all weapons available. 
BCP (Battery Command Post) 
Houses the Tactical Display Console, the Radar Operator Console, the IFF system, 
the Automatic Data processing Equipment, communication equipment, and the data link 
encryption devices for a HAWK firing unit. 
Battlespace 
The Joint Task Force (JTF) approved battlespace assigned to the ACE commander. 
Battlespace (AOI) 
The resultant of activity Al .3.3. It is defined in that activity. 
Battlespace (AO) 
The resultant of activity Al .3.2. It is defined in that activity. 
139 
Command and Control 
C2 - The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions 
are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
Also called C2. 
Courses of Action 
Tactical action or a combination of tactical actions that can be taken as a response to 
a threat stimulus. 
Courses of Action (Planned) 
Courses of action that, based upon initial intelligence and situation assessment, 
appear feasible. 
Courses of Action (Planned & Supportable) 
Planned courses of action that can be supported by ACE assets and logistics 
capabilities. 
CST Reference Plane 
The common space and time reference plane that will be used for data transformation. 
CTAPS 
To be determined. 
Combat Service Support Request 
To be determined. 
Commander (CAP) 
To be determined. 
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Control & Coordination Measures 
Measures used to control and coordinate airspace and airspace users. They include 
fire support coordination measures, airspace control measures, and air defense control 
measures. 
Control & Coordination Measures - Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) 
A line established by the ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under 
his control but which my affect current tactical operations. 
Control & Coordination Measures (Airspace Control Measures) 
Procedural control measures designed to maximize the effectiveness of combat 
operations by promoting safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace. 
Control & Coordination Measures (Control Measures) 
Established to maximize the effectiveness of air defense operations while minimizing 
interference with other operations. (FMF5-60) 
Control & Coordination Measures (Vital Area) 
A vital area is a designated area or installation to be defended by air defense units. 
It contains the facilities, units, and installations necessary for the landing force to accomplish 
its mission. The outward edge or boundary of the vital area is always the reference point in 
applying destruction-in-depth principles. There may be one or more vital areas, depending 
on the scope of the operation. The following factors are examined in determining and 
designating vital areas: 
The probable method of air delivery. 
The anticipated weapons to be used by an enemy. 
The addition of an overall standoff range to the outside edge of the defended 
complex. After the vital area boundary is determined, it becomes the range 
by which enemy air attacks must be destroyed to prevent damage to the vital 
area. In the event of an enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) 
capability, standoff ranges will be expanded to include the delivery capability 
for his largest weapon. 
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Cryptographic Considerations 
Considerations such as time for changing, availability of keys that support all of the 
agencies involved, and equipment compatibility. 
Current Mission Objective 
To be determined. 
DASC (Direct Air Support Center) 
The DASC is responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground 
forces and processing immediate air support requests. For TMD operations, the TAOC or 
TACC would coordinate with the DASC for aircraft that would be available to be diverted 
to OAAW missions. 
Decision Aids 
This category identifies those systems or tools that assist in the decision making 
process. 
Decision Aids (EREPS) 
To be determined. 
Decision Aids (Manual) 
To be determined. 
Decision Aids (Map Study) 
To be determined. 
Decision Aids (System Software) 
To be determined. 
Decision Aids (TAMPS) 
Producing/obtaining radar coverage diagrams from the tactical aviation mission 
planning system (TAMPS), Electronic Compatibility Analysis Center ( ECAC) studies, or 
manual computations. 
142 
Decision Aids (Support) 
To be determined. 
Denied Request (Support) 
To be determined. 
Detectable Battlefield Phenomenon 
Detectable Battlefield Phenomenon are those phenomenon detected that are not 
consistent with "normal" geographical or environmental conditions. Those phenomenon are 
detected by sensors such as unusual radar returns and are caused by unusual physical 
circumstances such as unusual lighting, shadowing effects, infrared (heat) and electrical 
conditions such as static charge buildup. 
Doctrine 
Publications that provide guidance in given area. See the specific doctrinal 
publication for specifics. 
Doctrine (FMFM 3-30) 
Doctrine- provides guidance in communications. 
Doctrine (Joint Pub 3-01.5) 
Joint Theater Missile Defense Publications that provide guidance in the TMD area. 
Doctrine (Joint Pub 3-56.21) 
Publications that provide guidance in given area. See the specific doctrinal 
publication for specifics. 
Engagement Order 
To be determined. 
Engagement Order   (JTAR 9 Line Brief) 
To be determined. 
143 
Engagement Quality Targeting Information 
Targeting information sufficient to complete an AOOW mission including target 
acquisition for weapon delivery. 
Engagement Quality Track Information 
Targeting information that is within the threshold for the weapon launch platform to 
launch the weapon and hit the target. 
FMFM 5-5 
The hostile capability to exploit news media releases and technical publications 
divulging information relative to weapons, tactics, and operations and to exploit unclassified 
military communications, such as weather and flight plan traffic, by overt means. 
FMFM 5-60 
FMFM 5-60 (control of aircrafts and missiles) - because of differences in 
organization and functioning regarding SAAWC operations, the Marine Corps has reiterated 
and further defined the SAAWC operational concept in FMFM 5-60 Control of Aircraft and 
Missiles, and established SAAWC- level Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation 
System (MCCRES) mission performance standards (MPS). 
Air Control - The authority to effect the maneuver of aircraft. The elements of air 
control are: air control agency, air controller, airspace control, operational control, positive 
control, procedural control, radar control, and terminal control. (FMFRP 0-14) Air control 
is the authority to direct the physical maneuver of aircraft in flight or to direct an aircraft or 
SAW unit to engage a specific target. (FMFM 5-60) 
Missile Engagement Zone - The airspace of defined dimensions within which the 
responsibility for engagement normally rests with missiles. (FMFM 5-60) Also called MEZ. 
MEZs may be designated within the missile intercept zone (MIZ). 
Frequency /Bandwidth Availability 
The amount of total bandwidth available for a given application and the frequency 
spectrum and number of frequencies available within the given spectrum. 
GCE (Ground Combat Element) 
The ground combat element conducts that ground war for the MAGTF commander. 
Coordination is required in all phases of TMD, but especially for OAAW operations. 
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GCE Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 
A single location in which centralized communications facilities and personnel 
incident to the coordination of all form of fire support. (FMFM 5-60) 
The DASC must request release of airborne assets destined for CAS or DAS missions 
prior to diverting those aircraft to OAAW missions. 
GCE (Scheme of Maneuver) 
The ground scheme of maneuver is intertwined with the ACE location of weapons 
and C3 facilities. Also, the ACE must provide air defense for the MAGTF as a whole. 
Ground Order Of Battle (GOB) 
Activities related to collecting information on the threat s Surface to surface missile 
(SSM) threat. Specific areas to address when conducting the assessment of the threat s SSM 
capability include , location, range, accuracy, ability to rapidly displace and be ready to fire 
once again. Particular attention is given to the threat's mechanized capability, as it will 
likely impact on the siting of agencies which conduct the control of Aircraft and Missiles. 
(MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Guidance (ACE-Priorities & Intent) 
This category involves the ranking by a commander of a number of elements of any 
situation in the order of each element's importance to the accomplishment of the mission. 
Priority information may involve establishing the precedence of elements relative to time, 
space, or any number of other limiting factors is an "if-then" relationship. (Joint Pub 3-56) 
Guidance (JFC Guidance & Objectives) 
The JFC-level guidance may include but is not limited to: A methodology for joint 
planning of JTMD. Priority for JTMD effort, for example, what types of targets are most 
important for attack operations and what friendly assets must be protected by active defense. 
Definition of the areas of operations (AO) of components. Apportionment is the 
capabilities/forces made available to the functional components. Guidance on 
component-to-component coordination to facilitate deconfliction and timely TMD operations 
is the role of the JFC's staff in coordinating JTMD activities. The degree of Joint Targeting 
Coordination, if established, involvement in TMD. (Joint Pub 3-01.5) 
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HAWK System 
Provides medium range (2nm to 20nm against helos and fixed-wing) surface to air 
missile defense for assigned areas of operations, air installations, and vital areas against low 
and medium altitude (50 feet to over 50,000 ft) air attacks. 
HAWK System (-PAR, -CWAR) 
The Pulse Acquisition Radar and Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar are not 
required for TMD operations when the TPS-59 is linked through the ADCP. 
HAWK System (ADCP) Air Defense Communication Platform 
The ADCP will be used to provide interface for the HAWK to the AN/TPS-59 radar 
and to also provide JTIDS connectivity until the TAOC is capable. 
HAWK System (BCP) Battery Command Post 
Houses the Tactical Display Console, the Radar Operator Console, the IFF system, 
the Automatic Data processing Equipment, communication equipment, and the data link 
encryption devices. 
HAWK System (Loader) 
To be determined. 
HAWK System (Re-loader) 
To be determined. 
HAWK System (TCO) 
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO). 
ID Threat 
The threat track when acquired by the weapons platform will confirm the target's ID 
prior to destroying the target. 
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Identification Criteria 
Coordinated measures which help provide timely identification include information 
from visual sightings, radar, IFF, flight plans, air corridors, flight characteristics, and, the 
actions of observed aircraft. 
Friendly aircraft are those: 
Recognized as a friendly. 
In a friendly corridor not committing a hostile act. 
Designated by a control agency. 
Unidentified and not committing a hostile act. 
Hostile aircraft are those: 
Recognized as an enemy. 
Unidentified and attacking friendly installations. 
Unidentified in areas where control agencies have specified all aircraft will 
be engaged. 
Information 
Information is symbols (e.g., numbers, letters, words, graphics, visual images, 
sounds, smells, or physical contact) whether they represent something concrete or abstract, 
that give visualization to convey a thought. 
Information (Resolution/Accuracy) 
A sense of how accurately the information represents the environment that it is 
attempting to describe. 
Information Requirements 
To be determined. 
Information (Tactical Picture) 
The information that portrays the current status of the battle space. 
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Initial Targeting Information 
Targeting information sufficient to commence an AOOW mission but may not 
contain complete targeting identification. 
Intelligence 
Data that has been processed and compared with other sources to provide and 
accurate estimate of the threats capabilities or intentions. 
Intelligence (FLTREP) - In-flight Report 
The FLTREP is designed for use by pilots/crews to report tactical sightings or 
information obtained in flight that is of such importance and urgency that a delay in reporting 
the data might negate the usefulness of the information. In such cases, the information to be 
reported will be transmitted on designated frequencies to the appropriate agency. 
Intelligence (HOTPHOTOREP) - Hot Photo Report 
The HOTPHOTOREP form (Appendix I) provides a brief, concise, high-priority 
report on time-sensitive targets of significant tactical importance or of a perishable nature. 
This report is used to alert the joint force commander of a threat to friendly forces or of a 
significant, fleeting target requiring immediate operational consideration, resulting from a 
quick sensor readout. The HOTPHOTOREP is submitted either by voice or message, based 
on time and security requirements, and will be followed later by the Initial Photo 
Interpretation Report (IPIR). (JP 3-56.1) 
Intelligence (Human) 
The hostile capabilities and practices in the areas of espionage; subversion; 
exploitation of lost, captured, or misplaced documents; and prisoner interrogation. 
Intelligence Report (INTREP) 
The INTREP is prepared by the first intelligence processing element (normally 
battalion, squadron, or ship level) acquiring the information. The intent of the report is to 
provide information on events or conditions that may have an immediate and significant 
impact on current planning and operations, or may be of immediate interest at the national 
level. The INTREP will not be used in lieu of the Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC) for 
reporting intelligence items covered by the CRITIC system. The INTREP may be prepared 
on any item of intelligence, regardless of source, and usually each report will address only 
a single item. The INTREP will be prepared using the standard format contained in 
Appendix K and will be given lateral as well as vertical dissemination. The value of the 
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report is in direct proportion to the timeliness of submission and  precedence used for 
dissemination. 
Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) 
The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a specific 
period of time specified by the joint force commander (usually 6 hours). Normally, the report 
will be prepared at battalion, wing, task group, and higher echelon. The format for the 
INTSUM is contained in Appendix L. The report will be prepared in message form and 
transmitted by appropriate means as determined by its urgency and content. Minimum 
dissemination will be the next higher, lower, and lateral echelon. Wider distribution will be 
as directed. 
Intelligence (IPB DATA BASE) 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is an analytical methodology employed to 
reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of 
operations. IPB builds an extensive database that for each potential area in which a unit may 
be required to operate. The data can be analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the 
enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form IPB is a 
continuing process. IPB Products are used to evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, 
and probable courses of Actions. For TMD, the IPB shows the Commander when and where 
they can most effectively engage the enemy and contributes significantly to the process of 
area limitation analysis and ultimately to automated cuing of TMD sensors and weapons 
systems to threatening targets. IPB includes updating the TM data bases to maintain and 
provide near-real time status of selected enemy TM related capabilities (e.g., Order of 
Battle, operating bases, type, range, and employment techniques of available missiles and/or 
warheads; missile launch, load, hide, and support sites; Potential routes; intelligence and 
electronic warfare (IEW) systems; C2 nodes and enemy defenses. IPB drives the 
development of the collection plan, which in tern drives sensor types, collection windows, 
and areas of coverage. (Joint Pub 3-01.5) 
Intelligence (IPIR) 
The IPIR is designed to provide more detailed information than HOTPHOTOREP. 
The IPIR will be prepared within a time frame to meet command requirements as specified 
by the appropriate authority. The specific intelligence required should be transmitted to the 
requester in consonance with the urgency of the request. The IPIR will contain information 
on special mission objectives as well as fleeting/transient targets, newly identified activity 
of priority interest, militarily significant change to known installations observed during scan 
of the mission imagery, and such other requirements for information as may be requested by 
appropriate authority. Normally, it is the final report that is transmitted by the collection 
unit. The message Precedence of the report will be determined by the request priority and 
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the significance of the information. The IPIR format and preparation instructions are 
contained in DIAM 57-5, "DOD Exploitation of Multi-Sensor Imagery," Appendix B. 
"Format for First and Second Phase Reporting IPIR/SUPIR." (JP 3-56.1) 
Intelligence (TIBS/TRAP) 
To be determined. 
Intelligence (Open Literature) 
The hostile capability to exploit news media releases and technical publications 
divulging information relative to weapons, tactics, and operations and to exploit unclassified 
military communications, such as weather and flight plan traffic, by overt means (FMFM 5-5 
Para). 
JFC Staff (Political Advisor) 
Advises JFC regarding assistance to HN or allied governments in developing passive 
air defense measures against TM attacks. 
JTF Assets 
To be determined. 
JTF Staff 
To be determined. 
LAN/WAN Options 
Voice and data communications connectivity with senior, adjacent, and subordinate 
air defense agencies using the TAOC's voice communications bus and/or externally 
introduced communications devices (e.g., remote radios, telephones, etc.). This capability 
will include LAN/WAN access. 
Connectivity will be provided via LAN/WAN with other agencies. 
The SOF will receive and parse the ACO from the TACC through the CTAPS 
LAN/WAN, USMTF, or diskette. The workstation will display the airspace control 
measures (ACMs) to the operator. 
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Land-line Options 
To be determined. 
Law 
A rule established by authority, society, or custom expressing the precepts and 
principles applicable in a particular domain. (Ref. Webster's II New Riverside University 
Dictionary) 
Law (Host Nation) 
A rule established by authority, society, or custom expressing the precepts and 
principles applicable in the host nation, (ref. Webster's II New Riverside University 
Dictionary) 
Law (USA) 
A rule established by authority, society, or custom expressing the precepts and 
principles applicable in the USA and its armed forces, (ref. Webster's II New Riverside 
University Dictionary) 
MACCS (Marine Air Command and Control System) 
A system which provides the aviation combat commander with the means to 
command, coordinate and control air operations within an assigned sector or to coordinate 
air operations with other services. (FMFM 5-60). 
MWCS 
To be determined. 
Mission 
The mission that has been assigned or implied by higher headquarters or inferred by 
the ACE commander. 
Mission (AAW) 
To be determined. 
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Mission (ACE Objectives) 
To be determined. 
Mission (End State) 
To be determined. 
Mission (JTF -AAW) 
To be determined. 
Mission (Legal & Political Bounds) 
To be determined. 
Mission (MAGTF Objectives) 
To be determined. 
Mission (Possible AAW) 
To be determined. 
Mission Ready COAs 
To be determined. 
Mobility 
The TAOC has the ability to task organize its assets to support various missions. 
This ability, combined with the mobility and flexibility afforded by the TAOM and the 
TAOC's radars allow the TAOC to rapidly respond to myriad of missions. 
Passive defense also includes such measures as deception, camouflage and 
concealment, hardening, EW, mobility, dispersal, redundancy, recovery, and reconstitution. 
Passive defense is the responsibility of unit commanders at all echelons. 
M-1022A1 Mobilizer. In an effort to alleviate mobility problems associated with the 
TAOC, actions are underway to procure the M-1022A1 for the MACS. The M-1022A1 
consists of a pair of dollies which are bolted to the ends of the TAOM shelter, thus allowing 
the TAOM to be towed behind a 5 ton vehicle. Designed to operate on improved surfaces 
(i.e., paved or gravel roads), the mobilizer incorporates a hydraulic lift system capable of 
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lifting the TAOM 10-18 inches off the deck. The mobilizer can also be used to facilitate 
TAOM loading/off loading from aircraft and shipping. Each MACS will receive five M- 
1022Al mobilizers. 
NCA 
The National Command Authority. 
Naval Assets (Amphibious) 
To be determined. 
Non-Engagement Quality Target Info 
Targeting information that is below the threshold for the AOOW weapon launch 
platform to launch the weapon and have it hit the target, requiring additional resolution 
through ACE, JTF or national assets. 
NWP-32 
To be determined. 
Order (OPORD) 
Order identifying the commander's operational concept and intent. 
OPORD (ACE - Annex K - Voice) 
To be determined. 
Orders (Ord) 
This category involves directives to take action. It does not include information 
concerning what the commander intends to do in the future but may tell the recipient what 
the commander requires to be done in the future. For weapons systems, it may include 
instructions such as fire, cease-fire, track, drop-track, vector, attack, etc. (Joint Pub 3-56) 
Order - Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
The ATO is the document that implements tactical air support. It tasks assigned and 
attached units to accomplish specific missions to support the Joint Force Commander's 
objectives. The ATO is published daily by the Combat Plans division of the Tactical Air 
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Control Center and provides sufficient detail to enable mission aircrews and Tactical Air 
Control System elements to execute assigned missions. (AFM 2-12) 
Order (OPlan) 
To be determined. 
Order (Surveillance -Operating Mode, Readiness State) 
To be determined. 
Order (Surveillance) 
To be determined. 
Ordnance 
Munitions for assets that will support the AAW mission. 
Ordnance (A-A Hawk Standard) 
Standard Hawk Anti-Air missile designed to destroy mass raids of aircraft using a 
stand off fuse and small grain. 
Ordnance (Aircraft) 
Munitions carried on aircraft that support the AAW mission. 
Ordnance (Available) 
Available usable munitions for assets that will support the AAW mission. 
PC 
Wide range of Automated Data Processing equipment with the performance level of 
a personal computer, below the performance level of a workstation computer, (bottom end 
of the performance scale). 
Physical Implementation 
To be determined. 
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Plans 
Plans include all plans to which the ACE Commander is part of. Those plans include 
the TECH/TAC OPDAT, the Air Defense Plan (ADP), the Joint Air Operations Plan, and 
higher headquarters Plans. 
Plans (CONPLAN) 
The concept plan provides the concept of operations. 
Plans (AAW) 
To be determined. 
Plans (ACE Surveillance) 
To be determined. 
Plans - Airspace Control Plan (ACP) 
The document providing specific planning procedures for the airspace control system 
for a particular area of operation. It is prepared by the Airspace Control Authority. 
Plans - Air Defense Plan (ADP) 
To be determined. 
Plans (EMCON ) 
Plan that identifies the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or 
other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing detection by 
enemy sensors; to minimize mutual interference among friendly systems and/or execute a 
military deception plan. 
Plans (MAGTFOPORD) 
To be determined. 
Plans (Surveillance /Collection) 
To be determined. 
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Plans (Technical Control Procedures) 
To be determined. 
Plans (Tech OpDat) 
Executing control of radar emissions as outlined in the ACE operation order's 
emissions control (EMCON) plan, making modification(s) as required by the tactical 
situation. 
Point-to-Point Options 
Voice Communications - each TAOM provides internal radio equipment (IRE) to 
support voice and data communications. Within each TAOM there are four AN/GRC- 
171 A(V)2 or AN/GRC-171A(V)4 ultra-high frequency (UHF) radios, three RT-524 very- 
high frequency (VHF) radios, and two Harris high frequency (HF) radios. Additional 
capability exists to introduce externally controlled radios and point-to-point circuitry from 
outside the TAOC to augment the TAOC's communication requirements. Each TAOM 
internally houses the required cryptographic instruments to encrypt its radios. Additionally, 
each TAOM contains one KY-68 secure voice telephone and has the capability to introduce 
both two and four wire point-to-point telephonic communication devices. 





















To be determined. 
Positions of Weapons, Surveillance, and C2 
To be determined. 
Possible Air Control Facility Locations 
To be determined. 
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Possible Air Defense Control Measures 
Recommending air defense control measures including WEZs and return-to-force 
(RTF) procedures for inclusion in the MAGTF operations order. 
Airspace Control Order - an order implementing the airspace control plan that 
provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published 
as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. (Joint Pub 1 -02) Also called ACO. 
Possible Airspace Control Measures 
To be determined. 
Possible Command Facility Locations 
To be determined. 
Possible Fire Support Coordination Measures 
To be determined. 
Possible Sensor Locations & Surveillance Standards 
To be determined. 
Possible Weapon Locations 
Activities related to the coordinating the circumstances and limitations under which 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE 
allows the commander to exercise control over aviation units and aircraft by prescribing the 
exact conditions under which they may engage a target. The ROE tells aviation units what 
they can attack, where they can attack, and when they can attack. ROE will contain at a 
minimum: The right to self defense, target identification criteria, and weapons control 
statuses. (FMFM 5-60) 
Radio Options 
To be determined. 
Reattack 
To be determined. 
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Reload Requirement 
To be determined. 
Reports (Combat Assessment) 
Combat Assessment Report - a voice or hard copy message report from the ACE 
commander to the MAGTF commander. This is a prearranged communication that provides 
specific information on the activities related to the determination of the overall effectiveness 
of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three 
major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) 
reattack recommendations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommenda- 
tions for the course of military operations. (Joint Pub) 
Report - Electronic Warfare Support Measures Report (ESM) 
The Tactical ESM Report is designed to provide a brief, concise report on 
time-sensitive electronic emissions of tactical significance and/or of a perishable nature 
requiring immediate operational consideration. The report is prepared as rapidly as possible 
after aircraft landing by the collection unit. It is a message report, and its precedence is 
determined by the request priority and the significance of the information obtained. Those 
units that normally submit formatted reports in accordance with Standard ELINT Data 
Systems Codes and Formats under the provisions of the National ELINT Plan will continue 
to do so unless otherwise directed by proper authority. (JP 3-56.1) 
Report (Intelligence) 
Intelligence Summary - the INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence 
situation covering a specific period of time specified by the joint force commander (usually 
6 hours). Normally, the report will be prepared at battalion, wing, task group, and higher 
echelon. The format for the INTSUM is contained in Appendix L. The report will be 
prepared in message form and transmitted by appropriate means as determined by its urgency 
and content. Minimum dissemination will be the next higher, lower, and lateral echelon. 
Wider distribution will be as directed. 
Report (Status) 




Prearranged communications that provide specific information on a unit's inability 
to comply with a given order. 
Report (Situation) 
Prearranged communications that provide specific information on the current tactical 
situation. 
Report - Mission Report (MISREP) 
The MISREP is used by all air units (e.g., strike/attack, reconnaissance/surveillance, 
airlift, observation, and helicopter) to report the results of all missions and significant 
sightings along the route of the flight. The MISREP amplifies the In-flight Report and is 
normally submitted within 30 minutes after aircraft landing to the tasking agency, the 
requesting unit/agency, and to other interested organizations. The MISREP format is 
outlined in Appendix H. JP 3-56.1) 
Report (Tactical-CST) 
Tactical Report - a single event of detectable battlefield phenomenon. 
Report (Tactical Warning) 
A warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile act base upon the evaluation of 
information from all available sources. In satellite and missile surveillance, a notification 
to operational command centers that a specific event is occurring. The component elements 
that describes threat events are: Country Of Origin- country or countries initiating 
hostilities; Event Type and Size — identification of the type of event and determination of 
the size or number of weapons; Country under Attack— determined by observing trajectory 
of an object and predicting its impact point.; Event Time— time the hostile event occurred. 
Tactical Warning triggers Passive Defense actions. (Joint Pub 3-01.5) 
Request (Intelligence - Theater) 
INTEL Request - a hard copy message sent by the ACE commander to the 
appropriate level of authority requesting information relative to specific anti-air warfare 
mission including Theater Missile Defense information. 
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Request for Support (RS) 
A voice or a hard copy message report from the ACE commander to the MAGTF 
commander. This is a prearranged communication through which the ACE commander 
requests for logistic support such as fuel, ordinance, and missiles. 
This category is a part of the circular process of allocating and reallocating support 
resources. The activity requiring support expresses that requirement with this category of 
information. Request for support does NOT include the information transmitted to the 
supporting unit by the supported unit calling for execution of the support previously 
allocated by the common commander. Requests for support may travel upward or laterally. 
(Joint Pub 3-56) 
Tactical Picture 
The display of the link data augmented with reports which provides situation 
awareness. 
Tactical Report 
A single event of detectable battlefield phenomenon. 
Tactical Report (Theater) 
A single event of detectable battlefield phenomenon provided by assets other than 
ACE-organic. 
Tactical Report (ACE) 
A single event of detectable battlefield phenomenon detected by ACE-organic assets 
(A.0.3.1.2) 
Tactical Reports 
Multiple instances of tactical report entities up to and including the totality of tactical 
reports in the situational data base and retrievals therefrom, specifically supporting the fusion 
process. 
Tactical Report (CST) 
The result of translating the tactical report's original spatial/temporal reference to a 
common spatial/temporal reference to facilitate the fusion, association and tracking process. 
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Tactical Report (Launch/Impact Point) 
Obtaining the Launch and Impact Points is necessary to determine engage ability by 
Hawk, THAAD, AEGIS, etc., for maximum Pk. 
When connected to the ADCP, three TBM messages are passed: 
Ballistic missile message: State vector and other descriptive data; 
covariance data. 
Reference point message: Launch point and impact point data. 
Data update request message: Multiple missile update capability 
Tactical Report (Visual) 
A single event of detectable battlefield phenomenon observed by visual means, 
valuable in conducting offensive AAW (OAAW). 
Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) 
In the air defense environment, the TACC may be generally described as a 
performance supervisor. Under the cognizance of the aviation element G/S.3, AAW aircraft 
requirements are included within overall aircraft scheduling, offensive AAW is initiated by 
the aviation element G/S-3 in accordance with information received from intelligence 
sources. The primary AAW concern of the TACC is to ensure the assignment of interceptor 
aircraft to the preplanned interceptor requirements, ground alert, or airborne. These aircraft 
are integrated into the total fixed-wing schedule and the TACC monitors the execution of the 
daily fragmentary order. In addition to supervising decentralized air defense execution, the 
TACC possesses divert, sector salvo, and scramble authority. 
Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) 
The TAOC is the agency responsible for requesting, receiving, and coordinating the 
various identification inputs, maintaining the appropriate aircraft classifications, and 
responding to queries made by defensive weapons systems by back-tell. As the focus of the 
sector air defense system, it must anticipate specific input requirements from associated air 
control elements and recommend appropriate tasking. It is further responsible to anticipate 
and recommend alternate procedures to preserve air defense continuity should its systems 
become degraded or inoperative. 
TAOC (ANATPS-59) 
A long range (300nm for aircraft, 400nm for TBM) radar that provides a three 
dimensional picture of the battle space. 
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TAOC (AN/TPS-59 Operating Mode) 
When modified, the radar will be able to operate in three separate modes: Air 
Breathing Target(ABT), Theater Ballistic Missile(TBM), or Combined. This is important 
since the radar cannot see TBMs when operating in the ABT mode. 
TAOC (AIC) 
Air Intercept Controller Responsible for the control of AAW missions from the point 
the aircraft is handed off from and returned to the traffic section. 
TAOC - Missile Coordinator (MC) 
Responsible for the control of applicable SAW engagements within the TAOC's area 
of responsibility. 
TAOC (SAAWC) 
Sector Anti-air Warfare Coordinator: the SAAWC is the ACE commander's air 
defense battle manager. 
TAOC - Senior Air Director (SAD) 
Responsible for the detailed operation of the TAOC. 
TAOC - Surveillance Identification Director (SID) 
Responsible to the SAD for the detection, identification, and classification of all radar 
inputs within the TAOC's assigned sector. 
TAOC - Senior Traffic Director (STD) 
Responsible for the coordination and routing of all air operations within the assigned 
sector. 
TAOC -Senior Weapons Director (SWD) 
Responsible for the proper employment of air defense weapons. 
TAOC (TDC) 




The ability to identify an airborne or ground target can limit air operations. Use of 
visual means, maps, aerial imagery, aircraft and ground sensors and systems (FLIR, NVGs, 
laser), and good target descriptions increases target identification ability. (FMFM 5-60) For 
TM Attack operations it is estimated that the target resolution for aircraft would have to be 
within 1000 M2 in desert climate, 200 M2 in mountains and at least 100 M2 in all cases for 
artillery. (Meeting with MAWTS-1, 18-19 May 1994) 
Target Information 
Tactical Air Direction (TAD) Net(s) - TAD nets provide a means for the direction of 
aircraft in the conduct of offensive air support missions and for the DASC to brief support 
aircraft on target information or assignment. Normally a VHF or UHF net, TAD nets are 
also monitored by terminal air controllers (e.g., forward air controller [airborne] [FAC(A)], 
tactical air coordinator [airborne] [TAC(A)], tactical air control party [TACP]). 
127340 M MAW ASRT (ACE) N NONE FLT LDR (N) () 
TG (Terrain/Geography/Oceanographic/Hydrographic Information) 
This category of information pertains to all aspects of the environment (other than 
weather). It includes the configuration, composition, fauna, flora, cultural features, and 
hydrologic and geophysical characteristics of the land and all aspects of the sea. It includes 
navigational information, fallout, effects of chemical weapons, and induced radiation data. 
(Joint Pub 3-56) 
Theater Assets (RSTA) 
Non Organic Assets are the National Theater Assets assigned to the ACE. Those 
assets may be weapon systems, or assets to support Reconnaissance, Surveillance and 
Tactical Assessment (RSTA) missions. 
Theater Reconnaissance 
Assets such as Cobra Ball, Rivet Joint, U-2, and RF-4. 
Threat Capabilities 
This category provides the recipient with intelligence on what the enemy can do (if 
he chooses). It is a basic ingredient of many decisions and weighs heavily on the selection 
of options. It does not involve the present status of the enemy but deals with possible future 
actions of the enemy. 
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Threat Capabilities (EW, TBM, ARM) 
Threat Capability - this category provides the recipient with intelligence on what the 
enemy can do (if he chooses). It is a basic ingredient of many decisions and weighs heavily 
on the selection of options. It does not involve the present status of the enemy but deals with 
possible future actions of the enemy. (JCS Pub 3-56) Threat Capabilities Electronic Warfare 
(EW) - Threat EW Capabilities, Threat Electronic Warfare Support(ES) and Electronic 
Attack (EA) capabilities. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) Threat Capabilities 
Reconnaissance (Recon)- Threat Reconnaissance Capabilities Determination of the threat's 
Airborne and Ground reconnaissance capability. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide). 
Threat Capabilities (Reconnaissance) 
Determination of the threat's Airborne and Ground reconnaissance capability. 
(MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Terrorist/Unconventional Activities 
Determination of potential terrorist or unconventional operations capability. A 
terrorist with a well-aimed sniper round or a well placed satchel charge can just as easily 
disrupt the MAGTF's ability to effect the control of aircraft and missiles as can an aircraft 
with ordinance. (MACCS Tactical Planning Guide) 
Time 
The available time prior to action occurring or a situation becoming more complex. 
Time includes response time set by dependent values such as weapon capability, force 
location and target range. 
Track 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated to 
provide a history. 
Track (Theater) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated by 
non-ACE assets to provide a history. 
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Track (ACE) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated by 
ACE assets to provide a history, typically by the detecting sensor in the process of detecting 
a target and building a track history. 
Tracks 
Multiple instances of track entities up to and including the totality of tracks in the 
situational data base and retrievals therefrom, specifically supporting the fusion process. 
Track (ABT) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated to 
provide a history of the Air Breathing Target being tracked, the track information being made 
available to weapons platform(s) via TADILs or voice nets (ATDL-1 in the case of 
AN/TPS-59 A/C track data to HAWK) if not acquired first by the weapons platform. 
Track (AN/TPS-59) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated by 
the AN/TSP-59 to provide a history, either TBM, ABT or Cruise Missile. The AN/TPS-59 
TBM track is passed to HAWK to ADCP via JTIDS for relay to HAWK via IBDL. 
Track (CST) 
The result of translating the track's original spatial/temporal reference to a common 
spatial/temporal reference to facilitate the fusion, association and tracking process. 
Track (Weighted) 
Using Track (CST)s and/or Tactical Report (CST)s as inputs, it is the result of 
formulating pair-wise association hypotheses to determine a "most likely" association in 
order to build a TBM or ABT tracking model. 
Track (Correlated) 
The output of the fusion process to be used to determine raid size, profile, launch and 
probable impact points. 
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Track (Defined) 
The output of the acquisition/localization process whereby the track is characterized 
by raid size, profile, launch and probable impact points. 
Track (Engagement Quality) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated to 
provide a history containing targeting information within the threshold for the weapon launch 
platform to launch the weapon and hit the target. Specifically for the HAWK, the 
AN/TPS-59 provides engagement quality tracks of sufficient resolution necessary for 
efficient acquisition by the HAWK High Powered Illumination radar. 
Track (Friendly) 
One of the results of the identification/classification process whereby a defined 
track's intention and weapons capabilities is determined. 
Track (Threat) 
One of the results of the identification/classification process whereby a defined 
track's intention and weapons capabilities is determined. 
Track (JTIDS) 
JTIDS is used to exchange TBM track data among JTF assets for engagement by 
THAAD, HAWK, AEGIS, etc. 
Track (JTIDS, AN/TPS-59) 
A number of associated Tactical Reports that have been correlated and associated 
by the AN/TSP-59 to provide a history, either TBM, ABT or Cruise Missile. The 
AN/TPS-59 TBM track is passed to HAWK to ADCP via JTIDS for relay to HAWK via 
IBDL. JTIDS is used to exchange TBM track data among JTF assets for engagement by 
THAAD, HAWK, AEGIS, etc. 
Track (Probable ABT) 
Results from the comparison of the Track (Defined) entity with the structural and/or 
behavioral model class when the degree of association exceeds the "Probable ABT" 
threshold. 
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Track (Probable TBM) 
Results from the comparison of the Track (Defined) entity with the structural and/or 
behavioral model class when the degree of association exceeds the "Probable TBM" 
threshold. 
Track (Medium Confidence ABT) 
Results from the comparison of the Track (Defined) entity with the structural and 
behavioral model class when the degree of association exceeds the "Medium Confidence 
ABT" threshold. 
Track (Medium Confidence TBM) 
Results from the comparison of the Track (Defined) entity with the structural and 
behavioral model class when the degree of association exceeds the "Medium Confidence 
TBM" threshold. 
Track (Uncorrelated) 
Results from the comparison of the Track (Defined) entity with the structural and 
behavioral model classes when the degree of association fails to exceed either the "Probable 
ABT" or the "Probable TBM" threshold. 
Track (Threat Composition) 
The result of the determination of the probability that this Track (Threat) entity is 
a member of or associated with a raid. 
Track (Monitored) 
Friendly aircraft are monitored by air controllers for navigation, safety and 
engagement of targets. Threat tracks continue to be tracked for the engagement process. 
Unengageable Target 
A target for which it has been determined that ACE, MAGTF and JTF assets are not 
appropriate to engage. 
Vital Areas 
A designated area or installation to be defended by air defense units. (Joint Pub 1 - 
02) 
167 
Weather Information (WX) 
This is a special category extracted from the TG category because or Its profound 
importance to military operations. (Joint Pub 3-56) 
Weapon Control Status 
To be determined. 
Weapons Assignment 
To be determined. 
Weighted Air Control Architecture 
To be determined. 
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APPENDIX E. MATRICES AND ANALYSIS 
E.l MATRIX ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
Fourteen matrices are used to describe the Marine Corps TBMD "As Is" system. The 
matrices were constructed in a tier-like fashion. The information contained within the 
matrices goes from general to concise. This was necessary to identify deficiencies at the 
lowest possible level. Information from one or more general-type matrix provided insight 
for and aided in the construction of specific-type matrices. Each of the matrices, unto itself, 
provides additional insight into the interrelationships of TBMD activities, organizations, 
systems, information, and applications. 
In reviewing these matrices, it is important to retain a two-dimensional perspective. 
The intersection of the X and Y axes are coded to demonstrate the presence or absence of a 
relationship. If the intersection of X and Y is valid, a code is assigned to identify the correct 
relationship. If the relationship is false, the intersection is left blank. For example, within 
the INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT matrix, there may be a specific type of intelligence 
not processed by a specified piece of equipment. In reality, the intelligence is processed 
manually. In this case, one must resist the inclination to add an additional parameter to one 
of the axes which identifies the communication type that processes the intelligence. There 
is another matrix that examines the relationship of which communication type processes 
what intelligence. Adding the organization parameter to the first matrix distorts the two- 
dimensional perspective and adds unnecessary complexity. 
However, in the last four matrices, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT- 
TAOC, INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, EQUIPMENT TO TACC- 
COMMUNICATION TYPE-TAOC, and EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMMUNICATION 
TYPE-BCP, the relationship to be examined takes on two separate two-dimensional 
perspectives, respectively. The first two-dimensional perspective examines the relationship 
between the two activities in terms of information flow. The second two-dimensional 
perspective examines the relationship between the information flow and the equipment used 
to pass the intelligence between the two activities. In the two remaining matrices, the first 
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two-dimensional perspective examines the relationship between the two activities and the 
equipment they employ for information transfer. The second two-dimensional perspective 
examines the communication type the equipment emulates. 
If a specific relationship does not occur within one matrix, the X or Y axis parameter 
must not be removed, as in the first example, where a specific piece of intelligence is not 
processed by a specified piece of equipment. Because of the lack of a relationship within 
that matrix, it would be easy to remove the intelligence parameter. However, if this were 
allowed, then the intelligence would not be seen on the INTELLIGENCE TO 
COMMUNICATION TYPE matrix and a vital relationship that shows which communication 
type processes the intelligence would be lost. 
The best approach to developing and reviewing these matrices is to maintain 
simplicity and avoid using too many codes within a single matrix. If a relationship exists, 
a character (R-Receive, P-Process, T-Transmit, D-Display, A-All, X or Y) defined within the 
matrix, is placed in the intersecting box. If a relationship was false, the intersecting box is 
left blank. 
When reviewing a matrix, confusion can arise concerning the definition or 
description of a specific parameter. For example, the definition of a specific activity may 
not be understood. To be consistent, definitions from the activity and data model were used 
to define and clarify the description of that activity. If a specific parameter was not 
previously defined within the TBMD study, an applicable policy or procedure that might 
define the confusing item was used. 
Analyzing relationships within a matrix can provide clues to voids or discrepan-cies 
of activities, systems, information, or equipment. For example, an analysis of one of the 
matrices revealed that a certain type of intelligence was processed by more than one form of 
communications type within one activity. This indicates that the need for the individual type 
of intelligence should be investigated. The matrix alone does not provide the answers to 
these questions. However, it does signal that further investigation may be warranted. The 
findings from analysis of the actual matrices are presented in Section E.3. 
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The following is a detailed description of the fourteen matrices used by the author. 
It describes each matrix in terms of its X and Y parameters, questions to be considered, and 
conditions to be evaluated. 
E.1.1 C2 FACILITY TO ACTIVITY 
This matrix is used to identify which C2 Facility is directly or indirectly related to 
which activity. If a C2 Facility has a relationship to an activity, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If a C2 Facility has no relationship to an activity, the intersecting box is 
left blank. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to the decomposition diagram. The C2 
Facility entries should appear as mechanisms. Because of the large volume of activities 
created within the TBMD "As Is" model (approximately 116), specific activity addresses 
were used in lieu of descriptive titles. 
In some cases, the C2 Facility may use the inputs, outputs or controls of an activity. 
In other cases the C2 Facility may be directly or indirectly involved with the creation of the 
activity. Many C2 Facilities may be involved with the use of individual inputs, outputs or 
controls of an activity or in the creation of the activity. 
If a specific C2 Facility is not directly or indirectly related to the activity through its 
creation or through the use of its inputs, outputs or controls, then further investigation may 
be required.   Is the activity needed?  Does the C2 Facility require the inputs, outputs or 
controls to conduct its mission? 
E.1.2 INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY 
This matrix is used to identify which piece of intelligence is directly or indirectly 
related to which activity. If a piece of intelligence has a relationship to an activity, an (X) 
is placed in the intersecting box. If a piece of intelligence has no relationship to an activity, 
the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to the decomposition diagram. The 
intelligence entries should appear as inputs or controls. Also, because of the large volume 
of activities created within the TBMD "As Is" model, specific activity addresses were used 
in lieu of descriptive titles. 
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In some cases, intelligence may be directly or indirectly utilized by an activity. In 
other cases, the input of intelligence may be directly or indirectly associated with the creation 
of the activity. Also, intelligence, in certain cases, may even function as a controlling factor 
within a specific activity. Finally, in some instances, more than one piece of intelligence 
may be inputted to an activity or activities. 
If a specific piece of intelligence is not directly or indirectly related to an activity 
through its creation or through its utilization, then further investigation may be required. Is 
the activity needed? Is the intelligence appropriate for that activity? Is the intelligence 
needed? Does the intelligence serve a purpose in carrying out the mission? 
E.1.3 EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY 
This matrix is used to identify whether a piece of communications equipment is 
associated with a particular C2 Facility. This matrix is the first complex matrix constructed. 
Its parameters represent the many possible relationships that may exist between equipment 
and C2 Facilities. If a piece of equipment is used to receive (R), process (P), display (D), 
transmit (T) or all (A) of the above by a C2 Facility, the appropriate letter or combination of 
letters is placed in the intersecting box. If the piece of equipment is not employed by a C2 
Facility, the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to DoD, Marine Corps, and Naval 
Publications. Also, the matrix should have a direct correlation to the "As Is" architecture. 
The primary purpose of this matrix is to identify which C2 Facilities employ which 
types of equipment and how the C2 Facility uses that equipment. The information contained 
in this matrix was extremely significant in the construction of all but one of the remaining 
matrices. It is also the first indicator of the existence of redundancy of system capabilities 
and redundancy of information flows. Every C2 Facility possessed at least one, and in most 
cases at least three types of communications equipment. When the same types of equipment 
are used by numerous C2 Facilities, it suggests possible opportunities to eliminate redundant 
systems. Other areas identified within the matrix may need further investigation. Examples 
would be as follows: Does the use of different types of equipment within one C2 Facility 
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hinder or interfere with the mission of that C2 Facility? Is the existing architecture too 
complicated? 
E.1.4 EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE 
This matrix is used to identify whether a piece of equipment is associated with a 
particular type of communications. The primary focus of this matrix is the identification of 
the type of transmission each piece of equipment employs. If a relationship between the 
piece of equipment and the communication type exists, an (X) is placed in the intersecting 
box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left empty. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to DoD, Marine Corps, and Naval 
Publications. Also, the matrix should have a direct correlation to the "As Is" architecture. 
The information contained in this matrix was also used in the construction of other 
matrices. The matrix also provides another indicator of redundancy in system capabilities. 
Areas of concern, which warrant further investigation are: If three or more pieces of 
equipment utilize the same communication type, is every piece of equipment necessary? Can 
the architecture benefit from streamlining the equipment? Will the TBMD mission suffer 
if only one piece of equipment is used for communication? 
E.1.5 COMMUNICATIONS TYPE TO C2 FACILITY 
This matrix is used to identify whether or not a communications type is utilized by 
a C2 Facility. If a communication type is used by a C2 Facility, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If the communication type is not employed by a C2 Facility, the 
intersecting box is left blank. This matrix was constructed using the information provided 
in matrix E. 1.3 and in matrix E. 1.4. 
The primary purpose of this matrix is to identify what form of communication is used 
to pass information C2 Facilities within the context of the TBMD mission. The secondary 
purpose of this matrix is to identify whether or not information flow to C2 Facilities is in a 
usable format. This becomes apparent when reviewing the different communications types 
for the same C2 Facility. This matrix clearly demonstrates the complexity that exists within 
and between the C2 Facilities. 
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In almost every case the C2 Facility has at least two communication types at its 
disposal. This is an indication of redundancy with the existing systems and brings to light 
areas that need further investigation. Does each C2 Facility need two or three different 
communication types? Are two or more communications types being used for the same 
purpose? Does a need exist for four separate communication types? Can a C2 Facility 
benefit from the use of a single communications type? 
E.1.6 INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY 
This matrix is used to identify what intelligence information is directly or indirectly 
utilized by which C2 Facility. This matrix is complex because it presents the many possible 
relationships that may exist between intelligence and C2 Facilities. If a piece of intelligence 
is received (R), processed (P), displayed (D), transmitted (T) or all (A) of the above by a C2 
Facility, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If 
the piece of equipment is not employed by a C2 Facility, the intersecting box is left blank. 
In some cases, intelligence may be received, transmitted, processed, or displayed by 
a C2 Facility. On the other hand, intelligence may be used in any combination of those four. 
Also, the possibility of more than one piece of intelligence being inputted to more than one 
C2 Facility is highly probable. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to the decomposition diagram. The 
intelligence entries should appear as inputs or controls and the C2 Facilities should appear 
as mechanisms. This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E. 1.1, 
matrix E. 1.2, and matrix E. 1.3. 
The primary purpose of this matrix is to try and determine if the correct C2 Facilities 
are getting the necessary intelligence needed to conduct the mission. For example, what 
form of intelligence does the JFC (Political ADVISOR) need to carry out his or her mission? 
Since the JFC (Political Advisor) is only, in fact, an advisor the only forms of intelligence 
he or she needs is general intelligence (to include the INTREP and the INTSUM) and Threat 
Capabilities. 
If a C2 Facility is not receiving, processing, displaying or transmitting intelligence, 
or if a C2 Facility is receiving an abundance of intelligence, then further investigation may 
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be necessary. Does the C2 Facility need that piece of intelligence to carry out its mission? 
Is the piece of intelligence necessary for TBMD to be accomplished?   Can a piece of 
intelligence be eliminated or combined with other intelligence to fit the needs of a C2 
Facility? 
E.1.7 INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT 
This matrix is used to identify whether intelligence transmission is associated with 
a particular piece of equipment. This matrix is complex because it presents many possible 
relationships between intelligence and equipment. If intelligence is received (R), processed 
(P), displayed (D), transmitted (T) or all (A) of the above by a piece of equipment, the 
appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If the piece of 
equipment is not associated with a piece of equipment, the intersecting box is left blank. 
In some cases, intelligence may be received, transmitted, processed, or displayed by 
a piece of equipment. In other cases, intelligence may be associated, through a combination 
of those four, with a piece of equipment. Finally, in some instances, more than one type of 
intelligence may be associated with more than one piece of equipment. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E. 1.3 and matrix 
E.1.6. The primary purpose of this matrix is to determine which types of intelligence are 
associated with which piece(s) of equipment. Furthermore the matrix examines what that 
association is. For example: Is the INTSUM associated with the AN/TPS-59 and what is 
the manner of that association? The relationship does exist. The INTSUM is received, 
displayed and transmitted by the AN/TPS-59. The second purpose for the matrix is to 
determine whether or not a type of intelligence is associated with too many pieces of 
equipment and visa-versa. For example: Is it really necessary for Threat Capabilities to be 
received, processed, displayed and transmitted by eight pieces of equipment? 
The information contained in this matrix is a definite indication of repetition of 
equipment capabilities. The matrix also illustrates the necessity to investigate further. 
E.1.8 INTELLIGENCE TO COMMUNICATION TYPE 
This matrix is used to identify what intelligence information is associated with what 
communication type.   This matrix is semi-complex because it presents two possible 
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relationships that may exist between intelligence and communication type. A type of 
intelligence is either received (R) or transmitted (T) by the communication type. If a 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If the type of equipment is not associated with a communication type, the intersecting 
box is left blank. 
In some cases, intelligence may be received or transmitted by the communication 
type. In other cases, intelligence may be associated through a combination of both. In no 
case, however, will there be no association. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E.1.3, matrix 
E. 1.4, and matrix E. 1.7. The primary purpose of this matrix is to determine which type of 
intelligence is associated with what type of communication process. For example: Is the 
INTSUM associated with radio communications? If so, what is the manner of that 
association? There is a relationship and the radio is used to receive and transmit the 
INTSUM. A second purpose of the matrix is to determine whether or not it is necessary for 
a type of intelligence to be associated with multiple types of communication. For example, 
is it really necessary for Threat Capabilities to be received and transmitted by four different 
communications types? 
Again, the information contained in this matrix is an indication of the repetition of 
communications type capabilities. The matrix also demonstrates a necessity to investigate 
further. 
E.1.9 OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY 
This matrix is used to identify which outputs are directly or indirectly utilized by 
which C2 Facility. Also, this matrix is used to identify general information flow within the 
C2 Facilities. The matrix is complex because it presents the many possible relationships 
that may exist between outputs and C2 Facilities. If an output is used by a C2 Facility, the 
output is received (R), processed (P), displayed (D), transmitted (T) or all (A) of the above. 
If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the 
intersecting box. If the relationship between outputs and C2 Facility does not exist, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
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This matrix should have a direct correlation to the decomposition diagram. The 
outputs can be in the form of inputs or controls to an activity. The C2 Facility entries should 
appear as mechanisms. This matrix also was constructed using information contained in 
matrix E. 1.1 and in matrix E. 1.3. 
The primary purpose of this matrix is to provide insight into the information flows 
within C2 Facilities. It gives a broad view of what information is used and how that 
information is passed within the TBMD architecture. The second purpose of the matrix is 
to provide initial guidance for further analysis of information flow. The information 
contained in this matrix was used in the construction of other, more specific matrices. 
This matrix gives way to questions that can only be answered by more in-depth 
analysis. Does the information, passed between the C2 Facilities, arrive in a standard 
format? Is the information, when received, correlated? Is the necessary information getting 
to the correct C2 Facilities? Is the information received in a timely manner? Is there a need 
for streamlining the existing architecture? 
E.1.10 OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT 
This matrix is used to identify which outputs are communicated through which types 
of equipment. Also, this matrix is used to identify the role of equipment in the flow of 
information. The matrix is complex because it presents the many possible relationships that 
may exist between outputs and equipment. If an output is communicated through a type of 
equipment, the output is received (R), processed (P), displayed (D), transmitted (T) or all (A) 
of the above. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is 
placed in the intersecting box. If the relationship between outputs and equipment does not 
exist, the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix should have a direct correlation to the decomposition diagram. The 
outputs can be in the form of inputs or controls to an activity. Also, this matrix should have 
a direct correlation to the "As Is" architecture. The equipment types are identified within the 
architecture. This matrix was constructed using information contained within matrix E.l .3 
and matrix E.l.9. 
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The purpose of this matrix is to provide insight into type of equipment used to 
communicate information within the TBMD architecture. It provides a perspective on the 
continued theory of redundancy within the communications framework. Another purpose 
of the matrix is to provide initial guidance for further analysis of information flow. The 
information contained in this matrix was used in the construction of other, more specific 
matrices. 
This matrix also leads to questions that can only be answered by further analysis. 
More specifically, are there too many different types of equipment and types of 
communication? Does the existence of the numerous communications systems hinder the 
operations within the TBMD community? Do the equipment types communicate data in a 
usable format? 
E.1.11 EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMMUNICATION TYPE-TAOC 
This matrix is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the relationship between information flow from the TACC to the 
TAOC. This is accomplished by examining the types of equipment used by the two facilities 
to pass information. Either one of two relationships exists. The TACC either transmits (T) 
or receives (R) information using the type of equipment or the TAOC receives or transmits 
information with the type of equipment. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or 
combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If the relationship does not exist, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine how the information is passed between the two 
facilities. Once the relationship between the equipment and the C2 Facilities is established, 
then the relationship between the equipment and communication type can be examined. If 
there is a relationship between equipment and communication type, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E.1.3, matrix 
E. 1.4, and matrix E. 1.5. The primary purpose of this matrix is to examine the information 
flow between the TACC and the TAOC, the type of equipment used to transfer the 
information from one facility to another, and the type of communications used by the 
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particular type of equipment. The main focus is on how information is passed and in what 
format is it passed. 
For example, both the TACC and the TAOC used the AN/TPS-59 to receive and 
transmit information. The communication type is point-to-point. On the other hand, the 
TACC and TAOC also use a LAN/WAN to receive and transmit information. In this 
instance the communication type is both radio and land-line. The question now becomes, 
which type of equipment, combined with the communication type, provides the best format 
for receiving and transmitting data? To answer this question, further research may be 
required. 
E.1.12 EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMMUNICATION TYPE-BCP 
This matrix is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the information flow from the TAOC to the BCP. This is accomplished 
by examining the types of equipment used by the two facilities to pass information. Either 
one of two relationships exists. The TAOC either transmits (T) or receives (R) information 
using the type of equipment or the BCP receives or transmits information with the type of 
equipment. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is 
placed in the intersecting box. If the relationship does not exist, the intersecting box is left 
blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine the relationship between how the information 
is passed between the two facilities. Once a relationship between equipment and the C2 
Facilities is established, then the relationship between the equipment and communication 
type can be examined. If there is a relationship between equipment and communication type, 
an (X) is placed in the intersecting box. If no relationships exist, the intersecting box is left 
blank. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E.1.3, matrix 
E.1.4, and matrix E.1.5. The primary purpose of this matrix is to examine the information 
flow between the TAOC and the BCP , the type of equipment used to transfer the 
information from one facility to another, and the type of communications used by the 
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particular type of equipment. The main focus is on how information is passed and in what 
format is it passed. 
For example, both the TAOC and the BCP used the ATDL-1, LAN/WAN, and 
Tactical Radio to receive and transmit data. This is a clear instance of redundancy of system 
capabilities. Are three different pieces of equipment necessary to perform the same task? 
Another example is the PAR and CWAR located in the BCP. Both pieces of equipment 
receive and transmit data. However, the TAOC does not receive or transmit this data. 
Again, are there too many systems located within these facilities? The answer to these 
questions may lie with further research. 
E.1.13 INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC 
This matrix is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the intelligence flow between the TACC and the TAOC. This is 
accomplished by examining the types of intelligence used by the two facilities both 
separately and combined. Either one of two relationships exists. The TACC either transmits 
(T) or receives (R) intelligence or the TAOC receives or transmits intelligence. If the 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If the relationship does not exist, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine the relationship between intelligence and the 
type of equipment used to pass the intelligence between the two facilities. The matrix also 
examines the type of equipment available at either facility. Once the relationship between 
the intelligence and the two facilities is established, then the relationship between the 
intelligence, the equipment type, and the facility can be examined. If there is a relationship 
between intelligence and equipment type, an (X) is placed in the intersecting box if the 
equipment is located within the TACC or a (Y) is placed in the intersecting box if the 
equipment is located within the TAOC. There is also a possibility that the equipment is 
located at both facilities. If this is true, a combination of the two letters will be placed in the 
intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E.1.3, matrix 
E.1.6, and matrix E.1.7.   The primary purpose of this matrix is to examine the flow of 
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intelligence between the TACC and the TAOC and the type of equipment used to transfer 
intelligence from one facility to another. The main focus is on what type of equipment is 
used to pass the intelligence and the efficiency of the system as a whole. 
For example, both the TACC and the TAOC receive and transmit the Report (Tactical 
Warning). In this instance, both the TAOC and the BCP also possess the same equipment 
to receive and transmit this piece of intelligence. However, in the case of the INTSUM, 
while both the TAOC and the BCP receive and transmit the intelligence, they share only one 
piece of common equipment, the LAN/WAN. This clearly demonstrates the need for the 
LAN/WAN. However, if the LAN/WAN is used to communicate the Report (Tactical 
Warning) also, is it necessary to have the other types of equipment at both facilities? This 
and other questions concerning system redundancy can be better answered with further 
research. 
E.1.14 INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP 
This matrix is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the intelligence flow between the TAOC and the BCP. This is 
accomplished by examining the types of intelligence used by the two facilities both 
separately and combined. Either one of two relationships exists. The TAOC either transmits 
(T) or receives (R) intelligence or the BCP receives or transmits intelligence. If the 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If the relationship does not exist, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine the relationship between intelligence and the 
type of equipment used to pass the intelligence to or from either of the two facilities. This 
matrix also examines the type of equipment available at either facility. Once the relationship 
between the intelligence and the two facilities is established, then the relationship between 
the intelligence, the equipment type, and the facility can be examined. If there is a 
relationship between intelligence and equipment type, an (X) is placed in the intersecting box 
if the equipment is located within the TAOC or a (Y) is placed in the intersecting box if the 
equipment is located within the BCP.   There is also a possibility that the equipment is 
181 
located at both facilities. If this is true, a combination of the two letters will be placed in the 
intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
This matrix was constructed using information contained in matrix E.1.3, matrix 
E.1.6, and matrix E.1.7. The primary purpose of this matrix is to examine the flow of 
intelligence between the TAOC and the BCP and the type of equipment used to communicate 
the intelligence from one facility to another. The main focus is on what type of equipment 
is used to pass the intelligence and the efficiency of the system, as a whole. 
For example, both the TAOC and the BCP receive and transmit the Report (Combat 
Assessment). In this instance, both the TAOC and the BCP also possess the same equipment 
to receive and transmit this piece of intelligence. However, in the case of the INTSUM, the 
TAOC only transmits this type of intelligence and the BCP only receives this type of 
intelligence. The equipment used by each C2 Facility varies. Besides the LAN/WAN, 
Tactical Modem, and Tactical Radio, the TAOC also utilizes the TADIL A and TADIL B. 
Again, this may be an indication of too many different systems within the facilities. 
E.2 TBMD "AS IS" MATRICES 
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E.3 MATRIX FINDINGS 
No single matrix represents a summary of all findings. In fact, most matrices lead 
to a need for further research. The matrices were constructed in such a fashion as to allow 
each matrix to represent a portion of the overall TBMD system. In some instances the 
matrices reinforced known conditions. However, when combined and taken as a whole, the 
matrices provided answers to more specific areas of concern. 
The goal of this analysis was to investigate several areas of concern and provide 
insight and guidance to a proposed 2002 "To Be" Marine Corps TBMD model. Matrix 
analysis facilitated those goals by providing a comprehensive investigation of the "As Is" 
Marine Corps TBMD model. The areas of concern include: Intelligence Data Flow, Battle 
Management Information Architecture Cohesiveness, and Battle Management Information 
Support. 
An example of how the analysis works is as follows: Matrix E. 1.3 EQUIPMENT TO 
C2 FACILITY, provides a wealth of information about what systems are used within the C2 
Facilities and how those systems are employed. It also reinforces a known condition of 
system redundancy. However, the matrix does not provide enough information to answer 
specific question about information flow or data correlation. When Matrix E. 1.3 is combined 
with Matrix E. 1.6 INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix E. 1.7 INTELLIGENCE TO 
EQUIPMENT, and Matrix E.1.13 INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, a 
more comprehensive picture of information flow and data correlation starts to develop. 
The matrix findings are described below: 
E.3.1 MATRIX 1: C2 FACILITY TO ACTIVITY 
Matrix 1 is used to identify which C2 Facility is directly or indirectly related to which 
activity. If a C2 Facility has a relationship to an activity, an (X) is placed in the intersecting 
box. If a C2 Facility has no relationship to an activity, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 1 shows that at least one C2 Facility has a relationship with all but eight of 
the one hundred and sixteen activities (processes) in the Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD 
system. The relationship is one of three types. The C2 Facility(ies) either monitors the 
activity, creates the activity, or uses the information from the activity to create specific 
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information. Four of the eight activities, Weight Communications Options, Establish Point- 
to-Point Data Link Options, Establish Launch Warning Options, Create TechOp Data, are 
regulated by the communication assets of the ACE. The other four activities, Conduct 
Search, Confirm/Engage TEL or Platform, Conduct C2 Warfare, and Conduct Passive Air 
Defense, are regulated by aircraft belonging to the ACE. 
Matrix 1 represents the first indication of the enormity of the level of involvement 
required by the C2 Facilities to carry out the TBMD mission. However, it does not, by itself, 
indicate what information is involved, what equipment is involved, how information is used 
or how the equipment platforms process the information. When reviewing Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, combined with Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 
FACILITY, and Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, these issues are better 
resolved. 
E.3.2 MATRIX 2:   INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY 
Matrix 2 is used to identify which piece of intelligence is directly or indirectly related 
to which activity. If a piece of intelligence has a relationship to an activity, an (X) is placed 
in the intersecting box. If a piece of intelligence has no relationship to an activity, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 2 narrows the scope of the flow of information to activities. By concentrating 
on a specific type of information (i.e., intelligence), a more accurate picture of how 
information flows throughout the TBMD system is developed. In the matrix, intelligence 
is seen as either an input or a control. Therefore, it can be ascertained that intelligence is 
used, either directly or indirectly, as a tool in the process(es) taking place in each activity. 
This matrix represents the first indication of the significant level of information is 
used throughout the TBMD process. However, it does not indicate how the information 
communicated, what equipment is involved, or how the equipment platforms process the 
information. Matrix 2 is also an initial indication of the importance of receiving and 
transmitting information in a timely, accurate fashion. However, by itself, only 
generalizations can be made. 
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When matrix 2 is combined with Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, 
Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, and Matrix 8, INTELLIGENCE TO 
COMMUNICATION TYPE, a more accurate picture of information use (i.e. format 
timeliness, equipment capabilities, etc.) can be observed. 
E.3.3   MATRIX 3:   EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY 
Matrix 3 is used to identify whether a piece of communications equipment is located 
at a particular C2 Facility. This matrix is the first complex matrix constructed. Its 
parameters represent the many possible relationships that may exist between equipment and 
C2 Facilities. If a piece of equipment is located within a C2 Facility it is used to receive (R), 
transmit (T), process (P), display (D) or all (A) of the above. If the piece of equipment is 
located at the C2 Facility, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the 
intersecting box. If the equipment is not located at the C2 Facility, the intersecting box is 
left blank. 
Matrix 3 was developed with three purposes in mind. First, the matrix shows which 
C2 Facilities contain which types of equipment. Second, it shows how the equipment is 
employed within the C2 Facility. Finally, and less obvious, because of the information it 
contains, it is used in the development and analysis of almost every other matrix. 
This matrix is an indication of the capabilities of the C2 Facilities to use information. 
It shows how C2 Facilities can communicate and in which modes they communicate. This 
matrix is also a prime example of system redundancy. It clearly shows that certain pieces 
of equipment (TADIL A, TADIL B, LAN/WAN, and Tactical Radio) are capable of doing 
the same tasks. It is also an indication, to a lessor extent, of the instability of the entire 
communications network. The instability is due in part to the use of a wide variety of 
communications equipment. This is explored further in Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO 
EQUIPMENT. Finally, from this matrix, it is clear that some C2 Facilities cannot 
communicate in a manner that is timely, thereby making them less efficient. The TAOC 
(SAAWC) is a prime example. It can receive information from seven different pieces of 
equipment. However, it can process the information on only two systems. 
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Combine this information with the analysis of Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC- 
COMM TYPE-TAOC, Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, Matrix 
13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TACO, and Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE 
TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, it can be ascertained that the communication systems 
employed in the TBMD architecture are not conducive to effective decision making or 
mission accomplishment. 
E.3.4. MATRIX 4: EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE 
Matrix 4 is used to identify whether a piece of equipment is associated with a 
particular type of communications. The primary focus of this matrix is the identification of 
the type of transmissions each piece of equipment employs. If a relationship exists between 
the piece of equipment and the communications type, an (X) is placed in the intersecting box. 
If no relationship exists, then the intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 4 depicts various types of communication uses. It is an indication of 
redundancy of equipment. All but three of the pieces of equipment use a form of radio 
transmission. Of those, seven also have landline capabilities. This matrix clarifies, in 
addition to information from Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, and Appendix A, 
USMC "As Is" TBMD Architecture, a lack of need for the TADIL A. 
When information contained in this matrix is combined with Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT 
TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 5, COMMUNICATION TYPE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 7, 
INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, and Matrix 8, INTELLIGENCE TO 
COMMUNICATION TYPE, further evidence is examined that indicates the existence of a 
deficiency with respect to equipment redundancy. 
E.3.5   MATRIX 5:   COMMUNICATIONS TYPE TO C2 FACILITY 
Matrix 5 is used to identify whether or not a communication type is utilized by a C2 
Facility. If a communication type is used by a C2 Facility, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If the communication type is not employed by a C2 Facility, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 5 is used to support the idea of system redundancy within the C2 Facility 
environment.   All but three C2 Facilities, GCE (FAQ, Commander (CAP), and Special 
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Forces, use a form of landlines to communicate. Also, all C2 Facilities use a form of radio 
communications. This information combined with information contained in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 4, COMMUNICATION TYPE TO C2 
FACILITY, Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, and Matrix 8, INTELLIGENCE 
TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, gives a clear picture of the over abundant redundancy of 
equipment in the C2 Facilities. 
E.3.6   MATRIX 6:   INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY 
This matrix is used to identify what intelligence information is directly or indirectly 
utilized by which C2 Facility. This matrix is complex because it presents the many possible 
relationships that exist between intelligence and C2 Facilities. If a C2 Facility uses a piece 
of intelligence it will be received (R), transmitted (T), processes (P), displayed (D) or all (A) 
of the above. If a piece of intelligence is directly or indirectly used by a C2 Facility, the 
appropriate letter or combination of letters will be placed in the intersecting box. If a piece 
of intelligence is not used by a C2 Facility, the intersecting box will be left blank. 
Matrix 6 presents a picture of which C2 Facilities use what intelligence. It also 
depicts how the C2 Facilities use intelligence. Except for, GCE (FAC) and Special Forces, 
the C2 Facilities receive, process, display, and transmit the different pieces of intelligence. 
Matrix 6 reenforces the idea of the importance of information in the C2 Facility 
within the context of TBMD. Every C2 Facility will handle (receives, transmits, displays, 
and/or processes) several different types of information in the performance of its mission. 
The HAWK (TCO), for example, uses ten separate pieces of intelligence in preforming its 
mission. This matrix also substantiates the notion that the C2 Facilities need to be able to 
communicate information in a timely, accurate fashion. With the level of information being 
used within each C2 Facility and the importance of the decisions, it is crucial that the 
information is communicated in a correct, useable format, as soon as possible. 
The information contained in Matrix 6, combined with the information contained in 
Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 11, EQUIPMENT TO TACC- 
COMM TYPE-TAOC, Matrix 12, EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP, Matrix 
13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TACO, and Matrix 14, INTELLIGENCE 
215 
TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, illustrates the importance of reliable information flow 
between C2 Facilities. 
E.3.7   MATRIX 7:   INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT 
Matrix 7 is used to identify whether intelligence transmission is associated with a 
particular piece of equipment. This matrix is complex because it presents many possible 
relationships between intelligence and equipment. If intelligence is communicated by a 
piece of equipment it will be received (R), transmitted (T), processed (P), displayed (D) or 
all (A) of the above. If intelligence is communicated by a piece of equipment, the 
appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If intelligence 
is not communicated by a piece of equipment, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 7 is a representation of the mode in which a piece of equipment communicates 
a piece of intelligence. It is also a strong indicator of equipment capability redundancy 
within the TBMD environment. Each piece of intelligence is or can be received by at least 
six or as many as ten different pieces of equipment, transmitted by at least three or as many 
as ten separate pieces of equipment, processed by at least two or as many as eleven separate 
pieces of equipment, and displayed by at least seven or as many as twelve different pieces 
of equipment. 
Matrix 7, combined with Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY, Matrix 4, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 5, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, 
Matrix 13, INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC, and Matrix 14, INTELLI- 
GENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP, demonstrate the need to trim the amount of 
equipment used to communicate information. 
Matrix 7 also presents an indication of information flow dilemmas. If, for example, 
IPBDB Info is received by the TAOC (SAAWC), there is a possibility that it can be received 
from seven separate C2 Facilities, Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, over five 
separate pieces of equipment, Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY. This information, 
in five different formats and being displayed on five separate mediums, has to be correlated 
and processed. If that is not enough, then the processed information has to be broken down 
and transmitted out of the TAOC (SAAWC) to the proper C2 Facilities in the appropriate 
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format. This is a representation of efficiency problems, formatting problems, processing 
problems, and ultimately, decision making problems. 
E.3.8   MATRIX 8: INTELLIGENCE TO COMMUNICATION TYPE 
Matrix 8 is used to identify what intelligence information is associated with what 
communication type. This matrix is semi-complex because it presents two possible 
relationships that may exist between intelligence and communication type. A piece of 
intelligence is communicated, the intelligence is either received (R) or transmitted (T) by the 
communication type. If intelligence is associated with a communication type, the 
appropriate letter or combination of letters is place in the intersecting box. If intelligence is 
not associated with a communication type, the intersecting box will be left blank. 
Matrix 8 depicts the various types of communication uses in relationship to 
intelligence. It is an indication that there is redundancy of the equipment. Every piece of 
intelligence is received and transmitted by radio and land line communications. The clearest 
point this matrix supports, in conjunction with Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, 
and Appendix A, USMC "As Is" TBMD Architecture, is a need to streamline the equipment 
types used in the TBMD process. 
If, for example, the TAOC (SID) needed the Tactical Warning Report, Matrix 6, 
INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY to make a decision. First, the Tactical Warning Report 
can be transmitted by ten separate pieces of equipment, Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO 
EQUIPMENT. Of these ten types of equipment, the TAOC (SID) has five that can receive 
information, Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY. Of these five pieces of equipment, 
four communicate information via a radio, two of those four also communicate information 
via landline, and one communicates information via point-to-point, Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT 
TO COMMUNICATION TYPE. The TAOC (SID) can communicate using each of these 
three methods, Matrix 5, COMMUNICATION TYPE TO C2 FACILITY. In effect, the 
TAOC (SID) has five pieces of communications equipment it can receive the Tactical 
Warning Report on. Why it is necessary to have so many? 
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E.3.9   MATRIX 9:   OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY 
Matrix 9 is used to identify which outputs are directly or indirectly utilized by which 
C2 Facilities. Also, this matrix is used to identify general information flows within the C2 
Facilities. The matrix is complex because it presents the many possible relationships that 
may exist between output and C2 Facilities. If an output is used by a C2 Facility, the output 
is received (R), transmitted (T), processed (P), displayed (D) or all (A) of the above. If a 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 9 demonstrates the enormity of information that flows to and from the C2 
Facilities. The matrix is used to demonstrate that all, but two, of the outputs in the model 
are related to C2 Facilities. Only Threat Warning and Launch Warning Options are not 
associated with a C2 Facility. It also shows how the outputs are related to the C2 Facilities. 
For example, Target Information is transmitted by both the TAOC (SWD) and the 
TAOC(SAAWC). That information is received, displayed and processed by the ACE 
Battlestaff (COS) and the HAWK (TCO). The HAWK (TCO) also transmits Target 
Information to the ACE Battlestaff (COS). This is a prime example of the information flow 
within the TBMD system. The TAOC transmits Target Information to the HAWK Battalion 
which receives, displays and processes the information. The HAWK Battalion, once they 
have correlated the data, then transmits their Target Information to the ACE Battlestaff. The 
ACE Battlestaff receives the Target Information from both the TAOC and the HAWK 
Battalion and uses the information to monitor the situation. 
Matrix 9 is also an indicator of the need for timely, accurate communications between 
C2 Facilities. Once again, Target Information is a prime example. The HAWK (TCO) 
cannot react to a track very well if the TAOC does not identify to them the presence of a 
possible target and the classification of the target. 
The information contained in matrix 9 combined with information from Matrix 1, C2 
FACILITY TO ACTIVITY, Matrix 2, INTELLIGENCE TO ACTIVITY, Matrix 6, 
INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, and Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT, identify 
the need for timely, accurate communications within the TBMD system. This combination 
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of matrices also is an indication of how large a role information plays in the entire process. 
Finally, Matrix 1, Matrix 2, Matrix 9, and Matrix 10 form the foundation for the analysis of 
the model. 
E.3.10 MATRIX 10: OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT 
Matrix 10 is used to identify which outputs are communicated through which types 
of equipment. Also, the matrix is used to identify the role of equipment in the flow of 
information. The matrix is complex because it presents the many possible relationships that 
may exist between outputs and equipment. If an output is communicated through a piece of 
equipment it is received (R), transmitted (T), processed (P), displayed (D) or all (A) of the 
above. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in 
the intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Matrix 10, like Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, demonstrates the 
problem of equipment redundancy. For all, but two, of the outputs there are at least two or 
as many as thirteen pieces of equipment that are used to facilitate communications. ID 
Threat information, for example, is capable of being received by ten separate pieces of 
equipment, displayed by eleven different pieces of equipment, processed by ten separate 
pieces of equipment, and transmitted by six different pieces of equipment. This is definitely 
equipment redundancy. 
Matrix 10, when combined with other matrices is also an indication of the problems 
associated with communicating information via more than one type of equipment. 
Launch/Impact Point is a simple example of this phenomenon. The Launch/Impact Point 
information is transmitted by the HAWK (TCO) and received, displayed and processed by 
the TAOC (SWD) and TAOC (SAAWC), Matrix 9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITIES. The 
HAWK (TCO) uses six different systems to transmit information while the TAOC (SWD) 
and the TAOC (SAAWC) have six, respectively, pieces of equipment that can receive 
information from the HAWK (TCO), Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY. Of the 
six pieces of equipment the HAWK (TCO) has, four can be found in either the TAOC 
(SWD) or the TAOC (SAAWC) or at both C2 Facilities. Also, both the TAOC (SWD) and 
the TAOC (SAAWC) process the information on different equipment. This means that the 
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HAWK (TCO) has to send the information out in more than one format in order for it to be 
useful. This is both time consuming and ineffective for all three C2 Facilities. 
E.3.11 MATRIX 11: EQUIPMENT TO TACC-COMM TYPE-TAOC 
Matrix 11 is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the relationship between information flow from the TACC to the 
TACO. This is accomplished by examining the types of equipment used by the two facilities 
to pass information. Either one of two relationships exists. Either the TACC transmits (T) 
or receives (R) information using the type of equipment or the TAOC receives or transmits 
information with the type of equipment. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or 
combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If the relationship does not exist, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine how the information is passed between two 
facilities. Once the relationship between equipment and the two C2 Facilities is established, 
then the relationship between the equipment and communication type can be examined. If 
there is a relationship between equipment and communication type, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
In the analysis of this matrix, there is a dual focus. The primary focus is on the type 
of equipment that passes information between the TACC and the TAOC. The secondary 
focus is on the communication type used by the equipment to pass the information. If a piece 
of information is communicated by more than one type of equipment, there may be an 
opportunity to reduce the number of systems that preform that function. This only holds true 
if the equipment is not mission essential (i.e., the removal of a piece of equipment does not 
hinder the effectiveness of the facility). 
When reviewing the equipment used to communicate information between the TACC 
and the TAOC, two topics need to be addressed. First, is there a communication problem 
due the equipment? Second, is there system redundancy? With the information contained 
in this matrix, combined with the information in Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, 
both questions can be answered. In order for the TACC to communicate with the TAOC 
both C2 Facilities have to be able to receive, transmit, process, and display information in 
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a timely, efficient manner. These qualities have to be present in order for the facilities to 
effectively carry out their missions. 
Both questions can be answered by citing one example. Both C2 Facilities have 
LAN/WAN capabilities present in their respective facilities. The LAN/WAN is capable of 
receiving and transmitting in the majority of the TACC commands. The ACE Battlestaff 
(COS) is the only one to have receiving, transmitting, and processing capabilities using the 
LAN/WAN, Matrix 3. In most cases, to display and process information, the TACC must 
use a separate piece of equipment. However, in the TAOC, only one command, the 
SAAWC, has LAN/WAN capabilities at all. Fortunately, it possesses all four capabilities, 
Matrix 3. Upon further inspection, the TACC also has four other types of equipment that can 
receive and transmit information and of those four only two can process and display the 
information. The TAOC, on the other hand, has five separate pieces of equipment that can 
receive, transmit, process, and display information, two pieces of equipment that can receive 
and transmit information, and two pieces of equipment that can display and process 
information. With all these systems available to each command, why is it that information 
can only be received and transmitted on one type of equipment and displayed and processed 
on another type of equipment? This is, of course, except for the five cases case where the 
ACE Battlestaff (ICO/TDC) communicates with the TAOC(SAAWC), Matrix 6, 
INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY. There is system redundancy present in this instance 
(the two facilities both contain six separate pieces of equipment). However, the problem is 
that the equipment is not being used to it's fullest capabilities. This effects timeliness 
(receive and transmit on one type of equipment then display and process on another piece 
of equipment), efficiency (time is lost due to the switch in equipment during the display and 
process phases), and information adequacy (information can be received in a number of 
different formats over several different pieces of equipment). It also affects the decision 
making process by not providing adequate information in a timely manner. 
When reviewing the communication types used by equipment to pass information 
between the TACC and the TAOC, two topics need to be addressed. First, does the 
communication type effect the format of the information? Second, is one communication 
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type better for transmitting and receiving information? With the information contained in 
this matrix, combined with the information in Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, 
Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, Matrix 5, COMMUNICATION 
TYPE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, and Matrix 8, 
INTELLIGENCE TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, these questions can be addressed. In 
order for the TACC and the TAOC to communicate effectively, information has to be passed 
in a format that is conducive to timely, efficient processing. 
In Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, it is shown that the type of 
equipment has a direct effect on the format of information. Given this, and since Matrix 4, 
EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, displays the relationship that exists between 
equipment and communication type, then it holds true that the communication type will have 
a direct effect on the information format. 
Using an example from Matrix 7, it is possible that IPBDB Info can be received by 
the TAOC (SAAWC) from five separate TACC commands, (Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO 
C2 FACILITY), over five separate pieces of equipment, (Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 
FACILITY). From Matrix 11, over those five pieces of equipment, it is possible that the 
information could be received using one of three different communication modes. This 
information, being transmitted in five different formats, using three communication modes 
and being displayed on four possible mediums, has to be correlated and processed. If that 
were not enough, the processed information has to be broken down (transformed) and 
transmitted out of the TAOC (SAAWC) to the proper C2 Facilities in the appropriate format. 
This is a representation of efficiency problems, formatting problems, processing problems, 
and ultimately, decision making problems. 
By examining the information contained in this matrix and combining it with 
information in Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, the second question can be 
addressed. The TACC and the TAOC, in the majority of instances, would use the 
LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem or Tactical Radio to receive and transmit information, (Matrix 
3). The LAN/WAN and Tactical Modem use landline and radio as their communication 
mode and Tactical Radio uses radio as its communication mode, (Matrix 11). There is no 
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way to decipher if one communication type or another is better. More than likely both types 
are used.    For example, one form, radio, would be used as the primary means to 
communicate, while the other, landline, would be used as the backup. 
E.3.12 MATRIX 12: EQUIPMENT TO TAOC-COMM TYPE-BCP 
Matrix 12 is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
this matrix examines the relationship between information flow from the TAOC to the BCP. 
This is accomplished by examining the types of equipment used by the two facilities to pass 
information. Either one of two relationships exists. Either the TAOC transmits (T) or 
receives (R) information using the type of equipment or the BCP receives or transmits 
information with the type of equipment. If the relationship exists, the appropriate letter or 
combination of letters is placed in the intersecting box. If the relationship does not exist, the 
intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine how the information is passed between two 
facilities. Once the relationship between equipment and the two C2 Facilities is established, 
then the relationship between the equipment and communication type can be examined. If 
there is a relationship between equipment and communication type, an (X) is placed in the 
intersecting box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
In the analysis of this matrix, there is a dual focus. The primary focus is on the type 
of equipment that passes information between the TAOC and the BCP. The secondary focus 
is on the communication type used by the equipment to pass the information. If a piece of 
information is communicated by more than one type of equipment, there may be an 
opportunity to reduce the number of systems that preform that function. This only holds true 
if the equipment is not mission essential (i.e., the removal of a piece of equipment does not 
hinder the effectiveness of the facility). 
When reviewing the equipment used to communicate information between the TAOC 
and the BCP, two topics need to be addressed. First, does the piece of equipment used to 
communicate information matter? Second, is there system redundancy? With the 
information contained in this matrix, combined with the information in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, both questions can be answered. In order for the TAOC 
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to communicate with the BCP both C2 Facilities have to be able to receive, transmit, process, 
and display information in a timely, efficient manner. These qualities have to be present in 
order for the facilities to effectively carry out their missions. 
Both questions can be answered by citing one example. Both C2 Facilities have 
LAN/WAN capabilities present in their respective facilities. The LAN/WAN is capable of 
receiving and transmitting in the majority of the TAOC commands. The TAOC (SAAWC) 
is the only one to have receiving, transmitting, displaying, and processing capabilities using 
the LAN/WAN, (Matrix 3). In the BCP, only the HAWK (TCO) has LAN/WAN 
capabilities. Unfortunately, it possesses only three (receive, transmit and process) of the four 
capabilities, (Matrix 3). In order to display information received, the HAWK (TCO) has to 
use another piece of equipment. Upon further inspection, of the nine pieces of equipment 
available to the TAOC, five pieces of equipment can receive, transmit, process, and display 
information, two pieces of equipment can receive and transmit information, and two pieces 
of equipment can display and process information. The BCP, on the other hand, has three 
additional pieces of equipment that can receive, transmit, display, and process information, 
two pieces of equipment that are capable of receiving and transmitting information, and one 
piece of equipment that can display and process information, (Matrix 3). With all these 
systems available to each command, why is it that information is, except for when the TAOC 
(SAAWC) communicates with the HAWK (TCO), (Matrix 6), received and transmitted on 
three types of equipment and displayed and processed on two other piece of equipment? The 
answer is system redundancy present in this instance (the two facilities contain four of the 
same type of equipment and five different types of equipment). However, the problem is that 
the equipment is not being used to it's fullest capabilities. This effects timeliness (receive 
and transmit on one type of equipment then display and process on another piece of 
equipment), efficiency (time is lost due to the switch in equipment during the display and 
process phases), and information adequacy (information can be received in a number of 
different formats over several different pieces of equipment). It also affects the decision 
making process by not providing adequate information in a timely manner. 
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When reviewing communication type used by the equipment to pass information 
between the TAOC and the BCP, two topics need to be addressed. First, does the 
communication type effect the format of the information? Second, is one communication 
mode better for transmitting and receiving information? With the information contained in 
this matrix, combined with the information in Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, 
Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, Matrix 5, COMMUNICATION 
TYPE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, and Matrix 8, 
INTELLIGENCE TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, these questions can be addressed. In 
order for the TAOC and the BCP to communicate effectively, information has to be passed 
in a format that is conducive to timely, efficient processing. 
In Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, it is shown that the type of 
equipment has a direct effect on the format of information. Given this, and since Matrix 4, 
EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, displays the relationship that exists between 
equipment and communication type, then it holds true that the communication mode will 
have a direct effect on the information format. 
Using an example from Matrix 7, it is possible that Track (AN/TPS-59 Data) 
intelligence can be received by the BCP from four separate TAOC commands, (Matrix 6, 
INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY), over five separate pieces of equipment, (Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY). From Matrix 11, over those four pieces of equipment, 
it is possible that the information could be received using one of two communication types. 
This information, being transmitted in five different formats, using two communication types 
and being displayed on three possible mediums, has to be correlated and processed. If that 
were not enough, the processed information has to be broken down (transformed) and 
transmitted out of the BCP to the proper C2 Facilities in the appropriate format. This is a 
representation of efficiency problems, formatting problems, processing problems, and 
ultimately, decision making problems. 
By examining the information contained in this matrix and combining it with 
information in Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, the second question can be 
addressed. The TAOC and the BCP, in the majority of instances, would used the ATDL-1, 
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LAN/WAN, or Tactical Radio to receive and transmit information, (Matrix 3). The ATDL-1 
and LAN/WAN use landline and radio as their communication type and Tactical Radio uses 
radio as its communication type, (Matrix 11). There is no way to decipher if one 
communication type or another is better. More than likely both modes are used. For 
example, one form, radio, would be used as the primary means to communicate, while the 
other, landline, would be used as the backup. 
E.3.13 MATRIX 13: INTELLIGENCE TO TACC-EQUIPMENT-TAOC 
Matrix 13 is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
the matrix examines the flow of intelligence between the TACC and the TAOC. This is 
accomplished by examining the types of intelligence used by the two facilities both 
separately and combined. Either one of two relationships exists. The TACC either transmits 
(T) or receives (R) intelligence or the TAOC transmits or receives intelligence. If the 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine the relationship between intelligence and the 
type of equipment used to communicate the intelligence to or from the two facilities. This 
matrix also examines the type of equipment located at the two facilities. Once the 
relationship between the piece of intelligence and the two facilities is established, then the 
relationship between the intelligence, equipment, and the facility can be examined. If there 
is a relationship between intelligence an equipment type, and (X) is placed in the intersecting 
box if the equipment is located in the TACC or a (Y) is placed in the intersecting box if the 
equipment is located in the TAOC. There is also the possibility that the equipment is located 
in both facilities. If this is true, than a combination of the two letters will appear in the 
intersecting box. If there is no relationship, the intersecting box is left blank. 
In the analysis of this matrix, there is a dual focus. The primary focus is on the 
systems that pass intelligence between the TACC and the TAOC. The secondary focus is 
on the intelligence flow between the two facilities. If a piece of intelligence is 
communicated by more than one type of equipment, there may be an opportunity to reduce 
the number of systems that preform that function. This only holds true if the equipment is 
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not mission essential (i.e., the removal of a piece of equipment does not hinder the 
effectiveness of the facility). 
When reviewing the equipment used to communicate intelligence between the TACC 
and the TAOC two topics need to be addressed. First, does the equipment support the 
mission of the C2 Facility? Second, is the intelligence being received in a timely fashion? 
First, the missions of the two C2 facilities needs to be addressed. The TACC functions as 
the combat operations center for the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It is the senior agency within the Marine Air Command and 
Control System (MACCS) and as such, is responsible for the overall supervision, 
coordination, and control of tactical air operations in the Marine corps area of responsibility. 
The TACC supports three basic functions; Command, Operations, and Planning [Ref. 12]. 
The mission of the TAOC is to act as the senior air defense agency within its assigned sector 
of responsibility. The TAOC performs the functions of air surveillance and early warning, 
aircraft control, and controls all surface to air missile fires within its assigned sector [Ref. 
12]. With the information in this matrix and information contained in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 
9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, and Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT the 
questions can be answered. In order for the TACC to perform its mission it must be able to 
receive, display and process information from many different sources. At the same time, 
however, once the information is correlated, the TACC must be able to transmit this 
information to the TACC. 
Both questions can be addressed using the same example. Report (ESM) is a piece 
of intelligence that consist of information from many sources. Some of those sources are the 
GCE (FSCC), the GCE (FAC), the HAWK (TCO), Special Forces and Artillery, (Matrix 6). 
The information is transmitted to and from the TACC from the different sources via 
LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem and Tactical Radio, (Matrix 3). In almost all instances, 
however, the intelligence is processed and displayed by different pieces of equipment within 
the TACC. The JTF Commander, the ACE Battlestaff (MACCS(DASC)) and the ACE 
Commander process information on the PC and display information on the PC or manually, 
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(Matrix 3). On the other hand, the Commander (CAP) and the ACE Battlestaff (COS) 
display and process the Report (ESM) on the TADIL C and TADIL A and TADIL B 
respectively, (Matrix 3). This is an indication that information is not being processed and 
correlated in a timely fashion. Almost every command, located in the C2 Facility, is 
displaying and processing the same information on three and sometimes four different pieces 
of equipment. 
Once the information has been correlated it is sent to the TAOC by means of a 
LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem or Tactical Radio, (Matrix 13 and Matrix 3). This is a good 
example of the equipment (LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem and Tactical Radio) supporting the 
mission. It is also a case of system redundancy. There are three separate systems capable 
of doing the same function. 
There is another area of concern within this context. The TACC has within its 
boundaries the entire ACE Battlestaff, the JFC (Political Advisor), the JTF Commander, and 
the ACE Commander. With these commands come almost every piece of communications 
equipment in the TBMD architecture, (Matrix 3). However, these systems are not being used 
to their fullest advantage. Different types of equipment possess different capabilities within 
the confines of their respective C2 Facilities. For example, the ACE Battlestaff (COS) has 
TADIL A and TADIL B equipment, but the capabilities are limited to display and process. 
The same can be said for the TAOC. Even though the SAAWC is the only command within 
the TAOC receiving Report (ESM) information from the TACC, it is not using its TADIL 
capabilities to their fullest extent. Both of these examples demonstrate the lack of cohesion 
necessary to communicate data in a timely, efficient, adequate manner. Either the systems 
that exist need to be brought on-line to their fullest capabilities or they need to be replaced 
with a system that will provide timely, efficient, adequate communications between C2 
Facilities. 
In recognizing the flow of intelligence between the two facilities, two areas of 
concern are addressed by this matrix. First, who uses what pieces of intelligence? Second, 
is the intelligence received in a format that is conducive to efficient decision making? The 
first question is readily answered by the matrix. Every piece of intelligence is used by the 
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two facilities. The information that is needed by the TAOC to conduct its mission is 
transmitted by the TACC and received by the TAOC. Also, the intelligence necessary for 
two facilities to perform their mission is received and transmitted both ways. What is not 
apparent in the matrix is format that in which intelligence is received or transmitted. 
However, if careful attention is paid to the equipment type used to communicate the 
intelligence, it is clear that at least three and sometimes four different formats are used. The 
information in this matrix, combined with the information contained in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, 
and Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, will demonstrate the likelihood of what 
format is used in each case. 
For example, from the matrix, the intelligence, Threat Capabilities, is transmitted by 
the TACC and received and transmitted by the TAOC. It is also apparent (because the pieces 
of equipment are present at both facilities) that the information will be transmitted and 
received by one of three pieces of equipment, LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem or Tactical 
Radio. From Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, the LAN/WAN has the 
capabilities to receive, display, process, and transmit information, the Tactical Modem only 
has the capability to receive and transmit information, and the Tactical Radio only has the 
capability to receive and transmit information. This, therefore, narrows the choices of 
communication to LAN/WAN because of its full compliment of capabilities. Now, Matrix 
3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, shows that the TAOC (SAAWC), which is the 
command for the TAOC, receives, transmits, displays and processes information via the 
LAN/WAN. This shows that anything not transmitted via the LAN/WAN must be displayed 
by the PC, equipment inherent to the TAOM, or manually. Therefore, to conduct efficient 
communication between the TACC and TAOC, all intelligence and information must be 
transmitted and received via the LAN/WAN. Once again this also shows how inadequate 
the entire communications system is. 
E.3.14 MATRIX 14: INTELLIGENCE TO TAOC-EQUIPMENT-BCP 
Matrix 14 is used to demonstrate two separate two-dimensional relationships. First, 
the matrix examines the flow of intelligence between the TAOC and the BCP.  This is 
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accomplished by examining the types of intelligence used by the two facilities both 
separately and combined. Either one of two relationships exists. The TAOC either transmits 
(T) or receives (R) intelligence or the BCP transmits or receives intelligence. If the 
relationship exists, the appropriate letter or combination of letters is placed in the intersecting 
box. If no relationship exists, the intersecting box is left blank. 
Second, the matrix is used to examine the relationship between intelligence and the 
type of equipment used to communicate the intelligence to or from the two facilities. This 
matrix also examines the type of equipment located at the two facilities. Once the 
relationship between the piece of intelligence and the two facilities is established, then the 
relationship between the intelligence, equipment, and the facility can be examined. If there 
is a relationship between intelligence and equipment type, an (X) is placed in the intersecting 
box if the equipment is located in the TAOC or a (Y) is placed in the intersecting box if the 
equipment is located in the BCP. There is also the possibility that the equipment is located 
in both facilities. If this is true, a combination of the two letters will appear in the 
intersecting box. If there is no relationship, than the intersecting box is left blank. 
In the analysis of this matrix, there is a dual focus. The primary focus is on the 
systems that pass intelligence between the TAOC and the BCP. The secondary focus is on 
the intelligence flow between the two facilities. If a piece of intelligence is communicated 
by more than one type of equipment, there may be an opportunity to reduce the number of 
systems that preform that function. This only holds true if the equipment is not mission 
essential (i.e., the removal of a piece of equipment does not hinder the effectiveness of the 
facility). 
When reviewing the equipment used to communicate intelligence between the TAOC 
and the BCP two topics need to be addressed. First, does the equipment support the mission 
of the C2 Facility? Second, is the intelligence being received in a timely fashion? First, the 
missions of the two C2 facilities needs to be addressed. The mission of the TAOC is to act 
as the senior air defense agency within its assigned sector of responsibility. The TAOC 
performs the functions of air surveillance and early warning, aircraft control, and controls 
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all surface to air missile fires within its assigned sector [Ref. 12]. The mission of the BCP 
is to function as the control facility for the HAWK surface to air missile system [Ref. 12]. 
With the information in this matrix and information contained in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 6, INTELLIGENCE TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 
9, OUTPUTS TO C2 FACILITY, and Matrix 10, OUTPUTS TO EQUIPMENT the first 
question can be answered. In order for the TAOC to perform its mission it must be able to 
receive, display and process information from many different sources. At the same time, 
however, once the information is correlated, the TAOC must be able to transmit this 
information to the BCP. 
Report (Situation), for example, is a piece of intelligence that consist of information 
from many sources. Two of those sources are the ACE Commander and the ACE Battlestaff 
(FOS), (Matrix 6). The information is transmitted to the TAOC (SAAWC) via LAN/WAN 
and/or Tactical Modem, (Matrix 3). It can also come from the ACE Commander via the 
Tactical Radio, (Matrix 3). In both instances, however, the intelligence is processed by a PC 
and displayed either on the PC or manually, (Matrix 3). Once the information has been 
correlated it is sent to the BCP by means of a LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem or Tactical 
Radio, (Matrix 14 and Matrix 3). This is a good example of the equipment (LAN/WAN, 
Tactical Modem and Tactical Radio) supporting the mission. It is also a case of system 
redundancy. There are three separate systems capable of doing the same function. 
However, there is also an underlying factor to consider here. Both the TAOC and the 
BCP have the ATDL-1 equipment at their disposal. The BCP can receive, display, process, 
and transmit the Report (Situation) using the ATDL-1, (Matrix 3 and Matrix 14). The 
TAOC, on the other hand, can only receive and display Report (Situation) information using 
the ATDL-1. This is definitely a case of equipment not supporting the mission. The answer 
is to either eliminate the piece of equipment from both facilities or bring the process and 
transmit functions on-line at the TAOC. Note also, the TAOC has other equipment (TADIL 
A and TADIL B) at its site that has the same capabilities of receiving and displaying, (Matrix 
3). These systems are also available to the ACE Commander for display purposes only, 
(Matrix 3). Yet again there are systems that are not being used to their fullest extent. 
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The second question can be answered with another example. Target Identification 
information is being communicated back and forth (received and transmitted) between the 
TAOC and the BCP using five separate systems, (Matrix 3 and Matrix 14). However, this 
intelligence is being displayed and/or processed by seven and four pieces of equipment 
respectively, (Matrix 3). This is a clear indication that information is not being received in 
a useable format in a timely fashion. 
In recognizing the flow of intelligence between the two facilities, two areas of 
concern are addressed by this matrix. First, who uses what pieces of intelligence? Second, 
is the intelligence received in a format that is conducive to efficient decision making? The 
first question is readily answered by the matrix. Every piece of intelligence is used by the 
two facilities. The information that is needed by the BCP to conduct its mission is 
transmitted by the TAOC and received by the BCP. Also, the intelligence necessary for two 
facilities to perform their mission is received and transmitted both ways. What is not 
apparent in the matrix is format that in which intelligence is received or transmitted. 
However, if careful attention is paid to the equipment type used to communicate the 
intelligence, it is clear that at least three and sometimes four different formats are used. The 
information in this matrix, combined with the information contained in Matrix 3, 
EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, Matrix 4, EQUIPMENT TO COMMUNICATION TYPE, 
and Matrix 7, INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, will demonstrate the likelihood of what 
format is used in each case. 
For example, from the matrix, the intelligence, Threat Capabilities, is transmitted by 
the TAOC and received by the BCP. It is also apparent (because the pieces of equipment are 
present at both facilities) that the information will be transmitted and received by one of 
three pieces of equipment, LAN/WAN, Tactical Modem or Tactical Radio. From Matrix 7, 
INTELLIGENCE TO EQUIPMENT, the LAN/WAN has the capabilities to receive, display, 
process, and transmit information, the Tactical Modem only has the capability to receive and 
transmit information, and the Tactical Radio only has the capability to receive and transmit 
information. This, therefore, narrows the choices of communication to LAN/WAN because 
of its full complement of capabilities. Now, Matrix 3, EQUIPMENT TO C2 FACILITY, 
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shows that the HAWK (TCO), which is the C2 Facility for the BCP, only receives, transmits 
and processes information via the LAN/WAN. This means that the LAN/WAN, even though 
it is capable, cannot be used to display the intelligence in the BCP. The only display 
capability at the BCP is through equipment inherent to the BCP or through manual means. 
This is an indication of three things. First, the equipment at the BCP is not being used to its 
fullest capabilities. Second, extra time has to be spent at the BCP to display the intelligence 
received over the LAN/WAN. Third, redundancy of equipment does not necessarily mean 
that the capabilities remain the same. 
E.4 MATRIX SUMMARY 
Some general conclusions from the matrix analysis include the following: 
Because of the multitude of different equipment platforms located at each C2 
Facility, there is an inability to communicate in a timely, efficient, accurate 
means. In effect, because information is received and transmitted over these 
many types of equipment, the information is not and cannot be effectively 
displayed and process (correlated and fused) in a fashion conducive to 
effective decision making. 
Many types of identical equipment, even when located at two communicating 
C2 Facilities, do not perform the same functions. For reasons unknown, 
certain attributes of the equipment are either not employed or are not 
available at certain C2 Facilities. This necessitates the configurations seen 
in the "As Is" architecture. It has also lead to efficiency and accuracy 
problems in terms of information flow. 
Many different types of equipment, in the TBMD system, perform the same 
function. The enormity of the system and the lack of equipment attributes at 
certain facilities have lead to the fragileness of this systems and have 
hampered interoperability. There may be an opportunity to eliminate 
duplicate equipment and develop a target system that could ultimately result 
in more efficient communications within the TBMD system. 
Information flow (i.e., format, accuracy, timeliness, etc.) is very important 
within the TBMD system. Without the needed intelligence and additional 
information, C2 Facilities cannot effectively carry out their missions. 
However, the architecture is arranged in such a fashion, it actually hinders the 
flow of information between C2 Facilities. 
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In performing the matrix analysis, it was necessary to keep in mind some key factors 
that may be underlying causes of all the matrix findings: 
• The Marine Corps "As Is" TBMD architecture came about because of a 
deficiency identified during the Persian Gulf War. It was crucial to put into 
place a system that could deal with the problems associated with MAGTF 
operation against an enemy with Theater Missile capabilities. Once an initial 
system was in place, there exists an opportunity to refine the system to meet 
the needs of the Marine Corps. However, first, the system, any system, had 
to be in place. For the Marine Corps, the obvious choice, because of its 
system capabilities, was the HAWK Missile system. 
• Once the TBMD system was established, the associated problems could be 
dealt with as they were encountered. First, increase the HAWK Missile 
system capabilities to include TBMD. Second, increase the capabilities of 
the AN/TPS-59 radar to include complete coverage of the MAGTF's area of 
operations. Third, configure the TBMD system to ensure a seamless 
information architecture is established. Finally, ensure the TBMD system is 
configured to maximize interoperability. 
Overall, the matrix analysis merely confirmed many of the improvement 
opportunities that NCCOSC, MCCDC, and the author had identified prior to and during the 
activity and data modeling portions of the TBMD project. However, this does not downplay 
the importance of using matrix analysis as part of the TBMD project. It does confirm the 
existence of many challenges facing the TBMD community on the road to achieving a 
seamless information architecture. 
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APPENDIX F. USMC "TO BE" ARCHITECTURE 
A. USMC "TO BE" AAW/TMD HAWK CONFIGURATION 
The proposed "To Be" model is only one possible architecture for the Marine Corps' 
TMD system. The "To Be" model (Figure F.l) will mirror the "As Is" model except for three 
additions. First, The BCP will no longer be directly linked to the TAOC. Communications 
will be facilitated through an Air Defense Communication Platform (ADCP). The ADCP 
will be linked, via a LAN, Point-to-Point, and TADIL A, to the TAOC and other agencies. 
The next change will occur within the TAOC. A Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordination 
Operations Facility (SOF) will be located within the TAOC. The SOF will be linked, via a 
LAN, to the TAOM and the Operations Center. The final change will occur with the 
communication equipment. TADIL J will be introduced into the TACC, the TAOC, and the 
ADCP. The TAOC will add the TADIL J link to its components to facilitate communi- 
cations between itself, the TACC, friendly aircraft, and friendly forces. The TACC will no 
longer have a direct connection to other forces via TADIL A. It will, instead, add TADIL 
J to its communication components to facilitate communication with other agencies and with 
the TAOC. 
B. CONFIGURATION ADDITIONS 
1. Sector Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (SAAWC) Operations Facility 
(SOF) 
SOF was moved into the TAOC to manage functions once handled at the TACC and 
the TAOC. The idea of the SOF came from the Navy's SAAWC concept, however, the 
Marine Corps SAAWC coordinator is not the Commander. The SAAWC provides an 
interface between the TAOC weapons section, TACC Battle Staff, and adjacent AAW 
agencies. 
The SOF is responsible for initial and on going planning for near term air operation 
and for the management of air defense assets by: 
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Recommending ATO changes and SAW redeployment. 
Maintaining situation awareness. 
Directing the tailored application of allocated air defense assets to meet 
near term battle requirements. 
Coordinating air defense operations with other MAGTF air, surface, and 
ground operations. 
A sample of the SAAWC AAW Management tasks are as follows: 
Ensure ROE and target ID criteria are disseminated and strictly adhered to 
by weapons platforms and other AAW assets. 
Develop and maintain a thorough knowledge of number, types, locations 
and status of AAW assets allocated to assigned sectors and disseminate as 
appropriate. 
Coordinate with and brief higher adjacent and lower AAW agencies on an 
air defense plan for the assigned sector. 
Monitor the operational status of MACCS AAW agencies in the sector and 
direct/recommend system reconfiguration (to include movement) of assets to 
ensure optimum surveillance and weapons engagement functions are 
maintained. 
2. Air Defense Communication Platform (ADCP) 
The ADCP is a single configuration shelter capable of meeting the requirements for 
receiving and broadcasting air picture information for SHORAD units. The data will provide 
cuing/interface for Stinger, Avenger, LAV-AD (Light Armored Vehicle-Air Defense), and 
HAWK units. The ADCP serves as the interface between AN/TPS-59 and the HAWK fire 
unit for TBM defense. The ADCP will have five separate communications links. The most 
important of these will be the TADIL J link that permits direct communication between the 
ADCP, friendly aircraft, and other friendly forces. 
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For the TBM mission, the ADCP will transmit/receive TADIL J data for TBM only. 
The platform provides TADIL A receive, GBDL (Ground-Based Data Link), and IBDL 
(Intra-Battery Data Link) interfaces. Command and Control information, cueing 
information, and other information is provided between the TAOC and the ADCP via LAN 
and Point-to-Point links. This information is then provided to the BCP via a GBDL link, 
which in turn controls the HAWK Launcher via an IBDL link. 
Add the ADCP to receive TBM tracks from AN/TPS-59 radars; to filter 
geographically any TBM data of interest to HAWK batteries; to propagate TBM tracks in 
time and space; to perform coordinate conversion and data formatting functions; and to 
provide connectivity to the joint data network [Ref. 12]. 
The ADCP provides a mission planning capability for HAWK/LAAD (Low Altitude 
Air Defense) commanders (no automation currently exists in air defense for this function). 
Finally, the ADCP will provide a "Building Block" capability for the MAGTF Commander 
to tailor air defense assets to better support the mission. 
3. Tactical Digital Information Link J (TADIL J) 
TADIL J (Link 16) is part of a joint service system known as JTIDS. JTIDS is 
interoperable with USN/USAF/USA/USMC/United Kingdom/France and NATO terminals. 
TADIL J will become an important netted data link between most TMD platforms, other 
forces, and allies by the year 2002. It will provide increased throughput, security, jam 
resistance, grid accuracy, and interoperability. Link 16 is the U.S. Naval/North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology for sets of netted links which allow for the 
exchange of tactical information among ships and aircraft in digital format in accordance 
with protocols and standards set forth in Navy Operational Specification 516 and NATO's 
STANAG5516. 
JTIDS supports a number of information transfer requirements for TMD. For 
example: 
Track data on target position, position uncertainty, velocity, and velocity 
uncertainty. 
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Launch point estimation. 
Impact point and time of arrival. 





Engagement coordination and status. 
However, the most impressive aspect of JTIDS is the ability it gives to components 
of every service to possess the same digital display and voice communications system. This 
will facilitate communication throughout TMD's identify, track, and launch process. 
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AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
ABT Air Breathing Target 
ACE Air Combat Element 
ADCP Air Defense Communication Platform 
AEGIS Automatic Electronic Guided Intercept System 
AO Area of Operations 
BCP Battery Command Post 
BMC4I Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence 
C2 Command and Control 
C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intellige 
COMM Communications 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COS Command Operating Systems 
CWAR Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar 
DOD Department of Defense 
EMCON Emissions Control 
ESM Electronic Warfare Support Measures 
FCR Fire Control Radar 
FOS Family of Systems 
HAWK High Altitude Will Kill 
HF High Frequency 
HPI High Power Illuminator 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
IPBDB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Data Base 
JFC Joint Forces Commander 
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JTF Joint Task Force 
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
LAN Local Area Network 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Center 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
NATO North American Treaty Organization 
NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment 
NCCOSC Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center 
PAR Pulse Acquisition Radar 
PATRIOT Phase Array Tracking to Intercept of Target 
SAAWC Sector Anti-Air Warfare Center 
SM2 Standard Missile 2 
SOF Sector Anti-Air Warfare Center (SAAWC) Operations Facility 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
SWD Senior Weapons Director 
TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link 
TAC Tactical Air Commander 
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation Beacon 
TACC Tactical Air Command Center 
TAOC Tactical Air Operations Center 
TAOM Tactical Air Operations Module 
TBM Tactical Ballistic Missile 
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TCO Tactical Combat Operations 
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access 
THAAD Theater High Altitude Air Defense 
TMD Theater Missile Defense 
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UHF Ultra High Frequency 
WAN Wide Area Network 
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